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Abstract 
The literature has little to say about M&A activities in emerging markets, especially 
when firms from these countries acquire targets in developed economies, yet this 
growing tendency has manifested itself clearly in the global markets for corporate 
control over the last two decades. Unsurprisingly, our understanding of what underpins 
their decisions to venture into more advanced economies or whether they are able to 
create or destroy value is still limited. Using recent data on the emerging markets, we 
find emerging-markets acquirers tend to acquire small firms with a relatively low stock 
of intangible assets in developed economies. This finding is in accordance with the 
strategic market entry hypothesis, which states that acquirers aim to learn from more 
advanced markets through market entry and gradually consolidate their global 
competitive position in the long run. Nonetheless, no matter what their strategy really 
is, we find that it is unlikely to materialize in the long run, or at least in the course of 
three, four or five years. Expected synergies are likely to be overwhelmed by the strong 
nature of the value destruction of cross-border acquisitions and evident agency and 
hubris problems. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Background and motivation 
Over the last two decades, FDI flows from developing countries have increased rapidly 
(WIR, 2006). By 2010, investment outflow from developing countries accounted for one 
quarter of global FDI outflows (WIR, 2010). Naturally, investors from these countries 
have become increasingly important players in the global FDI outflow, a field that has 
been dominated by firms in developed economies.  The outlook for FDI outflows from 
these economies is also promising. WIR (2010) presents evidence suggesting that global 
FDI from these countries is likely to keep rising over the coming years (Figure 1).  
Figure 1-1: Shares of developing economies in global FDI 2000-2009 (in percent) 
 
Source: World investments report 2010, p.3 
In this rising trend, we observe an important feature of FDI flow from developing 
countries. The majority of investment outlays from developing countries is directed 
toward countries in the South, meaning investors in these countries tend to invest 
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among developing and transitional markets. Meanwhile, capital from developing 
economies is less likely to flow to more advanced economies (WIR, 2011).  
However, the FDI from developing to developed countries has grown rapidly over the 
last ten years. Since 2000, acquisition FDI from developing to more advanced economies 
in the West has shown a particularly fast growing trend (WIR, 2006). In fact, FDI 
outflows from developing and transition economies reached 388 billion USD in 2010 and 
increased strongly by 21 percent over 2009. They now account for 29 per cent of global 
FDI outflows. In 2010, six developing and transitional economies were among the top-20 
investors. In particular, emerging economies are increasingly dynamic in cross-border 
investments and are becoming the new FDI powerhouse (WIR, 2011). From our own 
collected sample (Figure 2) we can observe a steady rise of acquisition FDI until 2003, 
and the flow started to grow significantly afterwards. The volume of transactions 
reached its peak around 2007, when more than 40 billion USD of capital flowed from 
emerging to developed economies in the form of cross-border acquisitions.  
Figure 1-2: Deal value and number of M&A deal 
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Note: This figure shows the trend of acquisition FDI from emerging to developed 
economies in terms of total deal value and deal numbers across two decades. Source: 
Thomson One Banker Database 
The growing acquisition FDI in this direction is characterized by several interesting 
motivations. First, gaining access to intangible assets may determine the acquisitions go 
to more advanced economies (Amsden and Hikino, 1997; WIR, 2006; Guillen and Garcia-
Canas, 2009). Indeed, recent evidence indicates that Chinese acquirers are attracted by 
patents and trademarks of technologically advanced countries (Beule and Duanmu, 
2012). Secondly, acquirers from developing nations are more vulnerable to agency 
problems than their counterparts in developed countries (Kim, 2000). As a result, they 
are more likely to be driven by managerial interests and engage in unprofitable 
acquisitions. Furthermore, managerial motive may overwhelm the motive to gain access 
to advanced technology. The reason is that managers in developing countries may resist 
better technology when the human capital associated with current technology would 
become useless (Parente, 1994; Krusell and Rios-Rull, 1996). Nonetheless, Dunning 
(2000, 2008) argued that firms engaging in cross-border acquisitions must entail an 
ownership advantage of some sort. Guillen and Garcia-Canas (2009) show a list of 
advantages of developing market firms such as the quick adoption of new technology, 
political capabilities and cheap labour. They argue that these acquirers may be 
motivated by the exploitation of such ownership advantages, even though some may 
question whether the value of these intangibles is sufficient (Rugman & Li, 2007; Narula 
& Dunning, 2010). Therefore, in this growing trend of acquisition FDI there are potential 
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differences in the determinants of acquisition. To our knowledge, this issue has been 
neglected by current literature.  
It is likely that when the motivation changes, the wealth effects of acquisitions 
documented in the literature may change accordingly. However, the literature is really 
short of evidence about wealth effects on this growing trend. In a rare case, Kim (2000) 
finds that Korean acquirers are unable to create gains when acquiring firms in advanced 
economies. Another study by Kale (2000) provides empirical evidence on the wealth 
effects of Indian acquirers, but he fails to distinguish targets from developing and 
developed nations. Additionally, Boateng et al. (2008) recently claimed that their study 
is the first attempt which examines the wealth gains of Chinese firms in cross-border 
acquisitions. Similar to Kale (2004), this study does not separate targets in developing 
from developed countries. Moreover, their inferences, drawn upon a small sample of 27 
cases, are rather limited. Given the under-researched geographical region, one may 
argue that it is possible to use the enormous stock of empirical evidence in previous 
studies in the US and UK to draw insights for acquirers in developing countries. 
However, we argue that the remarkable differences between developing and developed 
regions may limit the extent to which existing results can be generalized. In brief, our 
knowledge about the wealth effects of acquisition FDI from developing countries is 
inadequate. Further empirical evidence is therefore necessary.  
Also on the issue of wealth effects, many previous studies are subject to major 
shortcomings in the methodology. A large number of studies used a single-index model 
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and short time frame in an attempt to capture the wealth effects. However, Jensen 
(1986) casts doubt that this model is unable to capture the pure effects of 
acquisitions. Coutt et al. (1996) further challenge the assumption of a single-index 
model. Other studies use the control firm approach advocated by Barber and Lyon 
(1997). However, this approach is compromised by a dimensionality problem1. Recent 
development in this methodological issue is the employment of propensity score 
matching in tandem with difference-in- differences technique. This combined approach 
is effective in mitigating selections on multiple observable characteristics and, to some 
extent, selections on unobservable characteristics (Girma et al., 2006; Blundell and 
Costa-Dias, 2000). To our knowledge, no previous study addressing acquisition FDI from 
developing countries employs such an approach. This provides us with an opportunity to 
produce evidence on the basis of a sound methodological framework.  
In this thesis, we take the above issues on the wealth effects, methodology and 
determinants of acquisitions into consideration. The aim of this thesis therefore is to 
undertake a systematic investigation of the determinants and consequences of cross-
border acquisitions from developing nations.  
1.2. Research questions 
This thesis aims to answer three questions. The first inquires about the motivation of 
acquiring firms in developing markets. Our objective is  to find which characterisics of 
1
 The dimensionality problem is described as the problem associated with matching upon three or more dimensions 
(each dimension represents one conditioning variable). In matching upon multiple dimensions, there can be too many 
candidates that can be used as the matched firm while there is no mechanism to define which one is the best match. 
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target firms attract bidders in developing countries. This helps us to shed more light on 
the explanatory power of existing theories on this growing trend of acquisition FDI. It is 
noted that the common and more direct method for this task is using logistic regression 
to find multivariate relationships between ex-ante bidders characteristics and the 
bidders probability of acquisition. However, such a method requires data on the 
characteristics of bidders before the acquisition events. As this type of data is very 
limited in emerging markets, it is not yet possible to examine large number of firm-level 
determinants. To overcome such limitations, we employ an indirect approach whereby 
we examine the characteristics of targeted firms in developed economies. Available 
firm-level data in developed markets can accomodate an investigation of more 
competing theories relating to the determinants of acquisition. Moreover, although we 
prefer to place emphasis on acquirers from emerging-markets throughout the thesis, we 
have to extend our sample in this question to include observation of firms acquired by 
bidders in other non-developed nations in order to meet the intensive data 
requirement.  
In the second question, we aim to answer what are the long-term wealth effects of 
acquisitions in advanced markets on emerging-markets acquirers? The last question 
naturally follows, where we examine whether any variation in these wealth effects can 
be explained on the basis of competing hypotheses of current literature. The final 
question investigates the motivation of acquirers in this growing trend of acquisition 
FDI. With regards to the examination of avearage wealth effects, although this issue has 
been previously examined (Rau and Vermaelen, 1997; Cakici et al., 1996; Bayazitova et 
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al., 2009), major debate about the methodological issue still remains. It has always been 
difficult to justify the abnormal returns estimation models used to isolate the pure 
effects of M&A on the acquirers performance long after the completion of the M&A 
(Jensen, 1986). In addition, the evidence regarding wealth effects for emerging-market 
(EM) acquirers, especially in the long run, is rather scant in the literature. It is even more 
difficult to find studies that specifically address EM bidders and DV2 targets. The lack of 
evidence is perhaps due to the fact that around 75% of FDI outflow from developing 
nations is directed to less developed economies (WIR, 2006), however the growing 
trend of acquisition FDI from developing nations (as shown in Figure 1) has not been 
reflected adequately in the academic literature. Given such shortcomings, the first essay 
aims to address the methodological issue and provide new evidence on the issue of 
long-run wealth effects.  
While the second question addresses the long-run wealth effects of cross-border M&A 
on the bidders performance on a sample average, the last one aims to find out what 
determines the wealth effect on a firm level? More specifically, we attempt to identify 
significant factors which underpin the variation of wealth effects across bidders in 
emerging countries. Since theoretical frameworks about the potential determinants and 
relevant empirical findings have been well documented in the literature, the main aim 
of the final essay is to seek potential firm-level determinants which are specific to the 
context involving capital flow from emerging to developed markets. The essay also aims 
to examine whether there are any differences in sign and magnitude of the 
2
 Targets located in developed economies. 
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determinants to existing results, especially when the wealth effects are measured within 
a more advanced methodological framework.  
1.3. Outline of the thesis 
This thesis consists of three essays. The first essay attempts to draw inferences about 
the motivation of acquirers by examining the characteristics of their targets (Chapter 2). 
The second essay examines the average wealth effects of M&A on the long-run stock 
performance of acquirers from emerging countries when they acquire firms in 
developed markets (Chapter 3). The final essay is a natural extension of the second, 
where we examine the firm-level determinants of long run abnormal returns in the 
same context (Chapter 4).  
In the first essay, we attempt to examine the motivation of acquirers from non-
developed countries when they acquire targets in developed countries. We extend the 
country group of acquiring firms from emerging to non-developed countries and employ 
an indirect approach to meet the data requirement. The indirect approach is used in the 
spirit of Zhu et al., (2011) and Thompson (1997), where the motivation of the acquirer 
can be withdrawn via a multivariate comparison of the targets characteristics among 
component groups. More specifically, we use a multinomial logistic regression method 
to compare theoretical variables determining the decision to acquire a target in a 
particular group. The empirical results allow us to learn which one among the competing 
theories relating to acquisition motives is suitable for the context of this investigation. 
We find no evidence supporting the conventional market for corporate control (MCC) 
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hypothesis, as previous work often does. We find that acquirers in non-developed 
markets generally aim at small firms with a relatively low stock of intangibles compared 
with the corresponding industry average. This evidence is consistent with the Strategic 
Market Entry hypothesis, which posits that the primary motive of an acquirer is to 
expose itself into an advanced business environment and gradually build up ownership 
advantages for competition in the long run. 
In the second essay, we argue that the rising trend of outward FDI from emerging to 
developed countries in the form of mergers and acquisitions has not been reflected 
adequately in the literature, even though large volume of studies documented in the 
literature involve acquirers from advanced economies. We also argue that the most 
important issue for this type of study lies in the methodological framework.  Against this 
background, we seek to provide better treatment for the estimation of the abnormal 
return of the acquirer by employing a combination of propensity score matching and 
difference-in-differences technique. As such, a combined method can effectively deal 
with selections on observables and unobservables, and we are confident we can draw a 
conclusion about the strong nature of the value destruction of acquisition events 
regarding the acquirers long-run performance in this particular context.   
While the second essay examines the weighted average wealth effects, the final one 
naturally follows with an examination of the determinants of the variation of wealth 
effects across acquisition events. In this firm-level investigation, we include a broad set 
of firm-level, industry-level and macroeconomic explanatory variables that potentially 
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exert significant influence on the estimated abnormal returns. Before that, the 
abnormal returns are estimated within various matching frameworks in order to 
increase the robustness of the empirical findings. We analyze the multivariate 
relationships and find evidence suggesting that diminishing abnormal returns are 
attributed to significant agency problems, while larger acquirers might use the 
incremental economies of scale generated from acquired assets to partially compromise 
the negative effects of acquisition events.    
10 
 
Chapter 2: Motivation of non-developed market acquirers 
2.1. Introduction 
Acquisition FDI from emerging to developed countries has increased rapidly over the 
last two decades. Yet, little is known about the motivation of acquirers from  emerging 
economies. , yet. Recent studies (e.g. Guillen and Garcia-Canas, 2009; Grimpe and 
Hussinger, 2009; Mathew, 2006) posit that the main motivation acquirer in this specific 
context is to upgrade their technological capabilities and gain new experience by 
exposing themselves to the sophisticated and cutting edge demand. In other words, the 
lack of core skills in modern production such as advanced technology and management 
expertise boost their incentive for such assets in developed countries (Rui and Yip, 2008; 
Guillen and Garcia-Canas, 2009). This proposition is interesting, as it suggests different 
motives to disciplining inefficient management which is widely documented in the 
literature (Zhu et al., 2011; Dunning, 2000; Thompson, 1997). Nonetheless, this 
proposition is only backed up by scant empirical evidence.  
We therefore conduct an empirical investigation of the acquirers motive. This study 
essentially compares various characteristics of non-acquired firms to those of acquired 
firms in order to detect firm-level characteristics of targets in developed countries which 
attract acquisitions from non-developed countries. We hypothesize that if the motive of 
the non-developed market bidders is strategic market entry (i.e. they look for resources 
and growth rather than to replace underperforming management), their targets should 
have better performance, richer resources and greater potential growth than non-
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targets and the targets of developed market bidders. We examine these hypotheses 
within a multinomial logistic regression framework and use a relatively large sample 
consisting of more than 23000 targets located across 20 developed markets and a wide 
range of industries. The acquired firms are divided into three groups: (1) firms acquired 
by acquirers in non-developed nations (ND targets), (2) ones acquired by acquirers in 
developed markets (DV targets), and (3) non-targets to fit the methodological 
framework of this study. 
We find that ND targets are consistently and significantly smaller in size compared to DV 
targets and non-targets. This finding is consistent with the strategic market entry 
theory, since acquiring small targets allows for the easy and quick access to quality 
resources. In addition, we find evidence that acquirers in non-developed markets aim at 
firms with lower total factor productivity (TFP) than that of the industry median. This 
finding suggests that there is a threshold level of a targets technology that acquirers in 
less developed countries do not wish to breach, perhaps due to problems associated 
with a substantial technology gap. Finally, we find no evidence supporting the market 
for corporate control hypothesis.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews relevant theories 
and presents our hypotheses, and then the following section describes the methodology 
and data for this examination, before the empirical results are then presented and 
discussed. The final section summarizes this essay. 
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2.2. Theoretical framework 
We find in three alternative theoretical frameworks that explain the motivations of 
acquirers in cross-border acquisitions in the literature, including: (1) the ownership 
advantages paradigm (Dunning, 2000); (2) the Linkage-Leverage-Learning theory 
(Mathew, 2006), and (3) theories concerning the incentive to gain access to strategic 
assets (Athreye and Kapur, 2009; Guillen and Garcia-Canal, 2009; Rui and Yip, 2008; 
Gattai et al., 2010) 
2.2.1. Classical theories 
2.2.1.1. Ownership advantages paradigm 
In an earlier study, Jensen and Ruback (1983) presented a view of the takeover market 
as an arena where management teams compete for the control rights of a firms 
resources. In this market, poorly performed incumbent management is replaced by a 
better team. From this perspective, the general motivation of acquisition is to find and 
discipline a management team with a bad track record. In other words, acquiring firms 
are motivated by exploiting their superior management quality on potential targets. 
From a slightly different perspective but consistent with Jensen and Ruback (1983), 
several studies argue that underperforming firms are vulnerable to takeovers (Maine, 
1965; Davis and Stout, 1992). For instance, Maine (1965) argues that the stock price of a 
public corporation is the only objective evaluation of management quality. As the stock 
price dips lower, it creates a stronger incentive for more competent managers who are 
capable of driving the price back up (Davis and Stout, 1995). These two arguments fit 
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well in the view of M&A as an arena for corporate control, because one argues that 
acquirers tend to have the power to improve performance while the other argues that 
targets are usually underperforming.  
In a later study, Dunning (2000, p.164) theorizes that specific competitive advantages of 
the firm are the key determinants in their decision for foreign expansion since such 
advantages can set their firms on the favourable side of market imperfection. 
Conventional literature has identified three main types of competitive advantages. First 
is the possession of monopoly power that blocks other competitors from the entry of 
certain market segments (Caves 1982; Porter, 1985). Second, possession of special 
resources and capabilities that allow the firm to achieve superior technical efficiency 
compared to competitors is another important competitive advantage (Safarian, 1966). 
Third is the quality or competencies of the firms managers. Quality managers who are 
able to harness external resources and align them with existing resources in a way that 
best advances the interest of the firm can certainly put their firms ahead of competitors 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993). With the possession of these types of competitive 
advantages, firms can either exploit their monopoly power or take advantage of their 
superiority in technical efficiency and management quality in their expansion into 
foreign countries. In other words, the motivation of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
activities, according to Dunning (2000), is to exploit the ownership advantages of some 
fundamental elements of the production process. These traditional studies form a 
strong theoretical framework to explain the motive of acquiring firms in takeover 
markets.  
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Indeed, a number of examinations of the market for corporate control hypothesis have 
been conducted in the literature (Singh, 1975; Cosh et. al. 1980; Thompson, 1997; Zhu 
et al., 2011). For example, Zhu et al. find that unprofitable firms in emerging markets are 
more likely to be targets of domestic rather than cross-border takeovers. They argue 
that domestic acquirers share a business, culture and legal environment with the targets 
which gives them more information to detect poorly managed targets and also causes 
lower integration costs than foreign raiders.  
However, these studies only focus on the domestic acquisitions, and mostly on the 
developed markets. Little is known about the motivation of acquiring firms in non-
developed countries. The key ownership advantages such as advanced technology, 
superior management quality and monopoly power are more likely to pertain to firms in 
developed countries than to ones in emerging markets. Emerging-market firms might 
have competitive advantages of their own, however we have little knowledge about 
whether such advantages are of significant value when they venture abroad.  
2.2.1.2. Incentive for strategic assets 
As an alternative to the OLI (Ownership-Location-Internalization) paradigm, reverse 
internalization can be used to explain the motive of cross-border acquisitions. According 
to the this framework, acquirers are motivated by the skills and resources of target firms 
since they are convinced that such assets would enhance the overall expertise and 
resources of combined firms, therefore creating imperfections and new investment 
opportunities in their home markets (Seth et al., 2000; Eun et al., 1996). Consistently, 
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Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) argue that acquirers may pursue acquisitions to 
capitalize on monopoly rents or internalize actions that are costly to transact through 
the market mechanism (due to incomplete contract problems). In line with these 
studies, we argue that acquirers may well be motivated by the potential access to 
strategic assets, as such assets hold the key to enhanced competitive advantages.  
In fact, the literature highlights several crucial benefits of gaining access to strategic 
assets. One of the benefits of acquiring strategic assets such as R&D is that substantial 
fixed R&D costs can be spread over a number of national markets, thereby generating 
greater economies of scale. In addition, assets such as proprietary technology, privileged 
access to inputs, efficient distribution system and capability to differentiate products 
and services can be used to exploit or even create market imperfections, thus enhancing 
the competitive advantages of the acquirers (Bain, 1956). Gaining control of these 
advantages may lead to an improvement of operational efficiency, enhancement of 
market shares and upgraded capability to cope with continual changes in the business 
environment (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2009).  
Furthermore, acquired technological assets can be complementary to a bidders existing 
assets. The combination of external technologies and in-house research and 
development may have positive influences on firm performance and growth since the 
combined assets can help to speed up the research-to-market process and add 
attractive features to existing products and services (Kogut and Zander, 1992). The 
combination also facilitates the extension of a customer base and distribution network, 
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thus an increase in revenues by selling their products and services to the targets existing 
customers (Graebner, 2004; Raft and Lord, 2002). For instance, acquiring firms may use 
the sales network of the acquired target to extend the distribution network of their 
existing products (as was the case when Lenovo purchased the laptop manufacturing 
section of IBM), thereby increasing their market shares and enhancing their competitive 
positions in global markets (Capron et al., 1998).  
Besides technological capability, quality human capital of the target firm is also crucial in 
streamlining the management system of the poorly managed acquirers. Morck and 
Yeung (1991) argue that the skills and expertise of the acquired firms management can 
be deployed in a larger scale for scale economies. The existing human capital of the 
acquirer may as well be enhanced since the incumbent managers may learn from the 
targets managers, or these managers may even train the acquirers managers (Capron et 
al., 1998).  
Acquiring strategic assets may also represent the strategic move of the acquiring firms 
to infiltrate certain high demand or technology-intensive industries. Holding a targets 
intellectual properties, on one hand, can help acquirers unblock the technology barrier 
of a new market (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2009; ODonoghue et al. 1998; Graff et al. 
2003). On the other hand, gaining access to important patents can prevent potential 
rivals from market entry and can also block them from future access to protected 
technology. According to Cohen et al. (2000), the reason for the ownership of 
international property rights (IPR) often extends beyond making a profit from the 
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acquired patents either through commercialization or licensing. Prevention of rival firms 
from patenting related invention is one of the most important motives of gaining IPR 
ownership. In consistence with Cohen et al. (2000), Blind et al. (2006) reiterate that the 
core motive of gaining control over technological assets is to block competitors. The 
endemic law suits among giant mobile phones manufacturers over the last decade 
clearly manifest the importance of seizing protected technology. Accordingly, control of 
intellectual property rights, especially patents, could be essential for the firm to 
maintain, consolidate and enhance their position in the technology market.  
Given the important benefits of the ownership of strategic assets, we argue that the 
rationale of reverse internalization theory is similar to that of the OLI paradigm since 
both theories hinge on the imperfections of product markets that the strategic assets 
create, the economies of scale of R&D fixed costs and the difficulties in transferring 
complex technology via market transactions. The difference between the two is the flow 
direction of knowledge. While strategic assets are transferred from acquirers to targets 
in the OLI paradigm, they are taken from the targets in the reverse internalization 
theory (Seth et al., 2000). Therefore, the reverse internalization theory appears to be 
more persuasive than the OLI paradigm in explaining acquisitions where bidders lack 
expertise and high quality resources.  
2.2.1.3. Linkage-Leverage-Learning (LLL) theory 
LLL theory is in sharp contrast to the OLI paradigm. It accommodates the incentives of 
the firms to possess the strategic assets. According to LLL theory (Mathew, 2006), an 
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alternative approach to internationalization is seeking resources from external entities 
that are unavailable in domestic markets. Mathew (2006) highlights two sources of 
competitive advantages. First, competitive advantages can be gained from reaching out 
to sources of knowledge in the foreign markets. Second, firms can also learn and 
improve efficiency from performing such tasks repeatedly. In other words, experience in 
learning-by-doing is the other source of advantage. Since the sources of advantage are 
not proprietary like intangible ownership advantages, the LLL theory may be more 
powerful than OLI in explaining the motivation of firms that lack initial resources in 
internationalization.  
2.2.2. Motivation of non-developed-market firms 
LLL theory and incentives for strategic assets appear more suitable in explaining the 
motivation of acquirers in non-developed markets in the takeovers of firms in 
developed countries for several reasons, including the mismatch between MCC and the 
profile of EM firms, the great incentives for strategic assets of EM acquirers, and the 
advantages of acquisition mode of entry in gaining access to quality resources.  
Mismatch between MCC theory and the profile of emerging-market firms 
Firstly, the market for corporate control view does not fit well with the ownership 
advantages of firms in non-developed countries. Ownership advantages of these firms, 
according to Guillen and Garcia (2009), mainly comprise adaptive capabilities in various 
political environments and the ability to gather a large army of labour in a short period 
of time. Meanwhile, their technology and management capabilities are still in the infant 
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stage. Their ownership advantages are therefore unlikely to make up for ownership 
disadvantages in the current stage of knowledge-based global market.  
In addition, non-developed market firms often invest a small stake of interest in foreign 
markets. The reason is that the ownership structure of firms in these markets is 
dominated by founding family members (Bhaumik et al., 2010), and some characteristics 
of family-controlled firms hinder the outward FDI, especially the FDI toward developed 
countries (Bhaumik and Driffield, 2011). Family-controlled firms have their own design 
of business model that has been proven to be successful in the local market, and as a 
result family members are reluctant to change their business model in the new business 
context (Gallo and Sveen, 1991). Moreover, families in control evidently expropriate 
returns that should have been accrued to minority shareholders (Baek et al., 2006; 
Bertrand et al., 2002). Such expropriation is protected by the dominance of family 
members in the ownership structure. However, undertaking cross-border acquisitions 
would require firms to subject themselves to a higher standard of due diligence and 
regulatory scrutiny, thus leading to the potential inability to extract private benefits. 
Accordingly, family members are reluctant to go ahead with the cross-border expansion 
(Bhaumik et al., 2010), so the main operation of these firms is likely to remain in local 
markets.  
Furthermore, emerging-market firms are subject to a more serious asymmetric 
information issue since firms among developed countries share a similar corporate 
culture and their markets have a long history of economic relationship. As a 
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consequence, emerging-market firms generally pay a higher cost for the liability of 
foreignness, thereby reducing the chance of success in the aftermath of the acquisitions.   
Bidders in emerging markets are also unlikely to be than firms in developed markets in 
corporate governance. The poor regulation rooted in emerging countries prevents 
investors from enforcing their monitoring rights. Poor corporate governance has been 
long withstanding in the emerging markets, and the call to reform existing governance 
practice has been amplified after the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 (Gibson, 2003). 
Gibson argues that the root of corporate governance issues in emerging countries is due 
to a special characteristic. That is the fact that the ownership of firms in these countries 
is closely held by a founding family who often does a bad job in enforcing the legal rights 
of the shareholders. This evidence suggests that the existence of family-type large 
shareholders is the main cause of inefficient corporate governance as managers might 
favour large shareholders at the expense of minority ones.  In an earlier study, La Porta 
et al. (2000) concluded that the strong legal protection of the investors is associated 
with effective corporate governance. As a consequence, La Porta argues that the lack of 
corporate governance is related to the agency problem described in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) because the inside managers are more likely to use profits of the firm 
to benefit themselves at the expense of investors. As a result, weak protection for 
investors and family ownership in emerging countries may entail higher agency costs 
compared with that in developed countries.  
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Finally other macroeconomics and political issues may prevent emerging-market firms 
from operating efficiently.  In a recent paper, Chernykh et al., (2010) argue that firms in 
emerging countries encounter more hurdles to achieve efficient operation in the global 
market such as government corruption and the high volatility of the business 
environment. In particular, the high costs of external financing in these markets could 
hinder these firms from pursuing growth opportunities 
In short, the profile of emerging-market firms is different from that of developed-
market firms. It features the lack of key competitive advantages, lack of capital 
commitment, lack of information and experience in advanced markets, and a wide range 
of hurdles that hinder efficient operation. This profile therefore does not match the 
market for corporate control and the ownership advantage theoretical framework.  
2.2.3. Motivation to gain access to strategic assets  
The motive to acquire strategic assets and learn new sources of competitive advantages 
seems to fit the expansion strategy of developing-market firms. Child and Rodrigues 
(2008) argue that the internationalization of Chinese firms is not characterized by the 
exploitation of competitive advantages but by addressing weaknesses incurred in 
operations in domestic markets. Additionally, non-developed bidders are latecomers in 
the international market for corporate control, who use overseas investment not only to 
lever their existing advantage but also to learn about new sources of competitive 
advantages (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991). As a result their primary motive is more 
likely to be building ownership advantages for a later stage of competition rather than 
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competing with developed market firms with their existing advantages (Mathews, 2006; 
Athreye and Kapur, 2009). Consistently, Guillen and Garcia-Canal (2009) theorize that 
the key feature of the expansion path into developed countries is for upgrading 
capabilities. They argue that latecomers must enter more advanced economies in order 
to expose themselves to sophisticated, cutting-edge demand and develop their 
capabilities. When targets are located in advanced economies, acquirers may 
voluntarily bootstrap themselves into a higher corporate governance standard of the 
target (Bhagat et al., 2011; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Khanna and Palepu, 
2004).  
Additionally, various studies indicate that the strategies of acquirers from non-
developed markets are different from those in developed countries. Instead of seeking 
outright improvement in operating efficiency, acquirers in India, for instance, seek 
strategic assets in cross-border acquisitions in order to facilitate the organizational 
transformation of their firms (Gubbi et al., 2010). Gubbi and colleagues argue that 
foreign acquisitions is an important mode of internationalization as it enables acquiring 
firms in emerging economies to gain access to critical assets of the target company 
when given the problems in the transactions of intangible assets and capabilities 
through market mechanisms. They went on to argue that critical assets from acquired 
firms in developed countries are especially more valuable since the advanced 
institutional environment in developed economies is a promised land for high quality 
resources. Along with Indian bidders, acquirers in China use cross-border acquisitions to 
gain access to strategic capabilities in order to leverage their particular type of 
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ownership advantages (Rui and Yip, 2008). According to Rui and Yip (2008), the 
ownership advantage of Chinese acquirers is chiefly the low cost of labour, whereas 
strategic assets in developed economies can leverage such an advantage. 
Finally, firms may seize control of certain technology to block access of their rivals or to 
unblock a technology barrier of a certain line of business. However, blocking rivals from 
accessing strategic technology is unlikely to be the core motive of bidders in non-
developed markets as they are still in the infant stage of technology development 
(World Bank, 2008) and their positions in technology-intensive markets might be far 
away from a monopoly or oligopoly. Rather, the motive seems to lean towards breaking 
the technology barrier of developed economies. Taking over firms in developed markets 
and controlling their ownership advantage in technology might serve as springboard 
for the acquirer to gradually consolidate their competitive positions in the global 
market. Luo and Tung (2007) find that emerging-market firms systematically and 
recursively acquire critical assets via international expansion. Therefore short term 
profitability might not be a priority for these firms as they may consider international 
markets as just learning laboratories which facilitate the transfer of knowledge-based 
capabilities across countries (Hitt et al., 1997; Almeida, 1996; Chang, 1995; Doz, Santos 
and Williams, 2001).  
With the above lines of arguments, we find the strategic market entry framework more 
persuasive in explaining the motivation of acquirers in non-developed markets.  
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2.2.4. Resources and entry strategies 
We argue in this section that if emerging-market firms are motivated by intangible 
resources then the acquisition mode of entry is more suitable than other modes due to 
several advantages that are pertinent to the institutions of target firms in developed 
economies. Firms can simply buy wanted resources in the foreign market, they can find 
local partners to form joint venture, or they can choose acquisitions. However, direct 
purchase of intangible assets from developed markets may be a costly transaction due 
to the tacitness of knowledge. Certain knowledge-based assets can only be transferred if 
experts of buying and selling parties interact directly in the form of learning by doing. 
Such transfer is either difficult to organize in cross-border transactions or very costly 
(Teece, 1977). As a result, transactions involving tacit knowledge may be more effective 
when they are internalized within an organization in the form of acquisition (Kogut and 
Zander, 1993; Meyer et al., 2009). In addition, owing to weak institutional enforcement 
in the protection of intellectual property rights in emerging countries, firms in the 
developed world might be reluctant to sell their intangible capabilities via a resources 
exchanges market for fear of incomplete contract problems (Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart and Moore, 2006; Gattai et al., 2010). Under such 
circumstances, acquisition is a more viable choice since it entitles acquirers with the 
control of residual rights of ownership and facilitates internalisation of the technology 
transfer.  
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The joint venture mode of entry also entails similar problem to incomplete contracts. 
When business partners invest substantially in specific resources, they are exposed to 
interdependencies and opportunistic behaviour (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; 
Brouthers et al., 2003). Weak institution in non-developed markets increases the 
severity of this threat, thus favouring the acquisition mode of entry.  
Besides the mentioned advantages of acquisitions, Rui and Yip (2008) argue that 
mergers and acquisitions is a preferred route for Chinese firms as they need to acquire 
multiple capabilities simultaneously (i.e. technological, managerial and marketing). 
These firms are also under increasing pressure to catch up with such capabilities of 
foreign competitors operating in China. Meanwhile, in-house research and development 
is not a quick alternative to building high quality technological resources given the 
limitations of the weak institutional environment in less developed countries. Therefore 
acquisition is a favourable route which meets various requirements in the expansion 
strategy of firms in non-developed markets. 
Following these lines of argument we have established a strong link between acquisition 
and a motivation for strategic assets, in that when acquirers are motivated by such 
assets they are more likely to use acquisition than other modes of entry. This theoretical 
link lends support to our main argument that the dominant motive of our context-
specific acquisitions is to gain access to strategic assets.  
In the next section, we present our hypotheses.  
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2.2.5. Hypothesis establishment 
2.2.5.1. Intangible assets  
Intangible assets embrace a wide variety of aspects, but technology and human capital 
are the cores of intangible assets (Kramer, 2011; Kaplan and Norton, 2004). In the 
previous section, we argue that firms in non-developed markets are primarily driven by 
strategic assets (i.e. technology and quality management) in the acquisitions of targets 
in developed countries. Accordingly, it is plausible to postulate a link that targets with a 
higher stock of intangible assets are more likely to be acquired by emerging market 
firms. Nonetheless, if acquirers in emerging countries are driven by external resources in 
more advanced markets they might as well take into account their limited absorptive 
capacity (due to the significant technology gap) and their lack of commitment in 
offshore investments. As a result, there might be a threshold in the level of technology 
under which acquirers in emerging countries can absorb intangible assets efficiently. 
Indeed, Chen and Su (1997) compare the characteristics of targets in cross-border and 
domestic acquisition in the US and find that cross-border targets tend to have lower 
R&D expenditures than that of domestic targets. This evidence indicates that non-US 
bidders do not target technology-intensive firms. Moreover, Archibugi and Pietrobelli 
(2003, p.98) find that from the side of the host countries, the technological activities of 
large foreign firms are most strongly established in fields of relative national weakness 
in Canada, France, Germany and USA.  
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Finally, second-class capabilities from advanced economies might be adequate for 
firms in non-developed countries. Besides the technology gap, the reason for this is that 
when developed-market firms venture into less developed markets they are unlikely to 
bring their best capabilities as they need to retain such assets in their own markets, 
where competition is fierce. Similarly, firms in non-developed markets may not require 
the latest technology from advanced countries to stay competitive in their local 
markets. One might argue that technological assets have public-good characteristics, 
therefore transferring such assets overseas may not weaken their competitive capacity 
at home. However, when transferring intangible assets overseas, especially to countries 
with weak enforcement of property rights, there is a significant risk that know-how and 
technologies can be leaked to their competitors. Furthermore, management capability 
in the form of human capital is not always a public-good asset since the best managers 
may wish to remain in a more competitive environment and are unwilling to relocate to 
less competitive markets.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
Developed-market targets with the value of intangible assets under a certain 
threshold level are more likely to be acquired by acquirers from non-developed 
markets.   
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2.2.5.2. Target size 
Besides limited absorptive capacity, acquirers in non-developed markets might also 
need to account for the high levels of risk in their strategic cross-border acquisitions. 
Mathew (2006) argues that small- and medium-sized firms motivated by external 
resources are exposed to high levels of risk in internationalization. They therefore tend 
to offset risks by choosing joint ventures and partnerships rather than wholly-owned 
subsidiaries as a mode of entry. This argument suggests that when facing a high level of 
uncertainties in cross-border transactions, firms lacking initial resources are likely to 
start with a small stake as they would avoid substantial loss when things go wrong. With 
low commitment in advanced markets, resource-driven acquirers from non-developed 
markets have two options when they plan to tap into more advanced markets. One is to 
acquire considerable shares of small targets, and two is to seize a small stake of 
ownership from large corporations. The second choice is less likely to grant the acquirer 
access to strategic resources, especially when such resources are intended for use in 
non-developed countries. Weak intellectual property rights protection in less developed 
countries often fails to guard against technology dissipation. As a result, target firms are 
unwilling to share technology and know-how for investors from the developing world. 
However, acquiring firms can force the target to transfer technology via acquisitions for 
control. When control rights of the firms are transferred from targets to acquirers, the 
acquirers, by definition gain access to all of the information available to incumbent 
targets management. Therefore, through acquisitions for the control of small firms 
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rather than the minority stake acquisition of a large target, acquirers may gain access to 
the key resources of the targets.  
In addition, target size has been the most persistent variable to distinguish acquired and 
non-acquired firms (Cosh et. al., 1989). The traditional negative relationship between 
target size and probability of acquisition is often associated with transaction costs view. 
Transaction costs cover expenses in the process of merging a targets assets into a 
bidders organization and the cost to deal with the defense mechanism activated by the 
targets management (Harris and Robinson, 2002; Palepu, 1986). These costs increase 
with the targets size and might escalate rapidly in the cross-border context, thereby 
leading to a decrease in the acquisition likelihood.  Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
Non-developed acquirers are more likely to aim at small firms in developed 
markets than non-acquirers and acquirers from developed countries.  
2.2.5.3. Control variables 
Operating performance 
Operating performance of the target firm has been associated with the motivation of 
the acquiring firms (Cosh et al., 1989; Palepu, 1986; Thompson, 1997; Zhu et al., 2011). 
The difference in performance between target and non-target may imply two different 
motives. According to the corporate control hypothesis, acquiring targets with a 
relatively low operating performance compared with that of the non-target suggests 
that acquirers are motivated by replacing the targets managers who fail to maximize the 
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firms value. Palepu (1986) find that inefficient firms in the US are more likely to become 
takeover targets. However, Palepu did not distinguish domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions, so the positive link between low performance and acquisition likelihood 
probably holds in domestic acquisition. Indeed, Zhu et al., (2011) examined the partial 
acquisition activity that involved targets in emerging countries and found that only 
domestic acquisitions lead to a significant increase in returns on assets (a popular proxy 
of operating performance). In cross-border acquisitions, however, Zhu and his 
colleagues find that acquirers are more likely to choose targets with good performance 
prior to the acquisition, perhaps because a strong performance record implies quality 
resources.  
Operating performance may not be an important discriminator between targets and 
general companies. In a study of UK markets for corporate control in the 1980s, Cosh et 
al. (1989) conclude that short/long-run profitability or stock return cannot discriminate 
targets from non-targets. Instead, they find that size remains the most important 
discriminator.  
Therefore profitability is a potential determinant of acquisition. However, whether it is 
significant or not depends on the markets where the acquisitions take place and on the 
type of acquisition (i.e. domestic or cross-border acquisition). Since we argue that the 
motive of acquirers in this study is to access quality resources in developed markets, it is 
plausible to hypothesize that more profitable targets (hence higher quality assets) are 
more likely to be acquired.  
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Market valuation  
Market valuation of target firms may be positively or negatively related to the 
probability of acquisition. On one hand, a low market-to-book ratio suggests the target 
is a cheap buy and has the potential to increase in value. Therefore, firms with low 
market valuation are more likely to be acquired (Palepu, 1986). On the other hand, a 
high market-to-book ratio may imply that firms have a great stock of intangible assets 
and investment opportunities (McNichols and Stubben, 2009), which makes the firms 
attractive to acquirers driven by gaining control of quality resources. In the context of 
this study, we argue that acquirers may be motivated by intangible assets, thus 
favouring high market-to-book targets. They may also be motivated by exposing 
themselves in the advanced markets and learning new capabilities in the form of 
practicing in developed countries. In the latter case, going for cheap firms could be a 
good start as it allows acquirers in less developed countries to quickly submerge into the 
new business environment. In brief, market valuation is a potential determinant of 
acquisition. However, we cannot speculate the sign of this variable in our theoretical 
model.  
Level of cash holding 
Cash is a cheap source of funding compared to alternative financial tools such as 
borrowing from financial institutions, issuing bonds or stock offering. Therefore cash-
rich firms are attractive in the acquisition market because acquirers can use the targets 
cash to finance their ongoing projects. Furthermore, by aiming at cash-rich firms, 
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bidders may use the targets cash to even partially finance the acquisition by using the 
resources of the target itself (Song and Walkling, 1993), thus increasing the chance of 
successful acquisition.  When acquirers have a limited source of financing such as 
companies from emerging markets, cash is even more important (Petrova and Shafter, 
2010). It is therefore plausible that the level of cash holding is a potential positive 
determinant of the acquisition decision.  
Growth rate and financial leverage 
Targets growth rate and financial leverage may affect the probability of acquisition in 
different ways. Low financial leverage implies high borrowing capacity which attracts 
bidders seeking financial resources. Safieddine and Titman (1999) find acquired firms 
have significantly lower financial leverage. Meanwhile, low growth indicates inefficient 
management (Palepu, 1986; Smith and Watts (1992). Therefore, targets with these 
characters are likely to be acquired. In addition, the mismatch between growth rate and 
financial slack can also determine acquisition probability. Targets that seize good 
investment opportunities but lack financial resources attract bidders with excessive 
financial slack as the combined firm can boost the shareholders value of both parties 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). As a result, growth rate and financial leverage are included in 
our model as control variables.  
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2.3. Methodology 
2.3.1. Examination of targets characteristics 
There are two different ways to examine the motivation for strategic assets of the 
acquiring firms. The first method is to find the characteristics that determine the 
difference between the target and non-target prior to the acquisition. Such 
characteristics can be firm size, leverage ratio, liquidity, growth, profitability, market-to-
book ratio, research and development expenditure and productivity. If, for example, a 
targets profitability is lower than that of the non-target, it would suggest that the 
motivation of the acquiring firm is to seek and replace inefficient management (Zhu et 
al., 2011; Thompson, 1997). Alternatively, we can compare and detect the difference in 
the characteristics of acquirer and non-acquirer in the same manner. For instance, if 
acquirers generally have a larger stock of intangible assets than that of the non-acquirer, 
it suggests that acquiring firms are motivated by exploiting their technological 
advantage in the new market. In this paper we follow the first route, since the target 
firms in our examination are located in developed countries. Better data availability in 
developed countries allows us to investigate and control for a wider range of 
characteristics. If we follow the second route, we can only investigate a few 
characteristics (e.g. firm size, market-to-book and cash ratio) because the firm level data 
of acquirers in non-developed countries are rather limited.  
34 
 
In brief, we examine the motive of acquiring firms by finding the characteristics that 
differentiate target and non-target in developed countries. Such an examination is 
conducted within a multinomial logistic regression methodological framework.  
2.3.2. Multinomial logistic regression approach 
2.3.2.1. Advantages of multinomial logistic regression 
The multinomial logistic regression technique is employed in this study because of its 
inherent advantages over alternative techniques such as OLS or linear discriminant 
function analysis. According to Tabachnick et al. (2001), this approach has three 
advantages: (1) it is more robust to violations of assumptions of multivariate normality 
concerning both dependent and independent variables; (2) it does not assume a linear 
relationship between independent and dependent variables; and (3) it does not assume 
normal distribution of the error term (Bayaga, 2010). Bayaga argues that this approach 
is better when the model comprises dichotomous variables or their distributions have 
fat tails, as these violate the normality assumption. Since our dependent variable is 
categorical in nature and our model considers both continuous and dichotomous 
independent variables, multinomial logistic regression would be more suitable for this 
investigation.  
2.3.2.2. The basics of multinomial logistic regression 
Our model specification is as follow:  
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ܲݎ݋ܾ ( ௜ܻ = ݆) = ܨ(ܫ݊ݐܾ݈ܽ݊݃݅݁, ݏ݅ݖ݁, ܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ) = ܨ( ௜ܺ) Eq. 2.1 
Where: 
݅ = {1 ݐ݋ ܰ} (N is the number of targets in the sample) 
௜ܻ: ݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁ ݋݂ ݀݁݌݁݊݀݁݊ݐ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁  
The dependent variable has three alternative outcomes (݆): 
݆ = 0: developed-market firm not acquired (non-target) 
݆ = 1: acquirer and target both located in developed markets 
݆ = 2: developed-market firm acquired by bidder from non-developed markets 
The probability of each alternative:  
ܲݎ݋ܾ ( ௜ܻ = 1) = exp (ߚଵ ௜ܺ)
1 + exp(ߚଵ ௜ܺ) + exp (ߚଶ ௜ܺ) 
ܲݎ݋ܾ ( ௜ܻ = 2) = exp (ߚଶ ௜ܺ)
1 + exp(ߚଵ ௜ܺ) + exp (ߚଶ ௜ܺ) 
ܲݎ݋ܾ ( ௜ܻ = 0) = 11 + exp(ߚଵ ௜ܺ) + exp (ߚଶ ௜ܺ) 
Thus, the odds of choosing alternative j over the basement alternative (j=0) is defined 
as: 
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௜ܲ௝௜ܲ଴ = ܲݎ݋ܾ ( ௜ܻ = 1)ܲݎ݋ܾ ( ௜ܻ = 0) =  exp (ߚ௝ ௜ܺ) 
The log odds ratio is then:  
݈݊ ൤ ௜ܲ௝௜ܲ଴൨ = ߚ௝ ௜ܺ  Eq. 2.2 
After the transformation, the logistic regression now bears a linear regression form. 
In essence, the multinomial logistic model is equivalent to a set of simultaneous 
binomial logistic regressions where the parameter vector (ߚ) are also estimated by a 
maximum likelihood technique (Green, 2000). The estimation procedure of multinomial 
logistic regression, by definition, yields two sets of parameters in case of three 
alternative outcomes of dependent variables. These two sets in this particular study are: 
(1) one that represents the difference between the characteristics of firms acquired by 
non-developed acquirers (j=2) and those of firms acquired by developed-market bidders 
(j=1); and (2) one that represents the difference between characteristics of firms 
acquired by non-developed markets (j=2) and those of non-targets (j=0). The basement 
alternative in this case is actually targets of non-developed markets firms (j=2) rather 
than the regular non-targets in developed countries (j=0). Statistical software (e.g. 
STATA) facilitates the switch of the basement alternative with ease. However, when 
switching the base category to one with very low frequency compared with other 
alternatives, the maximum likelihood procedure may have problems in estimating 
parameters. To overcome this problem, the multinomial logistic regression may need to 
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run twice, where the base category is in turn set to case j=0 then j=1 (as the frequencies 
of these alternatives are much higher). Additional evidence from pair-wise binomial 
logistic regressions are also included in this paper for robustness check.  
2.3.2.3. IIA assumption and multicollinearity issue 
In a multinomial logistic regression framework there is an implicit assumption that the 
odd between any pair of alternatives is independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). In 
this paper, this assumption means that the introduction of any alternative (0 or 1 or 2) 
does not change the pair-wise relative odd of the other alternatives. This issue is dealt 
with by the employment of a Hausman-type specification test which checks the violation 
of IIA assumption3.  
Another issue in the implementation of logistic regression is multicollinearity, which is 
perhaps inevitable in studies that include multiple financial ratios in the covariate 
vector. To deal with this issue, the literature of financial economics suggests that 
covariates should be included in the model on the ground of related theories rather 
than including all possible ratios and using a technique such as stepwise regression to 
resolve the collinearity problem (Thompson, 1997). The reason for this is that employing 
an entirely data-driven technique might yield unexplainable models or irrelevant 
relationships as the pair-wise regression may require a complicated transformation of 
variables in order to fit models to the data. This paper therefore tries to avoid such a 
passage and inclines to the selection of covariates upon theoretical models. The latter 
3
 See Hausman and McFadden (1984). 
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approach is also more suitable in identifying the motivation of acquirers while building a 
predictive model and will perhaps better serve the quest for the potential target. The 
multicollinearity is to be checked with the variance inflation factor (VIF) method.  
2.3.2.4. State-based vs. random-based sample  
With regards to data sampling, the literature offers two possibilities for the formation of 
the sample: random-based and state-based. In the state-based sample, the sample is a 
multiple of groups, each of which contains data of the target and several non-targets. 
Meanwhile, the random-based sample sets no limit on the number of non-targets in 
each group, making it substantially larger than the otherwise state-based sample. The 
state-based sample has been used in a number of studies which seek to build predictive 
models (Tsagkanos et. al., 2009; Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003; Palepu, 1986). The 
rationale of state-based sampling is that when the population is dominated by a certain 
state of acquisition (usually non-acquisition state) the logistic regression may yield 
imprecise estimates due to the dilution of information content. Therefore if the 
population is dominated by 0 (i.e. non-acquisition state), it will technically be very 
difficult and usually inefficient in the determination of characteristics that discriminate 
alternative acquisition states. As a result, under imbalanced circumstances using a 
state-based method can balance the alternative states of acquisition and produce more 
precise estimates (Palepu, 1986). However, this approach also implies that in balancing 
the sample there is a high probability that any target can enter the sample, which makes 
it unreliable to generalize on the population level (Thompson, 1997). Given this trade-
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off, we lean toward the random-based formation and use data of all of the publicly-
listed targets and non-targets in developed countries since the subsequent result from 
this formation is more generalizable. 
2.3.3. Control for fixed effects and outliers 
The nature of our sample involves cross-country, cross-industry data over a long period 
of time. We control for time fixed effects by including year dummies, as these variables 
can capture the difference in the dominant motive in different waves of mergers. We 
would also like to control both country and industry fixed effects. However, we also 
avoid introducing too many dummy variables into the equation since it causes a 
decrease in the degree of freedom, and as a result can negatively affect the power to 
detect differences. We therefore control for industry fixed effects and country fixed 
effects in separate model specifications. The industry dummies are derived on the basis 
of a one-digit SIC code since the classification on two- or more digits of SIC code 
dramatically reduces the number of firms in each industry, effectively cancelling out the 
control for industry fixed effects. To deal with the effects of outliers, this study uses a 
winsorization procedure to trim extreme values off continuous variables. More 
specifically, each continuous variable is sorted from high to low and 0.05% of the range 
at each upper or lower end is removed. This cut-off value is chosen so that the 
histograms of the continuous variables do not have fat tail.  In addition, in order to 
control for the impact of outliers in the non-target group we once again trim the sample 
with regard to firm size so that the minimum and maximum sizes of non-target group 
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stays within those of the target group. The latter strategy is adopted from a current 
study (Zhu, et. al., 2011) as it is in line with a norm that too big or too small firms are 
very unlikely to be acquired. 
2.3.4. Proxies of intangible assets 
As ownership of targets intangible assets is hypothesized to be one of the most 
important motives in cross-border acquisitions, we intend to use different proxies to 
test the effects of targets intangibles on the probability of being acquired. Due to the 
nature of intangibles the direct measure of this variable is generally not available. 
According to accounting principles, the intangible item only appears on a balance sheet 
if the firm has acquired something in the past and the difference in the market and book 
value of the target is booked as intangible. As a result the intangible item in the balance 
sheet does not include the intangible value of the acquirer itself before they engage in 
any acquisition. As a result, we consider three indirect measures of intangible that are 
widely used in the literature: technology inputs (R&D expenditure), technology outputs 
(number of patents), and the effects of technology (i.e. higher productivity) (Keller, 
2004). 
Each measure entails advantages and disadvantages in capturing the true value of a 
firms technology. For instance, R&D is a noisy measure of technology because 
innovation is a stochastic process, whilst R&D data is often captured at a certain point in 
time. Therefore current R&D expenditure might not accurately reflect the technology 
level of the firm. Moreover, R&D expenditure varies substantially across countries, 
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industries and agents, which may limit the comparability of technology levels among 
targets in the sample.  
Intangible assets can, alternatively, be measured as the number of patents owned by a 
firm. However, holding a large number of patents does not necessarily mean a high 
technology level as not all patents have the same value. In fact, a small number of 
patents account for most of the value of all patents. In addition, not all of the 
innovations are patented as some might lurk in the form of business know-how.  Finally, 
patents might be the observable tip of an iceberg, while the unobservable might be 
non-codifiable due to its intangible nature (Keller, 2004). 
Finally, total factor productivity (TFP) is a derived measure of technology. TFP, by 
definition, is the portion of output not explained by the amount of inputs used in 
production. TFP level is determined by how efficiently and intensely the inputs are 
utilized in production (Comin, 2006). This proxy is predicted on the basis of production 
outputs, inputs and intermediate goods (Levensohn and Petrin, 2003). As the physical 
quantities of these factors are generally unobservable, TFP is often estimated by using 
values of such physical quantities. As a result, TFP fails to distinguish between price 
mark-up and productivity level (Katayama et al., 2003). Given the drawback of the TFP 
measure, one possible strategy is to consider changes in TFP rather than TFP levels 
which can control for some spurious factors that rarely change over time (Keller, 
2004).  
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Since the data for the number of patents is not available, this paper uses R&D 
expenditure and TFP as the alternative proxies for intangible assets.  While R&D 
expenditure items can be picked up in annual financial statements, TFP requires more 
complicated steps to estimate.  
2.3.5. TFP estimation 
The estimation of production function has been one of the most common objects of 
interests for the economists (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2000). The major concern in the 
estimation is the potential correlation between unobserved productivity shocks and 
inputs level. The productivity shocks are unobservable by the econometrician but are 
observable by the firms. In response to positive productivity shocks firms are likely to 
increase the level of inputs. If the correlation between productivity shocks and inputs 
exists then using OLS will yield biased and inconsistent estimates. To resolve this 
simultaneity problem several approaches have been used in the literature, including a 
fixed effects estimator, investment proxy (Olley and Parks, 1996), intermediate inputs 
proxy (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) and GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 2000).  
This study follows the procedure of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), where intermediate 
input4 is used as a proxy to control for the unobserved correlation between productivity 
shocks and inputs. Levinsohn and Petrin (2000) illustrate that intermediate input can 
smoothly track the productivity shocks. In their words intermediate inputs will 
generally respond to the entire productivity term while investment may respond only to 
4
 Complete goods and services used in the production process. For instance, costs of fuel, electricity or materials 
expense (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2000). 
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the "news" in the unobserved term. Therefore the advantage of intermediate proxy 
compared to investments proxy as in Olley and Parks (1996) is that the former can 
capture the entire productivity shocks while the latter only deals with part of the shock, 
meaning that partial endogeneity still remains. The approach using instrumental 
variables to cope with endogeneity is an alternative, but finding one that both correlates 
with inputs and is orthogonal with productivity shock is a difficult task and valid 
instruments do not always exist. Finally, assuming productivity shocks are constant over 
time as in a fixed effects approach may be too much to ask (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2000).  
Although the literature has not settled on which method is the best in dealing with the 
simultaneity problem, Levinsohn and Petrins (2003) approach appears the most 
suitable one for this study for several reasons. First, it enables us to use more of the 
existing data as Olley and Parkss (1996) approach requires investment higher than zero 
to be valid, whilst dropping zero-investment firms dramatically reduces sample size and 
can lead to potential bias. Second, the intermediate inputs are also generally more 
available and more likely to be positive. Finally, finding instrumental variables in the 
context of limited data or unreasonably assuming fixed productivity shocks is not a 
preferred choice. Therefore, we employ Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)s approach and use 
firms material expense as the proxy for intermediate input.  
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimate total factor productivity based on the Cobb-
Douglas production function. If the intermediate input is used to control for simultaneity 
the function bears the following form:       
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ݕ௧ = ɴ଴ + ߚ௞݇௧ + ߚ௟݈௧ + ߚ௠݉௧ + ߱௧ + ߟ௧     Eq. 2.3 
Where: 
ݕ௧ is the logarithm of output which is value-added 
݈௧ is the logarithm of labour input 
݉௧ is the logarithm of immediate input (material expense) 
݇௧ is the logarithm of capital 
The error term has two components: ߱௧ and  ߟ௧.  ߟ௧ is uncorrelated with input choice. 
However, ߱௧ is correlated with input choice and unobservable by econometricians, thus 
causing a simultaneity problem. Ignoring ߱௧ yields inconsistent results in the estimation 
of production function (Levinsohn and Petrin (2004).  
Levinsohn and Petrin argue that ߱௧ is determined by capital and intermediate input: ߱௧ = ߱௧(݇௧ ,݉௧). Thus, we can rewrite Eq. 2-2:  
ݕ௧ = ߚ௟݈௧ + ߶௧(݇௧ ,݉௧) + ߟ௧ 
߶௧(݇௧ ,݉௧) = ɴ଴ + ߚ௞݇௧ + ߚ௠݉௧ + ߱௧(݇௧ ,݉௧) Eq. 2.4 
This model specification is then estimated with a value-added or gross revenue method 
(See Levinsohn and Petrin, 2004). However, we only proceed with the value added 
method as it yields significant parameters, therefore generating better TFP estimates.  
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2.3.6. Additional dummy variable: hightech 
We include an additional binary variable of hightech in the logistic regression. This 
variable is generated on the basis of the proxy of intangible assets (i.e. R&D expenditure 
or TFP), while fixing the year of acquisition and targets one-digit SIC code in an attempt 
to control for time and industry fixed effects. It receives value 1 if the target has above 
the median of intangible proxy and set to zero otherwise. In accordance with the 
theoretical framework, if the acquirer is motivated by the targets intangible assets they 
will be more likely to aim at high-tech firms in that industry. However, such a norm 
might be compatible with domestic acquisitions or cross-border acquisitions among 
developed economies. It might be a different case when acquirers and targets belong to 
different leagues in terms of technological capabilities. As the technology gap between 
developed-markets and non-developed-market firms are remarkable on average, 
attempt to control firms with a high value stock of intangible assets may inhibit the 
absorptive capacity of the acquirers. Inversely, acquiring firms with a lower stock of 
intangibles could be more manageable or less overwhelming for the acquirers in less 
developed countries. Therefore, we expect a negative effect of this binary variable on 
the probability of acquisition.  
It also noteworthy that hightech, despite being a supplement for the proxy of intangible 
assets, is more likely to capture the pattern of the acquirers motive than other 
continuous variables, especially in the cross-border context which involves a wide range 
of industries and countries and is across multiple periods of time. The intuitive reason is 
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that a simplified binary variable may be more effective in detecting patterns in a sample 
that embeds a great deal of complexity.  
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2.4. Data 
2.4.1. Data requirement for TFP estimation 
According to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), TFP estimation requires output, quantity of 
labour, capital and proxy for intermediate inputs. We use net sales to proxy output and 
the number of employees to measure of labour quantity. We also use the total net value 
of property, plant and equipment accounted for reserves for depreciation, depletion 
and amortization as a proxy for physical capital. Finally, an inventory of raw material5 is 
used as a proxy for intermediate input. Regarding the proxy for intermediate inputs, 
WorldScope database offers two choices: inventory of raw materials and material 
expense. The latter item is, by definition, perhaps a better proxy for intermediate inputs 
than the former as it represents the amount of raw material that has actually gone into 
the production process. However, screening for material expense reduces the sample 
size dramatically. It also breaks the well-perceived structure of population, where the 
US and UK usually have the greatest number of observations. Therefore we use raw 
material as a proxy for intermediate input and assume that the year-end balance of raw 
material inventory reflects the annual requirement of the firm.  
  
5
 RAW MATERIALS represent the inventory of raw materials or supplies which indirectly or directly enter into the 
production of finished goods (Worldscope database glossary). 
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Table 2.1: Distribution of firms in developed countries 
Country 
Number 
of firms 
Year 
Number of 
observation 
USA 4,840 1980-1990 8,628 
Japan 2,054 1991 4,169 
UK 1,805 1992 4,293 
Germany 697 1993 4,543 
France 679 1994 5,178 
Canada 551 1995 5,207 
Australia 506 1996 5,331 
Italy 311 1997 5,498 
Austria 209 1998 5,905 
Swiss 198 1999 5,657 
Sweden 188 2000 5,357 
Netherlands 178 2001 5,483 
Spain 152 2002 5,441 
Finland 132 2003 5,392 
Denmark 129 2004 5,394 
Belgium 112 2005 5,370 
Norway 109 2006 5,108 
Portugal 81 2007 4,924 
Ireland 80 2008 4,620 
Greece 78 2009 5,455 
New 
Zealand 
41 2010 5,369 
Total 13,130 Total 112,322 
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The data for TFP estimation forms an unbalanced panel. As shown in Table 2.1, it 
comprises a series of annual observations of 13,130 firms in developed countries. The 
time series for each firm begins from 1980 to 2010, depending on data availability. The 
total number of annual observations is 112,322, and each observation contains 
information of net sales, physical capital, employee number and raw materials which 
enables the estimation of TFP. The distribution of the number of firms by country in the 
sample is in line with the common perception that the most advanced economies often 
have the greatest number of observations. 
TFP is estimated by Levpet software developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Table 
2.2 illustrates the result of the estimation using the default value-added method. The 
estimated TFP from this estimation is the variable of interest for further analysis. It is 
noted that the sum of the coefficient is reported as the result of a Wald test of constant 
return to scale (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2004).  The sum is significantly less than one, 
implying that firms in developed economies generally have diminishing returns to scale. 
In addition, the average number of observations per group is 8.6 indicates that the 
sample has about 8 annual observations for each firm on average, even though the 
panel is unbalanced.  
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Table 2.2: TFP estimation with Levensohn-Petrin productivity estimator 
Parameters Coefficient P value Chi2 
lnlabour 0.5614273 *** 67.12   
lncapital 0.2391428 *** 18.8   
Sum of coefficients 0.8005701 ***   394.3 
Number of 
observation 
112322 
Number of group 13130 
Average obs. per 
group 
8.6 
*** Significant at 1% level 
Note: sum of coefficients is significantly less than 1, suggesting diminishing 
returns to scale for these firms 
2.4.2. Sample description 
Two samples are used in this paper: RD sample (including research and development 
expenditure as a proxy for intangible assets) and the TFP sample, where total factor 
productivity is used as the proxy. Besides this, the difference in proxy for intangible 
assets, dependent variables and other explanatory variables such as size, market-to-
book, cash ratio, leverage and growth are essentially the same between the two 
samples. Alternative measures for intangibles are used since acquiring intangible assets 
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has been argued as being one of the most important motives in cross-border 
acquisitions, therefore using different proxies increases the robustness of the result.  
2.4.2.1. Distribution of targets in the sample 
We have two sampling situations: RD sample and TFP sample. Each sample is 
constructed as an unbalanced panel of target firms in which each firm has a series of 
annual records. In any sample there are three types of target with the following code: 
Non-targets (coded 0), targets of developed-market firms (coded 1), and targets of non-
developed-markets firms (coded 2).  
Only publicly-listed targets in developed countries are included in the sample. Private 
targets are excluded since we have no data on the characteristics of these firms.  
We present the distribution of transaction frequency by groups of targets (Table2.3), by 
year (Table 2.4) and by country of the target (Table 2.5). In Table 2.3, both RD and TFP 
samples represent the commonly perceived structure of population where there is a 
remarkable imbalance between the non-target and target groups. Even within the 
target group, the number of firms acquired by the non-developed market bidders is also 
much smaller than that of firms acquired by the developed-market bidders. The TFP 
sample is smaller than the RD sample because the data requirement for TFP estimation 
is more rigorous. Table 2.4 shows the frequency of acquisition transactions by years for 
three groups of targets (0, 1, and 2). This table suggests a rising trend of acquisitions 
over the last two decades. Table 2.5 presents the distribution of transactions by target 
52 
 
countries for each target group. It is not surprising to see that G7 countries and Australia 
have the largest number of firms acquired by both developed and non-developed 
markets bidders since these countries are the most dynamic markets of corporate 
control.  
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    Table 2.3: Distribution of target type 
RD sample6 
Target type Alternative Frequency Percent 
Non-target 0 29,277 87.51 
Dv-target 1 4,076 12.18 
Nd-target 2 102 0.3 
Total 33,455 100 
TFP sample7 
Target type Alternative Frequency Percent 
Non-target 0 22,115 88.7 
Dv-target 1 2,734 10.97 
Nd-target 2 83 0.33 
Total 24,932 100 
Dv-target: firms acquired by developed-markets acquirers 
Nd-target: firms acquired by non-developed-markets acquirers 
Alternatives 0, 1, and 2 are the corresponding codes for each target type 
 
  
6
 Sample where R&D expenditure is used as a proxy for intangible assets. 
7
 Sample where TFP is used as proxy for intangible assets. 
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Table 2.4: Tabulation of sample by year and target type 
TFP Sample RD sample 
Year Alternative Total Year Alternative Total 
0 1 2 0 1 2 
1989 190 48 0 238 1989 360 97 1 458 
1990 233 65 1 299 1990 183 66 0 249 
1991 313 69 0 382 1991 241 62 0 303 
1992 325 62 4 391 1992 244 60 3 307 
1993 379 90 2 471 1993 273 92 3 368 
1994 714 119 1 834 1994 604 117 1 722 
1995 755 125 1 881 1995 658 126 1 785 
1996 424 85 1 510 1996 326 90 0 416 
1997 541 88 1 630 1997 444 91 0 535 
1998 381 59 3 443 1998 405 70 3 478 
1999 428 72 4 504 1999 492 102 5 599 
2000 1,148 103 1 1,252 2000 1,372 133 4 1,509 
2001 954 63 2 1,019 2001 1,093 90 0 1,183 
2002 1,121 89 4 1,214 2002 1,217 111 3 1,331 
2003 1,165 98 3 1,266 2003 1,350 114 3 1,467 
2004 1,235 110 1 1,346 2004 1,485 136 2 1,623 
2005 1,686 196 7 1,889 2005 2,800 358 11 3,169 
2006 1,763 222 10 1,995 2006 3,025 471 18 3,514 
2007 1,444 198 11 1,653 2007 1,994 330 15 2,339 
2008 1,933 310 10 2,253 2008 3,546 630 18 4,194 
2009 2,463 350 11 2,824 2009 3,579 558 8 4,145 
2010 2,520 113 5 2,638 2010 3,586 172 3 3,761 
Total 22,115 2,734 83 24,932 Total 29,277 4,076 102 33,455 
Note: There is an increasing trend of cross-border acquisition over the years. The rising trend of acquisition 
in developed economies from less-developed markets firms is especially noteworthy. Alternatives 0, 1, and 
2 are the corresponding codes for each target type. 
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Table 2.5 Tabulation of sample by country and type  
TFP sample RD sample 
Country Alternative Total Country Alternative Total 
0 1 2 0 1 2 
US 10,661 1,373 34 12,068 US 15,273 2,073 48 17,394 
UK 3,998 167 14 4,179 JP 6,460 907 13 7,380 
JP 2,104 176 1 2,281 UK 2,704 135 9 2,848 
FR 1,386 189 4 1,579 CA 1,194 190 7 1,391 
WG 916 131 8 1,055 FR 846 123 0 969 
CA 501 86 3 590 WG 614 119 9 742 
IT 360 98 0 458 AS 601 8 0 609 
SZ 303 49 2 354 SZ 243 44 1 288 
AS 336 12 1 349 AU 60 212 9 281 
IR 308 13 0 321 FN 196 32 2 230 
NT 178 74 2 254 SW 177 40 1 218 
BL 226 25 0 251 IR 203 12 0 215 
SP 149 92 2 243 NT 140 37 1 178 
AU 78 131 7 216 BL 145 15 0 160 
FN 178 35 2 215 IT 100 46 0 146 
SW 153 37 0 190 NO 98 27 1 126 
DN 160 14 2 176 DN 107 13 1 121 
NO 114 25 1 140 NZ 89 22 0 111 
NZ 6 7 0 13 SP 27 21 0 48 
Total 22,115 2,734 83 24,932 Total 29,277 4,076 102 33,455 
Note: Targets of non-developed markets firms concentrates on G7 countries and Australia. Alternatives 0, 
1, and 2 are the corresponding codes for each target type.  
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2.4.2.2. Distribution of targets in the sample 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present the descriptive statistics of the independent variables and 
compare the corresponding median across three groups of target for the RD and TFP 
samples respectively. Panel A shows the differences in characteristics between ND 
targets (targets acquirers from non-developed markets or group 2) and non-targets 
(group 0), and Panel B shows the difference between ND targets and DV targets (targets 
of acquirers in developed countries or group 1). As the histograms of independent 
variables show signs of extreme values despite being handled by a winsorization 
technique, we use the median tests rather than a mean test to check the difference in 
characteristics for each set of two groups.  
There are some noteworthy features in the samples. First, Tables 6 and 7 both 
consistently show that ND targets generally have a significantly lower return on assets 
than both DV targets and non-targets, which surprisingly lends support to the 
conventional market for corporate control hypothesis. Secondly, low-tfp firms seem 
more likely to be acquired by non-developed markets bidders, as shown in Table 7, 
suggesting that acquirers aim at firms with a small stock of intangible assets. In addition, 
panel A in both Tables illustrates that ND targets have significantly smaller size than 
non-target, which is in line with our expectation. Finally, there is a remarkable sign that 
ND targets have a higher leverage ratio than DV targets (as shown in panel B of both 
tables). High leverage in developed markets may imply unused borrowing capacity 
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(Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003), which could then attract bidders lacking financial 
resources. 
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Table 2.6: Comparison of pre-acquisition characteristics in RD sample 
Note: This table compares the characteristics pre-acquisition of three groups in the sample (nontargets - 
group 0, targets of non-developed bidders - group 2, and targets of developed bidders - group 1). All 
theoretically significant explanatory variables are examined including operating performance (roa), 
technology level (r&d expenditures/sales), hightech target (binary variable), financial leverage (Total 
debt/Shareholders equity), growth potential (three year sales growth), market valuation (market-to-
book), cash holding (cash/total assets), and size (log of total assets). These variables are winsorized 0.05% 
in each tail of the distribution in order to remove extreme values. I use a non-parametric median test to 
test the difference in the characteristics of targets among three different groups. Panel A compares the 
characteristics of targets in group 2 against targets in group 1, whereas Panel B compares those targets in 
group 2 versus group 0. This table shows the median tests for the RD sample.  
Panel A: alternative 2 vs. alternative 0 
Alternative j=2 (targets of ND firms) Alternative j=0 (non-targets)   Median test 
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev. (2)-(0) Pearson chi2 
roa -21.060 -5.388 45.766 -33.175 2.717 527.280 -8.105 *** 16.079 
Rd ratio 0.556 0.012 2.306 1.353 0.021 26.278 -0.009   0.040 
hightech 0.500 0.500 0.502 0.504 1.000 0.500 -0.500   0.594 
gearing 64.147 34.967 198.146 52.692 19.111 652.821 15.855   2.573 
mtbv 3.104 1.655 10.219 1.961 1.350 85.063 0.305   1.015 
growth 28.710 5.152 68.964 21.912 6.837 91.576 -1.685   0.362 
cash ratio 0.210 0.123 0.218 0.216 0.141 0.218 -0.018   0.161 
size 5.118 4.723 2.472 4.942 5.038 2.526 -0.315 ** 4.020 
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Panel B: alternative 2 vs. alternative 1 
Alternative j=2 (targets of ND firms)  Alternative j=1 (targets of DV firms) (2)-(1) Pearson chi2 
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev.   
roa -21.060 -5.388 45.766 -10.230 3.379 220.189 -8.767 *** 12.748 
Rd ratio 0.556 0.012 2.306 0.399 0.015 6.198 -0.003   0.983 
hightech 0.500 0.500 0.502 0.461 0.000 0.499 0.500   n.a. 
gearing 64.147 34.967 198.146 69.416 27.511 874.627 7.456 ** 3.937 
mtbv 3.104 1.655 10.219 1.421 1.250 61.950 0.405   0.630 
growth 28.710 5.152 68.964 16.744 6.378 70.115 -1.227   0.983 
cash ratio 0.210 0.123 0.218 0.195 0.125 0.199 -0.002   0.354 
size 5.118 4.723 2.472 5.707 5.595 2.198 -0.872   0.983 
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Table 2.7: Comparison of pre-acquisition characteristics in TFP sample 
Note: This table compares the characteristics pre-acquisition of three groups in the sample (non targets 
group - 0, targets of non-developed market bidders - group 2, and targets of developed bidders - group 1). 
All theoretically significant explanatory variables are examined including operating performance (roa), 
technology level (tfp), hightech target (binary variable), financial leverage (Total debt/Shareholders 
equity), growth potential (three year sales growth), market valuation (market-to-book), cash holding 
(cash/total assets), and size (log of total assets). These variables are winsorized 0.05% in each tail of 
distribution in order to remove extreme values. I use a non-parametric median test to test the difference in 
the characteristics of targets among the three different groups. Panel A compares the characteristics of 
targets in group 2 against targets in group 1, whereas Panel B compares those targets in group 2 versus 
group 0. This table shows the median tests for the TFP sample 
Panel A: alternative 2 vs. alternative 0 
Alternative j=2 (targets of ND firms)  Alternative j=0 (non-targets) Median test 
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev. (2)-(0) Pearson chi2 
roa -14.359 1.905 45.168 0.536 4.499 21.360 -2.594 ** 5.459 
tfp 2.403 1.230 3.682 2.747 2.065 2.881 -0.835 *** 15.182 
hightech 0.337 0.000 0.476 0.607 1.000 0.489 -1.000   n.a 
gearing 81.894 43.158 171.700 78.029 41.854 653.887 1.304   0.114 
mtbv 2.388 1.831 5.950 2.869 1.604 21.816 0.227   0.314 
growth 15.842 6.079 35.084 15.530 6.185 72.719 -0.106   0.012 
cash ratio 0.149 0.094 0.173 0.148 0.089 0.163 0.005   0.314 
size 5.460 4.951 2.443 6.167 6.017 2.132 -1.066 ** 5.459 
 
61 
 
Table 7 Panel B: alternative 2 vs. alternative 1 
Alternative j=2 (targets of ND firms)  Alternative j=1 (targets of DV firms) (2)-(1) Pearson chi2 
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev.   
roa -14.359 1.905 45.168 -3.195 4.450 53.431 -2.545 ** 5.333 
tfp 2.403 1.230 3.682 2.445 1.750 2.898 -0.520 *** 10.171 
hightech 0.337 0.000 0.476 0.506 1.000 0.500 -1.000   n.a. 
gearing 81.894 43.158 171.700 59.749 31.475 630.589 11.683 *** 7.558 
mtbv 2.388 1.831 5.950 2.625 1.740 46.991 0.091   0.013 
growth 15.842 6.079 35.084 16.585 6.774 68.973 -0.696   0.302 
cash ratio 0.149 0.094 0.173 0.163 0.102 0.177 -0.008   0.593 
size 5.460 4.951 2.443 5.415 5.365 2.233 -0.414   0.593 
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2.5. Empirical results and discussion 
2.5.1. Robustness checks 
We perform 4 multinomial logistic regressions on an RD sample and a TFP sample. 
Model 1 and model 2 control for year and industry fixed effects, while models 3 and 4 
control for year and country fixed effects. Model 2 and model 4 further examine the 
effects of the hightech variable.  As discussed in the previous section, we in turn control 
for industry and country fixed effects rather than controlling both effects in the same 
specifications since introducing a large number of dummies into the equation can 
reduce the degree of freedom and therefore the power of the statistical tests.  
We check the multicollinearity issues with VIF statistics. As all VIF indices are 
significantly less than 10, multicollinearity causes no concern in all settings. Secondly, 
we used Hausman tests to ensure that the introduction of additional alternative (j) does 
not change the pairwise odds of other alternatives (i.e. checking if the IIA assumption is 
violated or not). It is noteworthy that the chi square statistics of all Hausman tests are 
negative on several occasions, meaning that the asymptotic assumption of the Hausman 
tests is not satisfied in the fitted models. However, this is not an unusual outcome for 
the Hausman test, especially when the data is highly imbalanced and the number of 
observations in group 2 is relatively small (STATA 11-Manual). This statistical outcome 
can be interpreted as strong evidence in favor of the H-null hypothesis that the 
difference in two sets of coefficients is not systematic (i.e. IIA is not violated). 
Additionally, a SUEST test can be used in the case of a violation of asymptotic 
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assumption, but a relatively small number of observations in the basement group 
(where alternative j=2) disallows us from performing this test.  
2.5.2. Results and discussion 
Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 summarize the multinomial logistic regression estimates of the 
determinants of acquisition probability (equation (1)). More specifically, determinants 
of pairwise relative odds of acquisition among three groups are examined in four model 
specifications and across the RD sample (Table 2.8) and TFP sample (Table 2.9). In each 
model specification we estimate two sets of coefficients. One set shows the differences 
in characteristics between non-targets and ND targets and the other illustrates the 
differences between DV targets and ND targets.  
We start by estimating an RD sample. Four specifications are used to essentially detect 
the differences in size and intangibles among three alternative groups of targets. 
Models 2 and 4 include the high-tech variable. The results in Table 2.8 show that rd ratio 
and its derivative high-tech variables are not significant. This finding fails to support our 
hypothesis that firms with a large stock of intangible assets or with intangible assets 
below a threshold level attract bidders from non-developed markets. However, we find 
strong supporting evidence regarding target size. ND targets are significantly smaller 
than non-targets and DV targets. The significant evidence is consistent across all 
specifications except for model 4 (have the same sign of coefficient but not significant). 
This evidence lends support to our hypothesis that acquirers aim at small targets to 
easily and quickly gain access to resources in developed countries.  
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We carry on with the estimation of the TFP sample. We also test with four model 
specifications, two of which include high-tech variables in order to examine the 
threshold level of intangible assets that acquirers do not want to breach. The results 
presented in Table 2.9 show that targets with a stock of intangibles lower than the 
industry median are more likely to be acquired by firms in non-developed markets. This 
finding is strongly significant and is consistent in both model 2 and model 4. In addition, 
the result shows the same findings with the estimation on the RD sample in terms of 
size. The results of all specifications but model 4 show that the ND targets are 
significantly smaller than the DV targets and non-targets. We also find significant 
evidence at a 90% confidence interval that ND targets have more intangible assets than 
DV targets and non-targets in model 4 (where we control for country fixed effects 
instead of industry fixed effects). This is mild evidence since other specifications do not 
yield significant estimates.  
Therefore the strong evidence about target size across two sampling situations and four 
model specifications suggests that acquirers in non-developed markets aim at small 
firms in developed countries. This finding lends support to our argument that acquiring 
small targets is easier, whilst it also enables acquirers to quickly gain control of the 
targets intangible assets and quickly expose themselves and learn new capabilities in 
advanced markets. Furthermore, we find that acquirers in non-developed markets are 
not very interested in high-class technology since the intangible assets are insignificant 
in most cases. We even find evidence in the TFP sample that acquirers in non-developed 
markets are more likely to acquire targets with a technology level below the industry 
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median. More specifically, model 2 and model 4 shows that the relative risk ratios 
between non-acquired firms and ones acquired by acquirers from non-developed 
markets are 2.218 and 2.242 respectively.  These numbers mean that the high-tech 
firms have greater odds of not being acquired by non-developed acquirers. Similarly, 
model 2 and model 4 also reports the relative risk ratios between DV targets and ND 
targets (2.502, 2.228 respectively). These numbers demonstrate that the high-tech firms 
have greater odds of being acquired by developed acquirers than by non-developed 
acquirers. Thus, model 2 and 4 provide evidence supporting a notion that high-tech 
firms in developed countries are less likely to be ND targets. This finding supports our 
argument that the limited absorptive capacity of acquirers in non-developed markets 
can only facilitate the transfer of lower-class technology from developed markets. 
Therefore, our two main findings support the strategic market entry motive of the 
acquirers. Acquiring an appropriate target in terms of size and technology level allows 
them to gather experience in an advanced business environment, quickly gain access to 
new technology and gradually build up their capabilities. This motivation is in contrast 
with that of the developed-market acquirers who often seek outright improvement in 
operating efficiency (Gubbi et al., 2010; Zhu et al., 2011, Thompson, 1997).  
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Table 2.8: Multinomial logistic relative risk ratios for RD sample 
Note:  j=0 vs. j=2 Comparison of characteristics between non-targets and ND targets. j=1 vs. j=2: comparison of characteristics between DV targets and ND 
targets. VIF statistics are less than 10, meaning no multicollinearity issue. Model 1 and model 2 controls for year and industry fixed effects, while model 3 and 
model 4 controls for year and country fixed effects. Model 2 and model 4 further examines effects of the dummy hightech variable on the relative risk ratio. 
Hausman tests find no evidence of IIA violation in all cases. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  j=0 vs. j=2 j=1 vs. j=2   j=0 vs. j=2 j=1 vs. j=2   j=0 vs. j=2 j=1 vs. j=2   j=0 vs. j=2 j=1 vs. j=2 
roa 0.999   0.999   roa 0.999   0.999   roa 1.000 1.000   roa 1.000 1.000   
  (-1.067)   (-0.835)     (-1.005)   (-0.801)     (-0.162) (-0.118)     (-0.163) (-0.128)   
rd ratio 1.003   0.999   rd ratio 1.003   0.999   rd ratio 1.005 1.000   rd ratio 1.005 1.000   
  (0.234)   (-0.070)     (0.209)   (-0.094)     (0.293) (-0.006)     (0.294) (0.015)   
gearing  1.000   1.000   gearing  1.000   1.000   gearing  1.000 1.000   gearing  1.000 1.000   
  (-0.079)   (0.022)     (-0.077)   (0.011)     (-0.199) (-0.055)     (-0.197) (-0.063)   
mtbv 1.000   1.000   mtbv 1.000   1.000   mtbv 1.000 1.000   mtbv 1.000 1.000   
  (-0.025)   (-0.132)     (-0.061)   (-0.138)     (-0.025) (-0.116)     (-0.025) (-0.099)   
growth  1.000   0.999   growth 1.000   0.999   growth 1.000 0.999   growth 1.000 0.999   
  (0.330)   (-0.725)     (0.372)   (-0.689)     (-0.250) (-1.024)     (-0.252) (-1.032)   
cash ratio 1.838   1.531   cash ratio 1.516   1.495   cash ratio 1.213 1.419   cash ratio 1.207 1.556   
  (1.241)   (0.857)     (0.819)   (0.782)     (0.403) (0.722)     (0.372) (0.864)   
size 1.203 *** 1.283 *** size 1.196 *** 1.280 *** size 1.011 1.151 *** size 1.011 1.152 *** 
  (5.585)   (7.440)     (5.294)   (7.222)     (0.268) (3.465)     (0.269) (3.492)   
  hightech 1.297   1.059     hightech 1.006 0.894   
  (1.321)   (0.289)     (0.027) (-0.530)   
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Table 2-8 continue    
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N 31194 N 31194 N 31197 N 31197 
VIF min 1.01 VIF min 1.01 VIF min 1.01 VIF min 1.01 
VIF max 1.1 VIF max 1.12 VIF max 1.1 VIF max 1.12 
Year dummies Yes Yes Year dummies Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Industry dummies No No 
Country dummies  No No Country dummies Yes Yes 
Hauman test IIA not violated IIA not violated Hauman test IIA not violated IIA not violated 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 2.9: Multinomial logistic relative risk ratios for TFP sample 
Note:  j=0 vs. j=2 Comparison of characteristics between non-targets and ND targets. j=1 vs. j=2: comparison of characteristics between DV targets and ND 
targets. VIF statistics are less than 10, meaning no multicollinearity issue. Model 1 and model 2 controls for year and industry fixed effects, while model 3 and 
model 4 controls for year and country fixed effects. Model 2 and model 4 further examines effects of the dummy hightech variable on the relative risk ratio. 
Hausman tests find no evidence of IIA violation in all cases. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  j=0 vs. j=2 j=1 vs. j=2   j=0 vs. j=2 j=1 vs. j=2   j=0 vs. j=2 j=1 vs. j=2   j=0 vs. j=2 j=1 vs. j=2 
roa 1.001   1.001   roa 1.001   1.001   roa 1.001   1.001   roa 1.001   1.001   
  (0.889)   (0.710)     (1.005)   (0.786)     (1.520)   (1.250)     (1.638)   (1.309)   
tfpva 0.999   0.999   tfpva 0.967   0.963   tfpva 0.979   0.984   tfpva 0.952 * 0.953 * 
  (-0.028)   (-0.014)     (-1.176)   (-1.306)     (-0.573)   (-0.430)     (-1.721)   (-1.668)   
gearing  1.000   1.000   gearing  1.000   1.000   gearing  1.000   1.000   gearing  1.000   1.000   
  (-0.365)   (-0.346)     (-0.331)   (-0.306)     (-0.316)   (-0.351)     (-0.288)   (-0.312)   
mtbv 1.000   1.000   mtbv 1.000   1.000   mtbv 1.000   1.001   mtbv 1.000   1.001   
  (0.124)   (0.211)     (0.153)   (0.230)     (0.145)   (0.292)     (0.154)   (0.291)   
growth 1.002   1.001   growth 1.002   1.002   growth 1.001   1.001   growth 1.001   1.001   
  (0.739)   (0.581)     (0.798)   (0.640)     (0.482)   (0.356)     (0.457)   (0.323)   
cash ratio 3.051   2.188   cash ratio 2.914   2.060   cash ratio 1.735   1.510   cash ratio 1.615   1.381   
  (1.592)   (1.103)     (1.532)   (1.022)     (0.806)   (0.595)     (0.704)   (0.468)   
size 1.148 *** 1.281 *** size 1.074   1.185 *** size 1.101 * 1.224 *** size 1.023   1.124 ** 
  (3.007)   (5.337)     (1.428)   (3.360)     (1.833)   (3.808)     (0.405)   (2.015)   
  hightech 2.218 *** 2.502 ***   hightech 2.242 *** 2.558 *** 
  (2.840)   (3.232)     (2.875)   (3.306)   
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Table 2-9 continues    
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N 23614 N 23614 N 23699 N 23699 
VIF min 1.01 VIF min 1.01 VIF min 1.01 VIF min 1.01 
VIF max 1.37 VIF max 1.52 VIF max 1.37 VIF max 1.52 
Year dummies Yes Yes Year dummies Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Industry dummies No No 
Country dummies  No No Country dummies  Yes Yes 
Hauman test IIA not violated IIA not violated Hauman test IIA not violated IIA not violated 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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2.5.3. Limitations  
The main concern of this study is that the results fail to indicate strong evidence of SME, 
perhaps due to the aggregate level of investigation in which multiple countries of both 
acquirers and targets are involved over a wide spectrum of years. Naturally, the follow-
up step of this study is to narrow down the perspective and impose constraints on 
either the country, industry or time dimensions. However, under such restrictions the 
number of observations, especially the number of M&A events from non-developed 
market bidders, declines dramatically, thereby making it impossible to perform further 
analysis.  
It is noted that given the context of the following empirical chapters where we consider 
acquirers from emerging countries, it would be preferable if this study uses the same 
group of acquirers countries. However, the number of observations would have been 
very limited due to the fact that markets for corporate control in emerging countries are 
still in the early stage of development. Therefore, the acquirer country group is 
extended to include observations in other developing nations.  
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2.6. Conclusion 
Over the last two decades, we have witnessed a growing trend of acquisition FDI from 
non-developed to developed markets. Acquiring firms in the former markets have 
different characteristics and competitive advantages to their counterparts in the latter 
(Bhaumik et al., 2010; Guillen and Garcia-Canas, 2009). In this paper we conduct an 
empirical examination of the characteristics of target firms in developed markets. Our 
purpose is to find the evidence that indicates the dominant motive of the acquirers in 
less developed countries.  
Using a large sample of more than 23,000 targets located across 20 developed 
countries, we find evidence supporting the strategic market entry motive whilst finding 
no evidence that is linked to the widely documented market for corporate control 
hypothesis.  
From the findings of this investigation, a message that emerges is that the primary 
motive of the acquirer is not necessarily the same in non-developed markets as in 
developed ones. Acquirers in the US or UK for example are often endowed with 
advanced technology, management quality and high corporate governance standards, 
while companies in less developed countries are often characterized by the lack of key 
resources and capabilities. The former therefore has the capability to hunt and punish 
inefficient management, whilst the latter seems to be far away from that stage. As a 
result they have the motivation to build up their ownership advantages in order to catch 
up with the established firms in developed countries. They may do so by acquiring a 
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small firm with a low stock of strategic assets in order to familiarize themselves to the 
advanced business environment and gradually consolidate their competitive position for 
the battle in the long run.  
  
73 
 
Chapter 3: New evidence on M&A wealth effects in emerging 
countries 
3.1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, FDI from emerging to developed markets in the form of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions have grown rapidly (WIR, 2006). However, we 
have known little about the effects of such an event on emerging-market acquirers. 
Although this issue has been rigorously researched in the literature, the results can 
hardly be generalized and apply to emerging markets. One of the reasons for this is that 
even in developed markets the empirical evidence of wealth effects has not reached 
consensus. Evidence of positive gains in certain circumstances8 found mixed with 
evidence of significantly negative and insignificant effects9. In addition, firms in these 
markets are characterized by a different set of ownership advantages (Guillen and 
Garcia-Canal, 2009) and possibly different value creation mechanisms (Gubbi et al., 
2010; Rui and Yip, 2008; Hitt et al., 2005). They also run their main business in 
environments governed by different sets of rules. Bhagat et al. (2011) and Kim (2000) 
document that firms in these countries have different international experience and 
exposure, corporate governance, cultural background, government regulation and 
maturity of the domestic capital markets.  Therefore, new evidence generated from 
this study may enhance understandings of average effects of M&A decisions on the 
8
 Moeller et al., 2005; Kang, 2000; Asquith, 1983; Eckbo, 1983 
9
 Ruback, 1988; Malatesta, 1983; Mandelker, 1974 
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future performance of acquiring firms and could therefore be potentially useful for 
managers in emerging markets.    
We also make a contribution by addressing the drawbacks in previous methods. Results 
from previous studies using a market model may systematically suffer from a 
fundamental problem that the pure effects of acquisitions cannot be isolated (Jensen 
and Ruback, 1983). The later traditional matching method (Baber and Lyon, 1997; 
Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess et al., 1995) can only control for selections on a small 
number of characteristics. To address this issue, we use a long event window with a 
combination of propensity score matching model (PSM) and the difference-in-
differences technique (DIDs) in this investigation. The major advantage of this method 
lies in its capability of dealing with selection bias on observable and unobservable 
characteristics (Girma et al., 2006; Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).  
This method is used upon a relatively large sample consisting of data in 17 emerging 
countries and targets in 20 developed economies over the period of 1988-2010. We find 
acquisitions into developed countries generally fail to add value to the emerging-market 
acquirers. More specifically on average the acquirer underperforms after three, four and 
five years starting from the M&A completion date. Further analysis which takes into 
account the presumably influential factors (i.e. previous M&A experience, cash 
payment, transfer of control rights and industry relatedness) confirm the strong and 
negative impacts of merger events on the acquirer long term performance. The 
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significant negative evidence is consistent with the results of the majority of studies in 
developed markets10.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews relevant theories 
and presents our hypotheses, then the following section describes the methodology and 
data for this examination. The empirical results are then presented and discussed. The 
final section summarizes this essay. 
3.2. Theoretical framework 
In this essay, we address two major gaps in the literature. First, there is a shortfall of 
studies that investigate wealth effects concerning acquirers from emerging markets. In 
particular, we know very little when they acquire firms in developed markets. Secondly, 
we address the drawbacks of the traditional methods used to estimate the wealth 
effects. Our methodological analysis shows that such drawbacks embed a high level of 
potential selection bias which casts serious doubt on the final results of previous 
studies.  
3.2.1. Wealth effects of M&A in emerging markets 
In a recent survey, Martynova and Reeneboog (2009) document enormous volume of 
study over more than 100-year history of mergers and acquisitions activities11. In five 
10
 Malatesta (1983) and Magenheim and Mueller (1988) use the market model and find significant evidence of 
negative average abnormal returns. Agrawal et al. (1992) use matching on firm size and find significant negative 
effects of M&A. Conn et al.  (2005)  and Ang and Cheng (2006) use matching on size and book-to-market and find 
significant evidence of negative effects. Croci (2007) find significant negative effects of M&A in France, Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland and UK. 
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waves of mergers (according to their division of the timeline) there are a number of 
studies examining the effects of mergers and acquisitions on acquirer performance. 
However, we do not find a single one that looks into this issue in emerging markets. In 
fact, the literature involving wealth effects from an emerging-country perspective is 
rather scant. We document only a small number of studies published in major academic 
journals (e.g. Kale, 2004; Chari et al., 2010; Yiu et al., 2007; Young et al., 2008). The lack 
of interest in emerging markets may be attributed to the inadequacy or unavailability of 
empirical data.  
3.1.1.1. Distinctive characteristics of emerging-market acquirers 
An investigation about wealth effects in emerging countries may yield different results 
from the effects documented in the US, UK and European markets due to potential 
differences in the motive of acquisition and competitive advantages.  
As shown in the previous chapter, the motivation of emerging-market acquirers is 
different from that of developed-market counterparts. While the latter seeks to replace 
inefficient management teams (Caves, 1989; Thompson, 1997; Zhu et al., 2011), the 
former appears motivated by quick access to quality resources and gathering new 
experience in developed countries (Guillen and Garcia-Canas, 2009; Grimpe and 
Hussinger, 2009; Gattai et al., 2010; Antkiewicz and Whalley, 2006, p.7; Deng, 2004). 
Such difference in motive is likely to cause a discrepancy in wealth effects. Indeed, Kim 
(2000) finds that when Korean firms are motivated by using their ownership advantages 
11
 Back from the mid 1890s (Martynova and Renneboog, 2009, p.2149). 
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on less developed countries, the resulting abnormal return is significantly positive. Kim 
also found that when Korean firms engage in acquisitions in advanced markets with 
different motives the optimistic reactions disappear, leading to negative and 
insignificant abnormal returns.  
Acquirers in emerging countries also have a different set of competitive advantages and 
disadvantages, compared to acquirers from developed nations. The latter can rely on 
their own technology, management expertise and brand equity in international 
expansion (Dunning 2000, 2008). Meanwhile, the former have advantages over basic 
inputs, political capability12 and the ability to gather a large army of labour in short 
amount of time (Guillen and Garcia-Canas, 2009). Guillen and his colleague argue that 
one feature of emerging-market acquirers is the lack of resources and capabilities of 
firms in advanced economies. Therefore, the access to key resources in the western 
world such as technology, marketing skills, and capital market may enhance competitive 
power over local firms in emerging countries. In addition, the well-known family 
ownership of emerging-country firms constrains their main focus on local markets 
(Bhaumik et al., 2010). Indeed, we argued in the previous chapter that foreign 
expansion in any form may take only a small part of their business due to the principal-
principal agency problems. Therefore, access to key resources in developed countries 
would grant emerging-market firms distinctive advantages in their main markets.   
12
 Guillen and Garcia-Canas, 2009 defines this as the ability to adapt quickly in variety of business environments.  
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3.1.1.2. Agency problems of emerging-market acquirers 
According to agency theory, the agency problem arises upon the divorce of 
management and ownership and the lack of stringent corporate governance practice. As 
a result, managers have the motivation to maximize their own utility at the expense of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1986). The mangers benefits are associated with 
the firm size, as size rather than profitability is more likely to determine executive 
remuneration (Maris, 1964). Large firm size is also a symbol of power in the market 
(Jensen, 1986). Therefore, the managers may wish to improve the firm size, and 
acquisition is probably the quickest way to do this when compared to green-field 
investments or organic growth. The focus on improving a firms size would harm the 
shareholders value since managers are willing to overpay or engage in acquisitions with 
high risks of negative net present value (NPV).  
In emerging economies, agency problem is more severe. In fact, as the story of the Asian 
financial crisis unfolded in 1997, non-value maximization corporate behaviour is the 
most frequently cited cause for the crisis (Gibson, 2003).  The concentrated ownership 
structure in these markets might be the main cause of this problem. In countries like 
China, the state often holds the majority of share in large bidding firms and the top 
CEOs of these corporations are assigned by government agencies (Guillen and Garcia-
Canal, 2009). As a result, the CEOs are protected from market principles that force them 
to maximize the value for the shareholders. They also enjoy political connections with 
the government agencies, who offer them profitable investment opportunities on the 
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win-win principles (Kim, 2000). Such a bureaucratic mechanism is a basis of serious 
moral hazards for the public investors and lenders (Radelet and Sachs, 1998). When the 
implicit arrangement between CEOs and State agencies is the ground of foreign 
expansion, the agency problem may be even more ample for the stockholders of 
acquirers in emerging economies. Furthermore, other studies argue that the stock 
ownership of firms in emerging countries is not well diffused (Kim, 2000), and most 
firms have ownerships concentrated with a small number of family members (Bhaumik 
et al., 2010). This is the root of corporate governance issues, since the family tends to do 
a bad job in enforcing the legal rights of minority shareholders. La Porta et al., (2000) 
argue that in a business environment characterized by unenforced codes of supervision 
and governance practice the founding family can extract private benefits at the expense 
of minority shareholders. 
Finally, when targets are located in advanced economies, emerging-markets managers 
may be motivated by the wealth fare of target countries such as immigration, 
healthcare and education for future generations (Deng, 2004). Such motivation can only 
bring harm to the shareholders value.  
In brief, the ownership structure of emerging-market firms is the cause of a conflict of 
interest between shareholders and managers and between the state owner/founding 
family and minority shareholders. This undoubtedly has negative impacts on the 
subsequent performance of the bidders after the acquisitions.  
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3.1.1.3. Hubris problems in emerging markets 
There are two versions of hubris behaviour documented in the literature (extreme and 
moderate), both of which commonly drive up merger premiums, thereby causing 
negative impacts on the wealth of the acquirers shareholders. The reason for 
overpaying for the target firm is that the bidders managers overestimate their ability to 
materialize expected synergies or underestimate the costs involved in the integration 
process (Roll, 1986; Mock, Shleifer and Vishy, 1990). In the extreme version of hubris 
behaviour, it is often assumed that no gain is achieved through acquisitions and the 
wealth improvement of the targets shareholders is entirely equal to a takeover 
premium transferred from the acquirer. The extreme version is consistent with strong-
form market efficiency, in that financial markets are efficient and no form of 
reorganization or no better alternative or talented management team are able to 
produce excessive gains or reduce current costs (Roll, 1986; Seth et al., 2000). The 
underlying assumption of the extreme version is the irrational behaviour of managers, 
because rational managers know any bid with premium over market price is erroneous. 
Therefore, given the core assumption of a strong-form market efficiency in the extreme 
version M&A should destroy value on average, and the difference in the magnitude of 
value destruction between developed and emerging market groups should be attributed 
to the difference in the level of the managers irrationality.   
The moderate version of hubris behaviour, on the other hand, assumes stock price 
movement does not exhibit a strong form of market efficiency, which therefore makes it 
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more suitable for the context of emerging markets. In this version, the valuation of 
target firms might still be erroneous with a high risk of overpay, because the distribution 
of the stock price of the target firm is often truncated on the left tail due to the fact that 
the stock price tends to run up prior to the announcement (Seth et al, 2000). As a result, 
managers only observe the right tail of the genuine distribution and risk overpaying the 
targets shareholders. Like bidders in developed economies, there is not much that those 
in emerging markets can do to deal with the distorted distribution of a targets stock 
price. However, in less efficient markets the value of insider information might be worth 
more than the same information in efficient markets because the acquirers in emerging 
markets are probably not required to disclose as much information as their counterparts 
do in developed countries. When a large volume of information about M&A transactions 
is hidden from the public the risks of hubris increases, thus making the subsequent 
impacts on wealth less predictable. Therefore the difference in the level of market 
efficiency and the scale of the overestimation of problems and the lack of knowledge 
about the distribution of a targets share price make the impact of hubris behaviour in 
emerging countries rather unpredictable, even when we have certain knowledge about 
the hubris behaviour of managers in the developed world.  
In summary, it is difficult to speculate about the impact of acquisitions on the acquirers 
performance in this context. The potential synergies created from a combination of the 
existing assets and key capabilities of the acquired firms can be offset by severe agency 
and hubris problems in emerging markets.  
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3.2.2. Traditional factors influencing wealth effects 
3.2.2.1. Relatedness 
Relatedness refers to whether an acquirer and target are in the same line of industry. In 
related acquisition, the acquirer and target are in the same line of industry, whilst in an 
unrelated or conglomerate acquisition they are not.   
Acquiring related firms can create operational synergies such as economies of scale and 
economies of scope by cutting out duplicate segments and excess capacities in the 
combined firms. It may also enhance the acquirers market power if the target is one of 
its competitors. Moreover, having knowledge of the targets industry may increase the 
absorptive capacity, which is especially important when the target seizes advanced 
technological assets. Since the technology gap between emerging and advanced 
economies is substantial, acquiring firms with a relevant portfolio of assets may lead to 
efficiency advantages which are unavailable to bidders with an irrelevant portfolio. 
Indeed, existing empirical evidence in developed markets is in favour of related over 
conglomerate acquisitions with regard to value creation (Datta et al., 1992; Markides 
and Ittner, 1994; Singh and Montgomery, 1987; and Conn et al., 2005). Therefore, one 
of the central predictions of these literatures is that related acquisition should 
outperform unrelated or conglomerate diversification (Klein and Lien, 2009).  
The problems of unrelated acquisition have been associated with the rent-seeking 
behaviour of divisional managers (Sharfstein and Stein, 2000), bargaining problems 
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within the firm (Rajan et al., 2000) or bureaucratic rigidity (Shin and Stulz, 1998). For 
instance, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue that CEOs have the potential to allocate 
capital budget in the socialism manner, whereby stronger divisions end up subsidizing 
weaker divisions. In addition, influence cost models posit that managers of the 
underperforming division have an incentive to bribe and persuade top management to 
channel resources to their division. It is certainly value destruction on an overall level if 
such an attempt is successful. And even if such an attempt fails as the top management 
sees through the managers motivation, such a division has to incur substantial lobbying 
costs. Secondly, managers of conglomerate bidders might have more resources at their 
discretion because diversification helps to reduce the bankruptcy risks, thus allowing the 
managers to borrow from financial institutions at lower interest rates13. Under such 
circumstances, conventional agency theory predicts that the managers can overinvest 
the resources (Matsusaka and Nanda, 1997; Stulz, 1990). Furthermore, Rajan et al. 
(2000) hypothesize that diversification is costly to the firm. They conclude that the 
introduction of a new subunit in a hierarchy can have ramifications for other subunits 
because it alters the power structure in the hierarchy and affects the decision making 
process. Therefore, these managerial problems in unrelated diversification hinder the 
optimization of investment resources in both the long and short term (Klein and Lien, 
2009).  
The notion that conglomerate diversification causes sub-optimal resource allocation is 
supported by a series of empirical studies in the corporate finance literature. In the 
13
 Berger and Ofek (1995) find that in practice the effect of diversification on extra-borrowing capacity is trivial. 
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1980s and early 1990s, diversified firms often traded at a discount compared to the 
portfolio of specialized firms (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Sevaes, 1996; Lins and Sevaes, 
1999). Additionally, the stock markets react positively when the firm announces a plan 
to refocus (Bhagat et al., 1990 and Comment and Jarrell, 1995).  
However, such a notion fails to explain the persisting existence of conglomerate 
acquisitions (Klein and Lien, 2009). Even in developing countries like India and Korea, 
conglomerates play a more important part in the market for corporate control (Khanna 
and Palepu, 1999, 2000). The alternative explanation is drawn upon the internal capital 
market hypothesis. In an early study, Williamson (1975) theorizes that the organization 
of diversified firms can be viewed as an alternative capital market, whereby 
conglomerate resources are distributed internally by the order of the head quarter. 
Williamson argues that the internal capital market is more efficient than the traditional 
external market for a number of reasons. For instance, top managers in the head 
quarter have better information about their organization than the external market as 
divisional managers are more willing to reveal important information internally than to 
outside investors. They only take into account their own expectation in resource 
allocation and do not need to worry about speculations in the market (Klein and Lien, 
2009).  
The internal market hypothesis is also supported by a number of empirical studies.  
These studies find that the evidence regarding the discount trading of diversified firms 
in earlier studies is subject to selection bias. Diversification and undervalued firms might 
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not have a causal relationship. It is possible that the link between diversification and 
undervalued firms is driven by the same underlying factors. When these factors are 
controlled for, the discount disappears (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Graham et al., 2002; 
Chevalier, 2004; Villalonga, 2004).  
In emerging markets, the internal capital market mechanism appears more efficient 
than the external market since the latter is subject to a series of institutional 
impediments. As a result, a diversification strategy may add value to the acquirer. This 
notion is supported by the prevalence of conglomerates in emerging economies 
(Khanna and Palepu, 1999, 2000). The popularity of unrelated acquisitions in emerging 
markets may have an alternative explanation. According to Kale (2004), the market for 
corporate control in countries like India is still in its infant stage, where acquirers have a 
limited choice of viable targets. Therefore, unrelated acquisition is more likely to occur. 
Nonetheless, conglomerate bidders are still capable of enhancing firm value by being 
pioneers in the liberalization process of the capital market. The benefits of low hanging 
fruits for the pioneer may outweigh problems associated with unrelated acquisitions 
(Kale, 2004).  
Briefly, relatedness is a potential determinant of wealth effects, and the empirical 
evidence in emerging countries leans toward the value enhancement of unrelated 
acquisitions.  
86 
 
3.2.2.2. Method of payment: Cash vs. Non-cash 
The impact of payment method has been documented in a series of papers (e.g. 
Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). A 
common perception on this respect is that cash-financed acquisitions generally have 
positive impacts on the acquirers performance in both the long and short run, whilst 
stock-finance acquisitions often result in negative impacts (Loughran and Vijh, 1997).  
Market inefficiency has been argued as the underlying driver of both payment method 
and its impacts on an acquirers performance. Indeed, if the stock market is truly 
efficient, the mode of payment in acquisitions of either cash or equity should not have 
any effect on the bidder performance (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). However, 
Longran and Vijh (1997) suggest that the market is not efficient and does systematically 
overestimate or underestimate synergy gains from acquisitions. One of the main causes 
of an inefficient market, according to Mitchell and Stafford (2000), is that the bidders 
management generally has access to private information that is unavailable to the 
target or to the public. As a result, in such a world of asymmetric information where 
managers have information that other shareholders do not, firms will issue stock only 
when it is overvalued and prefer to settle with cash when their stock is undervalued 
(Myers and Majluf 1984), and if the market fails to react properly to the message 
embedded in the method of payment then the potential overvaluation or 
undervaluation is likely to show up as an abnormal return a few years after the 
acquisition Longran and Vijh (1997). Therefore, the method of payment signals 
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information about the stand-alone value of the acquiring firm, and the market reaction 
towards such information is likely to result in a long term abnormal return.  
In emerging countries the impact of payment method could be stronger since the weak 
institutional framework in these countries allows managers to hide a significant volume 
of information from the public. When information about the payment method is 
disclosed the market adjustment for such information about the true value of the firm 
may cause substantial movement in the stock price, and as a result yield a remarkably 
abnormal return.   
3.2.2.3. Acquiring minority stake vs. acquiring for control right 
Acquisition for corporate control is an important influential factor of wealth effects. 
Controlling majority of the target ownership means having control over the tangible and 
intangible assets of the combined firm. In the minority stake control, the target firm is 
unlikely to share their intangible assets such as letting the acquiring firm use their brand 
name or sharing patents and know-how due to an incomplete contract problem 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986). According to Grossman and Harts contractual 
incompleteness argument, an acquirer might be harmed by the opportunistic and 
distortionary behavior of a target firms management if they do not acquire the residual 
rights of control (i.e. majority control). Seizing the residual rights of control allows the 
target firm to obtain a large share of surplus created from the integration (Grossman 
and Hart, 1986, p.716). As a result, gaining majority control in M&A may induce positive 
effects on ex-post integration surplus for the bidder.  
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Indeed, in an examination of the wealth effects of developed market firms in 
acquisitions of emerging markets targets, Chari et al., (2008) found that acquisition of 
control is a key factor which creates positive abnormal returns for acquirers. They 
document a significant increase (almost triple) in acquirer returns in acquisition of 
control, while acquisitions of minority stakes fail to yield significant returns. Chari and 
his colleagues adopt Grossman and Harts argument and hypothesize that taking control 
of target firms may eliminate the problems of incomplete contracts which commonly 
plague transactions in emerging markets. The synergies are perhaps materialized 
because acquirers in developed countries are willing to share valuable assets with target 
firms when they hold residual rights of control. In the absence of this condition, 
acquirers are unlikely to share such assets, especially in business settings characterized 
by weak property rights protection and a lack of monitoring (Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1997).  
In the context of this study, where acquirers are based in weak institutionalized 
emerging markets, target firms in developed countries are even more unlikely to share 
their valuable properties as long as the residual rights of control are still in their hands. 
As a result, if driven by strategic assets from advanced economies bidders might need to 
raise a premium in the takeover bid in order to gain control of residual rights. They may 
also need to pay a premium to deal with the free rider problem since the targets 
shareholders might refrain from selling stocks to the bidder and wait for the price rally 
after the announcement date. With the anticipation of a price increase after the merger 
announcement, a targets shareholders might keep holding out their stock for a better 
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price in the future. Therefore an acquirer in acquisition for control may need to pay a 
high premium to deal with incomplete contract and free rider problems.  
Nonetheless, managers in emerging countries may be willing to pay a handsome 
premium for control rights as with the control rights the managers are entitled to 
exclusively private benefits that minority investors do not have (Dyck and Zingales, 
2004, p. 7). Dyck and Zingales find that value of corporate control accounts for 14 % of 
firm equity on average, ranging from -4% in Japan to +65% in Brazil. The premium paid 
for control rights is higher in countries with less protection for investors (Dyck and 
Zingales, 2004, p4). This evidence suggests that managers in emerging countries are 
willing to pay more for control rights. However, what they receive from private benefits 
of control in developed countries may in effect be significantly less than what they 
expected. The reason for this is that more stringent governance practice and strong 
institutionalization in developed markets can hinder the exercise of private benefits of 
control.  
Following these lines of argument we argue that when a bidders management increases 
the bid premium to gain majority control, the subsequent stock performance can be 
affected in two different ways. On one hand, a significant increase in the bid premium 
may cause immediate adverse effects on the shareholders wealth of the bidder since 
market investors may interpret such a high premium offer as a result of managerial 
motives. On the other hand, gaining control allows the bidding firm to access intangible 
assets of the target firms (e.g. brand name, management expertise and innovative 
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patent and know-how). Such valuable acquired assets in combination with the 
ownership advantages of bidders in emerging markets (e.g. local knowledge, cheap 
labour, available raw materials) might be a formula for a lucrative performance in the 
long run (Seth et al., 2000: Eun et al., 1996). We therefore expect that majority control 
acquisitions are likely to cause negative effects on bidders performance in the short run 
but may result in a better performance in the long run compared to minority stake 
acquisitions.  
3.2.2.4. Previous experience in developed markets 
Experiences in acquisition activity may have positive effects on a shareholders wealth, 
since knowledge previously acquired in developed countries can help acquirers in 
cutting transaction and integration costs. Furthermore, experience may also be 
associated with the endowment of capability to integrate firms of diverse corporate 
cultures and managerial nationality. Barkema et al. (1996) argue that a firm engaged in a 
foreign expansion encounters two layers of acculturation and needs to accommodate 
the corporate and national culture of the target firm. According to this study, the 
expansion also requires the knowledge of foreign sites such as institutional 
characteristics. Therefore previous knowledge in expansion may reduce the cultural 
barrier. Barkema and his colleagues conclude that expanding firms may benefit more if 
they choose to expand in countries where they can exploit previous experience. Given 
the strong cultural connection among developed countries, we expect a significant 
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increase in wealth effects when acquirers have previous experience in developed 
countries. 
3.2.2.5. Changes in business environment 
Takeovers tend to occur in waves, and the pattern of value creation varies across 
merger waves (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Martynova and Renneboog (2008) 
show that each wave of mergers is characterized by a different set of features, and 
these sets are unlikely to be the same in different waves of mergers. Given the 
significant changes in the market for corporate control through time, the average level 
of wealth effects may vary accordingly.  
Indeed, earlier studies (Jarrell and Bradley, 1980; Schipper and Thompson, 1981) 
suggest the need to break a merger sample into different periods of time. For example, 
the 1968 Williams Amendment Act allows US target firms to have 10 more days to 
evaluate tender offers, which increases the chance that targets receive competitive bids 
from rival bidders (Jarrell and Bradley, 1980). The additional costs including litigation 
and delay may force the acquirer to pay a premium for the transaction (Jarrell and 
Poulsen, 1989). Moreover, Asquith et al. (1983) use pairwise t-statistics to compare two 
series of acquirers abnormal return in two periods of time. Their significant evidence 
lends support to the hypothesis that wealth effects in the market for corporate control 
vary with the time period. 
92 
 
In emerging markets, changes in business environment are more dramatic. Before the 
1990s firms in emerging markets operated in closed economies with heavy restrictions 
on conducting business. Stock markets and markets for corporate control were virtually 
nonexistent and takeovers were not allowed (Kale, 2004). However, gradual economic 
liberalization in emerging markets has removed business restrictions over time and 
created more opportunities for participating firms in the markets (Kale, 2004). Policy 
changes allow more firms from emerging markets to engage in acquisitions of foreign 
targets, which then increases the possibility of multiple bidding in any particular 
acquisition. As a result, emerging market acquirers may have positive gains at the 
beginning of liberalization due to a lack of competition, but this benefit may deteriorate 
at a later stage when more firms join in acquisitions activity.  
These lines of reasoning suggest the need to control for merger wave in the 
examination. Breaking the timeline allows us to accommodate changes in government 
regulations and other time relevant issues of markets for corporate control. 
In summary, we argue that acquirers in emerging markets have distinctive 
characteristics compared with those in developed countries. Their features regarding 
acquisition motive, competitive advantages, agency and hubris issue among other 
influential factors to make the average acquisition effects rather unpredictable.  
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3.2.3. Empirical evidence concerning emerging nations 
The wealth effects issue has been well-documented in the literature regarding 
developed economies. However, only a small number of recent studies have attempted 
to cast some light on the particular landscape concerning developing markets. For 
instance, Chari et al. (2004) examine the wealth effects of mergers on acquirers from 
developed markets when they acquire emerging-market targets. Surprisingly, on 
average the acquirer gains a significant abnormal return after the acquisitions events. 
Such evidence of positive (though trivial) abnormal return is rarely found in settings of 
domestic or cross-border acquisitions among developed countries. They attribute the 
reported gain to the power of the propensity score matching method used to construct 
non-event firms. Later, Chari et al (2009) chose a reverse set of acquirers and targets 
where the acquirers are located in developed countries and the target firms are in 
emerging countries. Instead of examining the acquirers wealth effects they look into the 
effects of mergers on the targets shareholders. Once again, they find the performance 
of the target tends to improve following acquisition. In particular, the return of assets 
(ROA) increases by 16% on average in the five years following the acquisition.  
Furthermore, Kale (2004) examines mergers impact on Indian acquirers and finds 
positive abnormal returns for acquirers (1.71%) following the acquisition. Kale argues 
that the value creation pattern in emerging markets might be very different compared 
to the mechanism typically observed in developed countries. The positive average 
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abnormal return is a primary result of the nature of traditional business environment in 
these (emerging) markets and its gradual transformation following liberalization.  
In an earlier study, Kim (2000) also used a simply market model to examine the wealth 
effects of an FDI announcement on Korean bidders. He finds that expanding into more 
advanced economies does not yield any statistically significant positive abnormal 
returns, while investing in less developed countries (LDCs) consistently generates 
positive and significant stock return for the bidder. He argues that the significant gains 
might be attributed to the ownership advantages of Korean firms over those in less 
developed countries. Meanwhile, such ownership advantages disappear when they 
invest in more advanced economies. In addition, the investment decision into advanced 
economies might be driven by the non-value maximization behavior of Korean firms 
managers who often benefit from a close connection with government agencies.  
In summary, we are aware of only a few studies examining the wealth effects of 
acquisition events in emerging markets. The inconsistency in their results suggests a 
significant difference in the sign and magnitude of wealth effects in these countries 
compared to such effects in developed economies.  
3.2.4. Estimation model of abnormal return 
This study also addresses problems associated with the calculation of abnormal return 
in previous studies. First, we use a long run instead of short run abnormal return to 
proxy for wealth effects. We use a long run window from one to five years to measure 
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excess return. We are unaware of any model predicting how long the wealth effects 
may disappear. However, we observe a number of studies that use a one to five years 
interval. Such a length of time horizon is also used to measure excess return after stock 
offering events (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995). Besides, 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) argue that the effect of restructuring decisions related to the 
appointment of new managers, combining the operations of both companies, and 
pursuing new investment opportunities should take a few years. Moreover, Healy and 
Palepu (1995) suggest that abnormal return should be measured over the course of at 
least 16 months. In our examination, acquirers and targets have distinctive 
organizational structures and are located in countries with great cultural differences. 
Therefore it may take a long time for the wealth effects to disappear in the performance 
record of the acquirer.  
Secondly, we use a different method to measure the long run abnormal return because 
methods adopted in a large number of previous studies may be systematically 
erroneous.  
3.2.4.1. Single-index model 
The literature is filled with studies examining short-run wealth effects in domestic or 
cross-border acquisitions14. The most common technique used in examining 
announcement return is using a single-index model as a basis for abnormal return 
14
 Malatesta (1983), Frank and Harris (1989), Kennedy and Limmack (1993) used the market model and found 
significant and negative wealth effects. Other studies using market adjusted model (Chatterjee, 2000; Bradley and 
Sundaram, 2004; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003) and CAPM (Gregory, 1997; Franks and Harris, 1989) yield 
inconsistent results about cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) in the long run. 
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calculation15. The underlying assumption of using a single-index model is the existence 
of an efficient market where merger news is quickly digested and reflected in stock 
returns. The wealth effects can therefore be captured in a certain number of days 
around the acquisition announcement.  
Despite the extensive application in long-run studies, Agrawal et al. (1992) suggest that 
these models are only sufficiently robust for short term examinations when the event 
window is narrow, but not suitable for examinations in longer measurement intervals. 
Long term investigations require control for other firm-specific factors such as size and 
change of beta risks (Dimson and Marsh, 1986; Agrawal et al. 1992). Dimson and Marsh 
(1996) argue that results yielded from a market model are susceptible to bias since 
there is a lack of explicit control for firm size. They also argue that as the measurement 
interval is extended any bias will be steadily magnified and soon become dominant 
In addition, using market models or CAPM models to predict benchmark returns has 
potential methodological problems when the event window is extended to a few years 
after the announcement (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Brown and Warner (1980) criticize 
the market model as the least efficient among event study methods since it introduces 
significant noise into the result. When the event window is narrow, it is easier to 
capture the genuine effects on stock performance since the firms risk is unlikely to 
change significantly in a short period of time. As the window extends to several years 
the captured abnormal returns might be plagued by various corporate decisions and 
15
 Popular models are the mean adjusted model, market model, market adjusted model, and Fama and the French 
three-factor model (Sudarsanam, 1996). 
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events which occur during the length of the measurement interval (Jensen and Ruback, 
2003). Furthermore, underpinning the single-index model is a set of statistical 
assumptions which are frequently adopted without empirical tests. When the market 
model is subjected to rigorous econometrics inspection, Coutts et al. (1994) find that 
misspecification is endemic in the market model: typically the residuals from the least 
square estimation exhibit autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and non-normality with 
occasional evidence of non-linearity. As assumptions do not hold, any inference about 
the impact of an event on return may be erroneous. Barber and Lyon (1997) also argued 
that the common methods using the above models to calculate abnormal returns for 
long run analysis are conceptually flawed and lead to biased test statistics. In brief, the 
above studies suggest that a short run model may be suitable to examine the temporary 
reaction of market investors around an announcement date and not suitable to 
measure long term excess wealth effects.  
3.2.4.2. Traditional matching technique 
Considering the problems of single-index models, later studies use a matching approach 
described in the study of Barber and Lyon (1997). Performance of firm matched upon 
size and market-to-book ratio is used as a benchmark to estimate excess return. Dimson 
and Marsh (1996) advocate control for size in event studies as they find that size is an 
especially important influential factor of stock return. Besides this, Fama and French 
(1992) find both size and market-to-book ratio is a significant determinant of stock 
return. Subsequently, various articles follow this route and control for firm size and 
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market-to-book ratio in the estimation of the long run abnormal return of events such 
as initial public offerings (Loughran and Ritter, 1995), seasonal offerings (Spiess et al. 
1995), and stock splits and dividends (Desai and Jain, 1996. There are three different 
approaches to control for size and market to book ratio: (1) Fama and French three-
factor model16, (2) reference portfolio17, and (3) control firm approach18.  
Among these approaches, the control firm approach is more robust for three reasons. 
First, Barber and Lyon (1997) showed that using the control firm approach to calculate 
abnormal returns is more robust than the reference portfolio and the three-factor 
models. The test statistics are better specified when matching sample firms to control 
firms with a similar size and market to book ratios.  Second, if all non-event firms in 
emerging countries are pooled to form reference portfolios based on size and book-to-
market ratio,19 performance of acquirers in countries with more favourable policies will 
form a bias towards higher abnormal returns. The opposite happens with the 
performance of acquirers in countries with less favourable policies, and that 
performance will generate bias towards lower abnormal returns. As a result, captured 
abnormal returns are biased because country effects are not isolated. Furthermore, the 
16
 Fama and French Three Factor Model (FFTF): The model is based on CAPM but accommodates Size factor and Book-
to-Market factor in the model. Fama and French justified that Beta, Size and Book to Market factors are adequate to 
explain the observed normal return. The return generated from this model can also be called a dynamic benchmark 
(Sudarsanam, 2003). 
17
 Reference Portfolio: The portfolio is constructed by stocks with predefined characters (e.g. size, Book-to-Market, 
industry). The real return of this portfolio is the dynamic benchmark of the normal return (Sudarsanam, 2003). 
18
 Within the traditional matching framework, the match firm has the closest values of size and market-to-book ratio 
to those of the acquirer. In order to find a match, a series of firms in the market are screened so that their market 
values (size) fall within a range of 70%-130% of an acquirers size. Then a firm that has the closest market-to-book ratio 
within the size range is chosen as the match. Alternatively, matched firms can also be drawn the other way around, 
where market-to-book ratio is used for filtering then size is used as a criterion to find out the closest match. 
19
 All peer firms are pooled then ranked by size and divided into 10 groups. Each group will then be further divided into 
5 smaller groups based on book-to-market ratio. Altogether, there will be 50 reference portfolios that can be used to 
match with sample firms (Agrawal et al., 1992; Barber and Lyon, 1997). 
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reference portfolio approach yields listing, rebalancing and skewness biases of test 
statistics, plus the implementation of this approach is more cumbersome. Thirdly, the 
control firm approach can mitigate problems related to the CAPM three-factor model 
(Kothari and Warner, 1996). As a result the control firms approach appears to be the 
most suitable within the traditional matching frameworks.  
However, one major drawback of the control firm approach is that it cannot handle too 
many matching criteria. Matching upon size and book-to-market involves dealing with 
two dimensions, and the procedure is manageable. However, matching upon three or 
more characteristics requires a solution which is able to accommodate three or more 
dimensions, which the existing procedure of this matching framework cannot resolve 
efficiently. Guo and Fraser (2009) refer to this as a dimensionality problem, which can 
be dealt with a propensity score matching framework.  
3.2.4.3. Propensity score matching and difference-in-differences 
In principle, in order to investigate the impacts of mergers and acquisitions on acquiring 
firm performance, it is ideal if we can identify an identical firm to the acquirer that does 
not involve mergers and acquisitions (non-acquirer). While this sort of counterfactual 
observation is generally unobservable, we can use propensity score matching to find a 
non-acquiring match or matches that resemble such counterfactual quality. The 
advantage of propensity score matching is that it can handle dimensionality problems 
while retaining the quality of traditional matching techniques (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983; Guo and Fraser, 2009; Chari et al., 2008; Petrova and Shafter, 2010). Essentially, 
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propensity score matching generates matched firms that have similar distributions of 
matching characteristics (covariates) to those of the acquirer. Matched firms also have a 
similar probability of acquisition to the acquirer. This constraint controls for the 
confoundedness and replicates conditions of randomized experiments for observational 
studies, thereby reducing selection bias on observable characteristics (Guo and Fraser, 
2009). 
Within this framework, matched firms can be found by nearest neighbour matching, 
mahalanobis or a kernel-based matching technique. The first two techniques are 
greedy matching, and they are inferior to the last one. According to Guo and Fraser 
(2009), the crucial advantage of kernel-based matching is that it takes into account the 
distance of each control firm within a specified span to the treated firm given a matrix of 
covariates. While nearest neighbour matching (1-to-1 or 1-to-n) treats control firms 
equally or assigns the same weight to each control firm, kernel-based matching use a 
kernel function to assign weight to each control firm so that higher weight is attributed 
to the control firm which is closest to the treated firm in terms of propensity score and 
lower weight is attributed to one that is further away.  Another advantage of kernel 
based matching is that the number of control firms is not limited within a small stratum, 
which is the case of greedy 1-to-n matching. Kernel based matching uses all possible 
matches within a predefined span (bandwidth), hence more firms are included in the 
control portfolio of each treated firm. In brief, by incorporating more information about 
the closeness of control firms to the treated firm and including more firms in the control 
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portfolio for each treated firm, kernel based matching would arguably generate better 
estimates of counterfactual outcomes for the outcomes of the treated firm.  
As kernel-based matching can mitigate selection on certain observable characteristics, it 
often yields reasonable results20 (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). However, there is still 
room for improvement (Girma et al., 2006). In effect, Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) 
proved that a combination of non-parametric propensity score matching approach with 
a difference-in-differences technique was effective. By definition, the difference-in-
differences estimator takes into account the longitudinal nature of the data and 
measures the excess outcome growth for the treated compared with the non-
treated
21
. The combined method can further reduce unobserved time-invariant 
individual-specific and common macroeconomic effect components that influence the 
participation decision (or treatment assignment) (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000; 
Heckman et al., 1997, 1998). This property of difference-in-differences may serve well in 
this paper because acquirers (participants) and control firms (non-participants) are 
occasionally pooled from different countries (geographically mismatched). Therefore, 
this technique could reduce latent bias caused by differences in macroeconomic factors 
(temporarily-invariant sources of bias) among acquirers and control firms.  
In brief, the combination of propensity score matching and difference-in-differences can 
deal with the selection of observables and unobservables more effectively than other 
methods extensively used in the previous studies. This advantage is highly important 
20
 (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000, p. 438) 
21
 (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000, p. 442) 
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because the power of event study methodology depends crucially on the quality of the 
benchmark
22. As a result, we employ this methodology to estimate the long run 
abnormal return.  
 
  
22
 Dimson and Marsh (1996), p. 119 
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3.3. Methodology  
3.3.1. Fundamental problem in observational studies 
One of the major problems in observational studies (such as program evaluation and 
event study) is that the counterfactual outcome of an event is generally unobservable. 
Unlike experimental investigations where the experiments are replicable and the 
assignment to the treatment of a certain subject is random, the assignment to 
treatment in observational studies is not random. Therefore a certain level of bias in the 
selection of treatment might occur, especially when the criteria for selection into the 
treatment is correlated with the outcome. Therefore, in observational studies it is ideal 
to be able to approximate conditions of experimental studies where the assignment to 
treatment is a random process. Rubin (2008) describes this process as a design of 
observational studies to approximate randomized trials. He argues that a crucial idea 
when trying to estimate causal effects from an observational data set is to conceptualize 
the observational data set as having arisen from a complex randomized experiment, 
where the rules used to assign the treatment conditions have been lost and must be 
reconstructed.  
In this study, one of the main tasks is to pinpoint the abnormal return which is purely 
the result of cross-border acquisitions between emerging-market bidders (EM bidders) 
and developed-market targets (DV targets) rather than the result of any other incidents. 
Since the counterfactual returns are unobservable in this type of study, it is necessary to 
closely estimate this return so that the final evaluation will be less inflicted by selection 
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bias. This task is equivalent to identifying an appropriate control firm or control group 
for the event firm (acquirer) whose return can be used as a counterfactual outcome for 
impacts evaluation. In this respect, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is a more 
contemporaneous framework which enables the identification of a control firm or 
control group upon a set of ex-ante (pre-event) criteria. More specifically, the purpose 
of using PSM in this paper is to find a counterfactual firm or group (for the EM bidders 
when they acquire DV targets) that has not undergone similar acquisitions on the basis 
of observable characteristics. The trajectory of return of such a control firm or group can 
then be used as a counterfactual return for the evaluation of M&A impacts.  
3.3.2. Neyman-Rubin counterfactual framework  
Counterfactual framework is one of the key models in causality investigations. The 
following part describes the mathematical form of this framework. The statistic 
literature documents a series of papers by Neyman (1923) and Rubin (1974, 1978 and 
1986) that form the background of the counterfactual framework. This framework starts 
with some fundamental notations.  
ଵܻ௜ The outcome of unit ݅ under treated conditions 
଴ܻ௜ The outcome of unit ݅ under non-treated conditions 
ଵܹDenotes receipt of the treatment 
଴ܹDenotes non-receipt of the treatment 
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௜ܻ Indicates measured outcome variable 
The Neyman-Rubin counterfactual framework can be formulated as follow:  
௜ܻ = ௜ܹ ଵܻ௜ + (1 െ ௜ܹ) ଴ܻ௜ Eq. 3.1 
The key message this formula tries to convey is that researchers cannot just directly link 
the cause ( ଵܹ) and effects ( ଵܻ௜) under the treatment condition, as they also need to 
check the outcome under non-treated conditions ( ଴ܻ௜) and then compare the outcome 
in treated and non-treated conditions. In a metaphoric way of expression, ଵܹand (1- ଵܹ) 
serve as a switcher that analysts can switch on and off the cause in order to document 
the difference in effect (Guo and Fraser, 2009, p. 25). As a result the causal effect for 
unit i is: ଵܻ௜ െ ଴ܻ௜ , by definition. However, the fundamental problem in counterfactual 
frameworks is that it is not possible to observe each individual treatment effect ଵܻ௜ െ ଴ܻ௜ 
since the outcome under non-treated condition ( ଴ܻ௜) is generally unobservable in non-
experimental studies. As a result, it is not possible to measure exactly what the causal 
effects under the counterfactual framework are. Nonetheless, the causal effects can be 
estimated by an examination of the average outcome of units under treated conditions 
and the average outcome of units under non-treated conditions and then evaluate the 
mean difference between thetwo groups in the population. More specifically, the 
average treatment effects can be estimated by the standard estimator for the average 
treatment effects: 
߬ = ܧ( ଵܻ|ܹ = 1) െ ܧ( ଴ܻ|ܹ = 0) Eq. 3.2 
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Where  
ܧ( ଴ܻ|ܹ = 0) is an estimation of the expectation of counterfactual outcomes  
It is important to note that ܧ( ଴ܻ|ܹ = 0) is just an effort to approximate the true 
counterfactual mean outcome ܧ( ଴ܻ|ܹ = 1). In an application of the Neyman-Rubin 
counterfactual framework on a sample representing a population, the standard 
estimator for the average treatment effects can be modified to: 
Ƹ߬ = ܧ(ݕଵෞ|ݓ = 1) െ ܧ(ݕ଴ෞ|ݓ = 0) Eq. 3.3 
Where: 
Ƹ߬: Estimated average treatment effect  
ܧ(ݕଵෞ|ݓ = 1) ׷ Estimated mean of outcomes under treated and condition 
ܧ(ݕ଴ෞ|ݓ = 1) ׷ Estimated mean of outcomes under non-treated and condition 
3.3.3. Unconfoundedness assumption  
The Neyman-Rubin counterfactual framework is a useful tool to build a method of 
estimating counterfactual outcomes. However, in order to apply this framework to 
actual evaluations, researchers need to impose a further assumption to simulate the 
condition of randomized experiments. The crucial assumption for actual evaluation is 
Unconfoundedness (Rusenbaum and Rubin, 1983), which can be expressed as: ( ଵܻ, ଴ܻ) ٣W | X  
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This assumption means that conditional on covariate vector X (which contains 
conditioning variables), the assignment to either treatment ( ଵܹ) or non-treatment ( ଴ܹ) 
is independent from the outcome ( ଵܻ, ଴ܻ) of the treatment. Equivalently, covariate X can 
capture all of the ex-ante differences between the treated and control group. 
Rusenbaum and Rubin (1983) describe this assumption as Unconfoundedness. Other 
studies address this assumption with different names, even though its meaning stays 
unchanged23. The key idea of this assumption is that if there is no difference in 
covariates between the treated and control group the assignment to treatment or non-
treatment is independent from the potential outcomes of the treatment. Only under 
unconfoundedness condition can ܧ( ଴ܻ|ܹ = 0|ܺ) be used as the estimate of the 
expectation of the theoretical counterfactual outcomes (ܧ( ଵܻ|ܹ = 0|ܺ). Specifically, 
ܧ( ଵܻ|ܹ = 0|ܺ) = ܧ( ଴ܻ|ܹ = 0|ܺ) 
3.3.4. Counterfactual mean estimators 
3.3.4.1. Propensity score matching models  
Expected outcomes of counterfactuals can be estimated by the Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) model. The key feature of this model is balancing the treated and 
control groups upon propensity score (i.e. probability of participation or probability of 
receiving treatment). The resulting sample after data balancing will then be similar to 
one generated by a randomized experiment where the rule of treatment assignment is 
23
 Unconfoundedness can be used interchangeably with Selection on observables (Barnow and Cain et al., 1980) or 
Conditional independence (Lechner, 1999) or Exogeneity (Imbens, 2004) or Ignorable treatment assignment (Guo and 
Fraser, 2009). 
108 
 
                                                            
lost (Guo and Fraser, 2009 p. 37). Furthermore, the PSM model allows for matching on a 
single dimension, which eliminates problems associated with multi-dimension matching 
and leverages the practicality of the model.  According to Rubin (2008) and Guo and 
Fraser (2009), estimation of propensity score and propensity score matching is the 
most basic ingredient of unconfounded assignment mechanism. Within the PSM 
framework the average treatment effects estimator is formulated as follows: 
߬ = ܧ( ଵܻ|ܹ = 1|ܲ(ܺ)) െ ܧ( ଴ܻ|ܹ = 0|ܲ(ܺ)) Eq. 3.4 
Where ܲ(ܺ) is the propensity score of the participant and it is a function of observable 
characteristics that determine the probability of participation.  
On the basis of the propensity score, matching can be performed in two alternative 
mechanisms: Greedy matching (including nearest neighbor matching and mahalanobis 
matching) and Kernel-based matching 
In greedy matching, each treated case is matched with one or more non-treated cases 
based on the prior estimated propensity scores. For instance, in 1-to-1 matching the 
non-treated case is the one with a propensity score closest to that of the treated. By 
definition, matching on propensity score helps control the differences in observable 
characteristics between the treated and non-treated companies and replicates the 
random treatment assignment of experiments. In other words, conditioning on the 
similarity of the observable covariates between the treated and control firms, the 
treatment assignment is randomized in the matched sample.  
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We can use greedy matching on the propensity score rather than on a collective set of 
observable characteristics, because when treated and non-treated have the same 
propensity score they are likely to share the same distributions of covariates 
(Rosenbaum, 2002). Moreover, Guo and Fraser (2009) argue that differences may 
remain in distributions of covariates even in the case of a homogeneous propensity 
score. However, such difference is by chance rather than systematic difference. As a 
rule of thumb, chance difference on an individual level may disappear in group level 
analysis which involves a sufficiently large number of individual cases (e.g. Average 
Treatment Effects-ATE, or Average Treatment Effects on the Treated-ATT).  
The other matching model is kernel-based matching (KBM). Similar to the greedy 
matching mechanism, KBM allows for 1-to-n matching where the number of non-
treated controls is identified within a radius of the propensity score of the treated. 
However, the advantage of KBM over greedy matching lies in the use of kernel functions 
or other sophisticated mechanisms (e.g.) to generate weights assigned to the non-
treated cases. In principle, KBM uses a larger number of matches than greedy matching 
but the non-treated outcome in the latter is evenly weighted. Such an outcome in the 
KBM is weighted so that the outcome of a non-treated firm is assigned a higher weight if 
its propensity score is closer to that of the treated firm (this technique is often referred 
to as Kernel smoothing technique). Then the counterfactual outcome in KBM is the 
weighted average of non-treated outcomes. The primary interest of this study is to find 
the average difference between treated outcome and its counterfactual, which is the 
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treatment effect. Therefore, we need to measure the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) with the following formula: 
ܣܶܶ = 1݊ଵ෍቎ ଵܻ௜ െ෍ܹ(݅, ݆) ଴ܻ௝௡మ௝א஼ ቏௡భ௜א்  Eq. 3.5  
 
Assign ܶ = ൛݅ଵ, ݅ଶ,  , ݅௡భൟ and ܥ = ൛݆ଵ, ݆ଶ,  , ݆௡మൟ as a respective set of treated and 
control cases; (݅, ݆)  is the index of individually treated and control cases; 
( ଵܻ, ଴ܻ) denotes the outcome of the treated and control cases respectively; ܹ(݅, ݆) is 
the kernel weight function constructed on the basis of estimated propensity scores. σ ܹ(݅, ݆) ଴ܻ௝௡మ௝א஼  is the weighted average of all non-treated outcomes of cases that have 
the propensity score fall within the propensity radius of the treated. Thus, σ ܹ(݅, ݆) ଴ܻ௝௡మ௝א஼  is the counterfactual outcome estimator in the KBM.  
There is one condition that KBM needs to meet. ATT calculated with the KBM technique 
implies that control and treated cases must fall in a common support region since 
treated cases falling off the support region may have zero matches. Even if the treated 
and control groups share the same common support region, the potential matches for 
the treated case may be sparse, which undermines the power of the KBM method. In 
order to deal with this issue, Heckman (1997) recommend a trimming strategy. Various 
levels of trimming such as 2%, 5% or 10% at two ends of the treated and control 
distribution can be cut off to decrease the chance that both the treated and control 
cases fall off the common support region. Different trimming specifications can 
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therefore be treated as sensitivity analysis of ATT against the distributional property of 
propensity scores (Guo and Fraser, 2009). 
3.3.4.2. Non-parametric approach  
This approach is essentially an extension of the propensity score matching method. 
Current literature extends the PSM framework and takes into consideration the 
longtitudinal nature of a certain sample (Heckman et al., 1997, 1998). If the outcomes of 
the treated (and control) are observed at two different points in time, PSM can then be 
combined with the difference-in-differences technique (DIDs) to estimate the 
counterfactual outcome in a more dynamic fashion. DIDs estimator, while retaining the 
quality of the PSM method, can further reduce selection bias associated with temporal 
time-invariant unobservables (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000; Girmal et al., 2006). The 
DIDs estimator is expressed as follows: 
ܦܫܦݏ = 1݊ଵ෍቎൫ ଵܻ௧భ௜ െ ଵܻ௧బ௜൯ െ෍ܹ(݅, ݆)( ଴ܻ௧భ௝௡మ௝א஼ െ ଴ܻ௧బ௝)቏௡భ௜א்  Eq. 3.6  
 
Assign ܶ = ൛݅ଵ, ݅ଶ,  , ݅௡భൟ and ܥ = ൛݆ଵ, ݆ଶ,  , ݆௡మൟ as a respective set of treated and 
control cases; (݅, ݆)  is the index of individually treated and control cases; 
( ଵܻ, ଴ܻ) denotes the outcome of treated and control cases respectively; ܹ(݅, ݆) is the 
kernel weight function constructed on the basis of estimated propensity scores; ݐ଴, ݐଵ 
denotes the time point before and after the intervention, respectively; ൫ ଵܻ௧భ௜ െ ଵܻ௧బ௜൯ is 
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outcome growth of the treated; ( ଴ܻ௧భ௝ െ ଴ܻ௧బ௝) outcome growth of the non-treated; σ ܹ(݅, ݆)( ଴ܻ௧భ௝௡మ௝א஼ െ ଴ܻ௧బ௝)  is the weighted average of all non-treated outcome growths 
of cases that have a propensity score fall within the propensity radius of the treated. 
Thus σ ܹ(݅, ݆)( ଴ܻ௧భ௝௡మ௝א஼ െ ଴ܻ௧బ௝) is the outcome growth counterfactual estimator in this 
combined approach.  
3.3.4.3. Stock performance measure 
We use the standard Return Index (RI) to measure the performance outcome of a firm 
at any point in time. Return index, by definition, is a theoretical growth in the value of a 
share held over a specified period, assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase 
additional units of that stock at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date
24 
The index is formulated as follows: 
ܴܫ௧ = ܴܫ௧ିଵ כ ܲܫ௧ܲܫ௧ିଵ (1 + ܦ ௧ܻ100 כ 1ܰ) 
Where 
ܴܫ௧:ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ݅݊݀݁ݔ ݋݊ ݀ܽݕ ݐ 
ܴܫ௧ିଵ ׷ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ݅݊݀݁ݔ ݋݊ ݀ܽݕ ݐ െ 1 
ܲܫ௧:ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ݅݊݀݁ݔ ݋݊ ݀ܽݕ ݐ 
ܲܫ௧ିଵ:ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ݅݊݀݁ݔ ݋݊ ݀ܽݕ ݐ െ 1 
24
 Datastream glossary. 
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ܦ ௧ܻ:ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀ ݕ݈݅݁݀ % ݋݊ ݀ܽݕ ݐ 
ܰ:ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ݓ݋ݎ݇݅݊݃ ݀ܽݕݏ ݅݊ ܽ ݕ݁ܽݎ (260 ݀ܽݕݏ) 
RI measure fits well into our methodology since we can calculate outcome growth 
( ଵܻ௧భ௜ െ ଵܻ௧బ௜) with ease: 
ଵܻ௧భ௜ െ ଵܻ௧బ௜ = ܴܫ௧ଶ െ ܴܫ௧ଵܴܫ௧ଵ כ 100 
3.3.5. Propensity score estimation models 
3.3.5.1. The choice of covariates 
Covariates (or conditioning variables) are determinants of propensity score. Choosing 
appropriate conditioning variables is very important in observational studies since 
treatment effects are sensitive to the specification of such variables (Guo and Fraser, 
2009). Two issues should be taken into consideration in specifying the propensity score 
estimation model. First, covariates must drive both treatment assignment and 
treatment outcome so that the conditional independence assumption (CIA) or 
unconfoundedness is satisfied. Second, only important variables are included in order to 
maintain the feasibility of the sample size. Theoretically, it is ideal to include a large set 
of conditioning variables in the estimation model. However, as the number of 
conditioning variables increases, the range of common support regions is narrowed 
down, perhaps because less non-treated cases are qualified as a match. A narrow 
common support region undermines the power of propensity score matching (Todd, 
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2005). When a large number of observations is dropped from the sample, the results 
will increasingly be prone to selection bias. In this paper, paying attention to sample size 
is important since data unavailability is an endemic problem in these markets.  
We choose firm size, market-to-book ratio and cash level as conditioning variables. As 
shown in the earlier part about the drawbacks of the single-index model, controlling for 
size and market-to-book ratio reduces the selection bias in the final results (Dimson and 
Marsh, 1996; Barber and Lyon, 1997; Agrawal et al., 1992). In addition, Rau and 
Vermaelen (1997) show that market-to-book is associated with acquisition probability, 
which then meets the treatment assignment assumption of PSM. Furthermore, size and 
market-to-book are also key determinants of stock return in both developed markets 
(Fama and French, 1992) and some emerging economies such as Turkey (Asku and 
Onder, 2003). Therefore, control for these variables satisfies the assumption that 
covariates must be determinants of the treatment outcome.  
Cash is included as a conditioning variable since a high level of cash fuels the agency 
problems. According to Jensen (1986)s free cash flow study, excessive cash provides the 
managers resources at their discretion and they tend to waste it on unprofitable 
investment projects, including mergers and acquisitions. Besides, as cash-rich firms are 
potential takeover targets (Song and Walkling, 1993; Bruner, 1988), managers may be 
motivated to engage in acquisitions in order to quickly increase the firm size with 
excessive cash and ultimately protect their position. In emerging markets, agency 
problems are more serious due to weak institutionalization (Kim, 2000; Kale, 2004, 
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Bhaumik et al., 2010). Without strict monitoring, managers in these countries have 
more reasons to waste cash on value-destroying acquisitions.  
We further control the fixed effects of macroeconomics factors. Additionally, we include 
year dummies in the covariate vector in order to keep acquirers and controls in the 
same wave of mergers and acquisitions. As mergers tend to occur in waves (Martynova 
and Reeneborg, 2009), inclusion of year dummies can improve the quality of the match.  
In a nutshell, the general function of the propensity score model for this paper is as 
follows: 
ܲݎ݋ܾ(ܣܿݍݑ݅ݏ݅ݐ݅݋݊௧ = 1)
= ݂(ܵ݅ݖ݁௧ିଵ,ܯݐܾ௧ିଵ,ܥܽݏ݄௧ିଵ,ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁,ܻ݁ܽݎ ݀ݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) 
3.3.5.2. Selection model specification 
We need to identify the proper specification of the selection model so that the covariate 
distributions of acquirers and non-acquirers are sufficiently overlapped after matching. 
The procedure to find such a model is described in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), 
Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Guo and Fraser (2009).  It includes repeated tasks from 
in-turn running various specifications of the logistics model to matching then using 
bivariate tests to check until imbalances in the matched sample become insignificant. 
The problem is this procedure is only feasible in nearest neighbor matching where the 
matched firm is identifiable for each treated firm with the help of software (pstest in 
psmatch2). However, when the kernel-based matching is used, pstest does not make 
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sense in this case since more controls are used to calculate the counterfactual outcome 
than the nearest neighbor only (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003, pstest manual). Therefore 
the most appropriate selection model for the local linear regression technique is likely 
to be the simple logistics model, where the choice of conditioning variables are 
theoretically driven as explained in the earlier part of this paper. The appropriateness of 
this selection model is further justified by the results of balancing tests.  
Table 3.1: Propensity score estimation model 
Covariate Odd ratio Standard error Z-statistic p-value 
Firm size 1.597547 0.0555485 13.470 0.000 
Market-to-book ratio 0.979417 0.0130576 -1.560 0.119 
Cash ratio 6.001688 2.295293 4.690 0.000 
Year dummies    Yes 
Bidders country dummies    Yes 
Number of observations      35932 
 
3.3.5.3. Significant difference before matching  
The following table presents the descriptive statistics of main characteristics which are 
theoretically considered as key determinants that jointly distinguish acquiring and non-
acquiring firms. The sample comprises 281 treated firms and more than 35,000 control 
firms. Noticeably, on average acquirers seem to have a larger size and higher market-to-
book ratio.  The acquirers median of size and market-to-book are 6.07 and 2.17, 
respectively, while the corresponding figures of control firms are 4.87 and 1.54. These 
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figures are consistent with conventional wisdom that firms with larger size and higher 
market-to-book ratio (glamour firms) have greater resources and a better chance of 
engaging in mergers and acquisitions. The cash holding statistics, on the contrary, show 
no difference in the average cash holding ratio between acquirers and control firms, 
whilst the free cash flow theory suggests that acquirers tend to hold larger amount of 
cash. Larger size and higher market-to-book ratio observed in the acquirer group 
suggests that the selection to acquisition is not random. Furthermore, the Hotelling test 
confirms that the vector of covariate means are significantly different between the two 
groups, suggesting that further steps are required to remove such difference in the 
vector of means so that subsequent estimation and analysis is not plagued with 
selection bias.  
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of conditioning variables (covariates) before matching 
  Bidders characteristics Control's characteristics Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
Median test Hotelling 
test 
  mean median std mean median std Z statistic Pearson chi2(1) F-statistic 
Mtb ratio 3.479075 2.17 4.901328 3.821503 1.54 56.28072 -6.118 *** 35.2762 *** 51.73 *** 
Size 6.078712 6.071699 1.872089 4.960478 4.870061 1.51355 -10.765 *** 73.3458 *** 
Cash ratio 0.1597 0.114168 0.148392 0.148903 0.104552 0.146523 -1.761 * 2.2417   
N 35651 281 ***,* significant at 1% and 10% level, respectively 
Note: Market-to-book ratio and Cash holding over total assets are calculated on the basis of local currency in order to 
eliminate the impacts of exchange rates fluctuation. Total assets on the other hand are absolute value rather than 
ratio, therefore this variable is calculated in USD to serve the cross-country comparison purpose.  
3.3.5.4. Balancing tests 
In order to justify for the specification of selection model used in this study, balancing 
tests are conducted in a Kernel matching setting to see whether the observed 
differences before matching are eliminated. The result shows that after matching, the 
covariates no longer jointly and significantly determine the probability of acquisition, 
suggesting the assignment to treatment is random and conditional on the propensity 
score estimates generated from the selection model. In other words, the specification of 
the selection model is successful in removing differences in the distributions of 
covariates between treated and control groups.  
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The following table presents the results of balancing tests in Epanechnikov kernel 
matching for different situations. There are five sample situations corresponding to five 
alternative event windows. This study uses three types of test to check for covariate 
balance after matching: Standardised bias, t-test and joint insignificance test. Regarding 
standardised bias tests, the results in both tables show that bias is reduced significantly 
after matching, particularly where there are remarkable decreases in size and cash 
biases, perhaps because size and cash are significant determinants of event 
participation as illustrated in Table 3.1. In addition, all of the standardised differences in 
all sample situations are less than 20 after matching, which according to Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1985), suggests no problem in matching performance. Similar results are 
achieved in testing for the mean differences of covariates before and after matching. In 
the unmatched sample (i.e. before matching), the mean size of the treated and control 
firms are significantly different in all settings. Such differences are consistently 
eliminated after matching. Market-to-book and cash ratios are also balanced after 
kernel matching, even though the effects of these matching procedures are not as 
powerful on these covariates as on size. Finally, joint insignificance tests also show 
satisfactory matching results since performing logistic regressions on matched samples 
results in the joint insignificance of matching covariates and a reduction of fit statistic 
(Pseudo R-squared) in all cases. These results prove that after matching the covariates in 
the matched sample are no longer jointly significant determinants of event participation 
(acquisition decision), therefore indicating that the specification of a selection model 
leads to satisfaction of ignorable treatment assignment condition.   
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Table 3.3: Kernel matching balancing tests 
It is noted that the x-year (x=1 to 5) wealth effect is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), where the outcome variable (return growth rate during event window) is calculated using the 
difference-in-differences technique. An unmatched sample is a sample before matching, and a matched sample is one after matching. Standardized bias test results represent the performance of the 
matching process. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), if standardized bias is less than 20 the matching process is deemed satisfactory. T-value and p-value are statistics of the test for the 
mean differences of covariates before (unmatched sample) and after matching (matched sample). The null hypothesis of this test is that the means of covariates are equal between the treated and 
control groups. Finally, the Pseudo R-squared indicates the explanatory power of the selection model. Pseudo R-squared close to zero is desirable in matching as it shows that the covariates cannot 
jointly distinguish the acquirer and control firm in the matched sample, which essentially satisfies the unconfoundedness assumption. Statistics of likelihood-ratio test are also indicators of joint 
insignificant test. Being unable to reject the null hypothesis means conditioning variables are unlikely to jointly determine the treatment assignment or program participation of the firm. 
Matching 
covariates 
Sample type 1-year wealth effect 2-year wealth effect 3-year wealth effect 4-year wealth effect 5-year wealth effect 
Standardised 
bias 
t-value  Standardised 
bias 
t-value  Standardised 
bias 
t-value  Standardised 
bias 
t-value  Standardised 
bias 
t-value  
size Unmatched 82.3 14.58  79.7 13.01  70.6 10.92  71.2 9.94  68.6 8.09  
Matched 1.2 0.14  0.0 0.00  -6.3 -0.59  -5.3 -0.45  -8.0 -0.58  
mtbv Unmatched 0.1 0.01  4.1 0.45  9.5 1.06  9.3 0.93  13.3 1.24  
Matched 0.2 0.09  0.8 0.23  2.2 0.37  4.7 0.86  6.4 0.75  
cash ratio Unmatched 6.0 1.00  6.2 0.95  6.0 0.87  3.9 0.51  5.0 0.59  
Matched 0.5 0.05  1.0 0.10  1.7 0.16  -2.3 -0.19  1.6 0.11  
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Table 3-3 continues                
Sample type Pseudo R2 LR chi2  Pseudo R2 LR chi2  Pseudo R2 LR chi2  Pseudo R2 LR chi2  Pseudo R2 LR chi2  
Unmatched 0.062 199.07  0.060 156.08  0.048 110.14  0.049 92.84  0.045 62.51  
Matched 0.000 0.02  0.000 0.06  0.001 0.61  0.002 1.13  0.003 1.14  
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3.4. Data 
3.4.1. Data sources 
The mergers and acquisitions events are collected for the period of 1990-2010 in the 
Thomson One Banker database (T1B). Originally all events since 1980 were collected, 
but the events in the 1980-1990 period were dropped since covariates and return data 
are not simultaneously available to form a usable record for this examination. The 
mergers and acquisitions package in T1B provides deal-specific characteristics including 
countries and industries of acquirers and targets, deal value, payment method, attitude 
of the acquirers, percentage of target shares owned by acquirer after the transaction, 
targets public status and the announcement and completion date of the merger 
transaction. The matching procedure required the identity of acquirers and peer firms 
(SEDOL codes) and data of conditioning variables (size, market-to-book and cash holding 
over total assets ratio). The former is again collected from T1B, while data of the latter is 
collected from WorldScope. GDP data from 1990 to 2010 is collected from the World 
Bank website. Table 3.4 summarizes our data sources for different types of data. 
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Table 3.4:  Data sources 
Data  Source 
Acquirer,  Control  firms  name and SEDOL  
Thomson 
One Banker 
Acquirer, target industry and industry SIC codes 
Acquirer, target country 
Deal announcement date 
Deal value 
Percentage of shares owned by acquirers before and after 
the acquisitions 
Deal financing (cash-financed or stock-financed or mix) 
Acquirer attitude (Friendly, Hostile, Neutral) 
Acquirer public status 
Acquirer and control market capitalization, market-to-book 
ratio, cash holding, total assets 
Stock prices and return indexes of acquirers and control 
firms 
Datastream 
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3.4.2. Distribution of events by country 
The table below shows the distribution of mergers and acquisitions events by country of 
bidder and country of target. The initial sample contains 1130 events (Table 3.5), but 
568 events were filtered out due to the unavailability of covariates (size, market-to-book 
and cash holding ratio) and a further 281 events were dropped because of duplications. 
This study only keeps the latest events (by completion date) if the bidder has engaged in 
multiple events in its history25. Therefore 281 events remain in the sample, and this 
sample is used for a later matching procedure. The table shows a common pattern that 
bidders in more advanced economies in emerging countries such as India and Malaysia 
are more active in acquisitions of developed market firms, whilst targets in more 
developed countries such as the US and UK are more frequently acquired. This pattern 
seems consistent with the bootstrapping hypothesis,26 which states that by 
bootstrapping themselves in the higher standard of corporate governance firms learn 
new capabilities.  
Table 3.5: Breakdown of M&A deals in Thomson One Banker 
Target country Acquirer country Number of deal 
All All 139,895 
All Emerging 13,991 
Developed Emerging 1,130 
 
25
 If the earliest event is kept then the estimates of abnormal returns fail to accommodate the bidders experience in 
cross-border acquisitions.  
26
 Khanna and Palepu (2004) 
125 
 
                                                            
Table 3.6: Distribution of M&A events by country 
Bidder Country Frequency Percent Target country Frequency Percent 
India 96 34.16 USA 86 30.6 
Malaysia 51 18.15 UK 52 18.51 
South Africa 34 12.1 Australia 47 16.73 
Taiwan 25 8.9 Canada 17 6.05 
China 20 7.12 Germany 15 5.34 
Russia 8 2.85 Italy 10 3.56 
Mexico 7 2.49 Netherlands 7 2.49 
Philippines 6 2.14 Japan 6 2.14 
Poland 6 2.14 Spain 6 2.14 
Korea 5 1.78 Denmark 4 1.42 
Brazil 4 1.42 Finland 4 1.42 
Egypt 3 1.07 Swiss 4 1.42 
Hungary 3 1.07 Austria 3 1.07 
Thailand 3 1.07 Belgium 3 1.07 
Turkey 3 1.07 France 3 1.07 
Argentina 2 0.71 Norway 3 1.07 
Columbia 2 0.71 Sweden 3 1.07 
Indonesia 1 0.36 Iceland 2 0.71 
Pakistan 1 0.36 Luxembourg 2 0.71 
Peru 1 0.36 Portugal 2 0.71 
Total  281 100 Ireland 1 0.36 
New Zealand 1 0.36 
Total 281 100 
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3.4.3. Distribution of events by year 
Figure 3-1: Number of deals by year 
 
Source: Directly from our sample 
This figure illustrates the number of deals in the final sample. 281 mergers and 
acquisition events are documented from 1988 to 2010. Events from 2011 onwards are 
excluded because stock returns and return indices are needed for at least one whole 
year after the announcement date so as to accommodate a minimum one year event 
window. Overall, the graph shows an increasing trend of mergers and acquisitions 
activity in emerging markets. However, the number of deals each year is very small, 
even though it is common for infant markets of corporate control. Before 2000, less 
than 15 acquisitions are observed in every single year. After 2000, the number of 
acquisitions increased rapidly and reached the peak of 112 in 2008. In 2009, the number 
of deals dropped remarkably, perhaps driven by the Asian economic crisis. This pattern 
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reflects changes of business environment in emerging countries. Firms in these 
countries previously operated in closed economies characterized by a range of financial 
and regulatory restrictions, and their market for corporate control is virtually non-
existent. However, such restrictions are gradually being removed over the years along 
with the economic liberalization process (Kale, 2004). As a result, there is a growing 
number of firms in emerging markets which have embraced such opportunities to play 
their part in acquisition markets, especially when some of them make their way into 
more advanced countries.  
3.4.4. Distribution of events by category 
Table 3.7: Breakdown of sample by categories 
Category  Freq.  Percent. 
Target status Private 202 71.89 
Public 79 28.11 
Deal attitude Friendly 265 94.98 
Unfriendly 14 5.02 
Relatedness Related acquisition 155 55.16 
Conglomerate acquisition 126 44.84 
Acquisition for control  Acquisition of less than 50% targets shares 75 27.47 
Acquisition for control (>50%) 198 72.53 
Payment method Cash Payment Only 114 40.57 
Non-cash payment 167 59.43 
Multievent bidders Bidders with no previous experience 190 67.62 
Bidders with previous experience 91 32.38 
The above table shows the frequency and percentage of M&A deals by category in the 
sample of 281 bidders in emerging countries. It is noted that RELATEDNESS criterion is 
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defined on the basis of two-digit SIC. Acquisitions where the acquirer and target share 
the same two-digit SIC are sorted as related acquisitions, otherwise they will be classed 
as conglomerate acquisitions. Moreover, we assume bidders have full control over the 
main decisions of target firms (such as technology transfer or management training and 
sharing know-how) when they have more than 50% of the targets share. If they own less 
than 50%, they only conduct partial acquisitions. With regards to multi-event bidder 
criteria, the sample of event firms can be partitioned into bidders with previous 
experience in acquiring firms in developed markets and those bidders that have no such 
experience.  
There are several remarks in the sample structure. First, most of the deals involve 
private targets (>70%), so perhaps bidders encounter less competition in acquiring 
private firms than acquiring public firms. Plus, acquiring private firms generally entails 
lower premiums since bidders do not need to deal with the free rider problem. As a 
result, private targets mean a lower cost of entry in developed markets. Secondly, 
nearly 95% are friendly deals27. The structure implies severe obstacles in making 
opposed bids. The dominance of friendly bids could be evidence of a lack of resources or 
a lack of long term strategy to pursue the deal aggressively, or simply because cross-
border transaction costs are already too high so additional costs incurred from dealing 
with opposition might cancel out potential synergies. Finally, acquisitions for corporate 
control also account for more than 70% of deals, which is consistent with the 
27
 In accordance with the definitions of Thomson One Banker, the board recommends the offer in friendly bid. If the 
board does not, the bid will be considered unfriendly.  
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incomplete contract hypothesis which states that a targets management is less likely 
to transfer core values of the firm to bidders in emerging markets unless they are forced 
to surrender control of residual rights.  
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3.5. Empirical results and discussion 
3.5.1. Full sample analysis 
Table 3.8 presents the wealth effects as a result of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, where acquirers are listed in 17 emerging countries and target firms are 
from 20 developed markets. The long-run effects are estimated in five settings of event 
window, ranging from one to five years. Given that the final results generated from the 
combination of propensity score matching and difference-in-differences are sensitive to 
different trimming and bandwidth value28, we use three specifications to check the 
consistency of the results. The first specification is the default setting for local linear 
regression technique in psmatch2, where the default bandwidth is 0.8. The second 
specification retains the default bandwidth but uses a trim value of 5%, meaning 5% of 
treatment observations, at which the propensity score density of the control 
observations is the lowest
29, are dropped from the sample. Such trimming specification 
in effect imposes a common support region in the matching procedure in order to 
control for a problem that treated firms outside the common support region are used 
for matching. Specification 3 uses a smaller bandwidth of 0.5, meaning that less control 
firms are employed in the calculation of the counterfactual outcome.  
The technical term for the estimated wealth effect is average treatment effects on the 
treated (ATT), which measures the average change in return growth rate as a result of 
the intervention (i.e. acquisition event). This abnormal return is different from one 
28
 Guo and Fraser (2009) 
29
 psmatch2 manual (Stata11) 
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yielded in traditional single-index models and ordinary propensity score matching. The 
abnormal return estimated in the latter two methods measures the average change in 
return (instead of return growth rate) as a result of the acquisition. As mentioned in the 
methodology section, the difference-in-differences technique specifies wealth effects as 
the average change in return growth rate, thereby mitigating selection on unobservable 
and temporal time-invariant characteristics. As a result, the abnormal returns in this 
study cannot be directly compared with ones measured in the single-index model or 
traditional matching method. 
It is noteworthy that as the number of days in the window increases the number of 
acquirer and control firms in the matching sample decreases. The reason for this is that 
the number of completed deals has a tendency to increase gradually over the last five 
years,30 and therefore later deals can only be examined in a shorter event window.   
This table also shows a strong tendency of negative wealth effects in all specifications. 
ATT in all settings has negative sign, even though only the last three abnormal returns in 
the three, four and five year event windows are statistically significant at a 95% 
confidence interval. More specifically, three-year abnormal return growth rate is around 
26 to 28%, meaning that the return growth rate of acquirers would have been 26-28% 
higher on average had they not engaged in the acquisition event. The range of abnormal 
returns for the four year and five year event windows are approximately 35-40% and 61-
71%, respectively. The overall result therefore, manifests strong evidence of the 
30
 See Figure 1 
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acquirers underperformance in the course of three, four and five years after the 
completion of merger events.  
The finding of a highly negative abnormal return is a bit surprising in consideration of 
some previous findings in the literature. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find a negative 
abnormal return of -4.04%, while Datta et al. (2001) find a negative figure of -10.67% 
and Conn et al. (2005) find -19.78% in a three year event window. In addition, Agrawal 
et al. (1992) finds acquirers significantly underperform by -10.26% in a six year event 
window. Nonetheless, the finding of a highly negative abnormal return in this study is 
not extraordinary. Loughran and Vijh (1997) examine the wealth effects of mergers and 
acquisitions in US markets and find five year abnormal returns of around 60% in some 
settings. Kohers and Kohers (2001) examined this issue in US high tech firms and found 
three year abnormal returns of more than 32%. Gao and Sudarsanam (2003) found that 
high-tech UK firms underperform by more than 32% after just one year. The remarkable 
discrepancy in our results and those in previous studies can be partially attributed to a 
much higher level of market volatility in emerging markets compared to the volatility in 
well-established markets.  
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Table 3.8: Wealth effects on full sample 
The event window is calculated from the completion date of the merger to one or several years after that. The number of acquirers and total firms 
decreases with the longer event window because investing in developed countries is a recent phenomenon for emerging-markets acquirers, therefore a 
low number of acquirers have long ex-post track records. This number indicates that a large number of deals in the samples were completed within the 
last five years.  Specification 1: Default setting of local linear regression technique in psmatch2 where no trimming is made and bandwidth is set to 0.8. 
Specification 2: 5% of the treated cases are trimmed in order to drop cases in the off-support region. Specification 3: The bandwidth is set to a smaller 
value of 0.5, meaning that a smaller number of control cases are used in the calculation of the counterfactual outcome. Treated off-support: A number 
of cases fall out of the on-support region. They are observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum 
propensity score of the controls. ATT: average treatment effects on the treated firms, which has been clarified in the methodology section.*: Significant 
at 95% confidence interval, generated by bias-corrected (BC) method in bootstrapping procedure. 
Event window 
Number of 
Treated/Total 
Specification 1 
 
Specification 2 
 
Specification 3 
 
Treated 
off 
support 
ATT 
 
Treated 
off 
support 
ATT 
 
Treated 
off 
support 
ATT 
 
one-year  277/351615 0 -0.0094998   13 -0.0079936   0 -0.0018326   
two-year 226/26242 1 -0.0710932   11 -0.0774486   1 -0.0713981   
three-year 201/22707 1 -0.2613207 * 10 -0.2806422 * 1 -0.2591625 * 
four-year 165/19891 1 -0.3679601 * 8 -0.3970317 * 1 -0.3538264 * 
five-year 120/14279 0 -0.6913664 * 6 -0.7140772 * 0 -0.6166616 * 
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3.5.2. Subsample analysis 
A number of studies in the literature have shown that mergers and acquisitions with 
particular characteristics may yield positive abnormal returns for the acquirers. For 
instance, cash-financed acquisitions (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rao and Vermaelen, 
1998), acquisitions of firms in the related industry (Markides and Itner, 1994; Singh and 
Montgomery, 1987), acquisitions for corporate control (Chari et. al. 2009), acquisitions 
where acquirers have experience in the past, or acquisitions during a particular period 
of time (Kale, 20004) are documented to have positive effects on the wealth of 
acquirers shareholders. We therefore draw several sets of subsamples based on the 
above criteria from the full samples in order to further check the robustness of wealth 
effects after controlling for such influential factors. More specifically, the sets of 
subsamples include acquirers in which acquisitions are funded by cash, acquisitions of 
firms in the related industry, acquisitions for corporate control, acquirers who have 
experience of cross-border acquisitions in the past, or acquisitions which occurred in the 
current merger wave which is marked by the year 2003 onward. 
3.5.2.1. Experience in cross-border acquisitions 
To examine whether experience has any positive impact on the long-run performance of 
the acquirer, the examination procedure for the full sample is applied to the sample 
which consists of control firms and all acquirer that haves conducted more than one 
acquisition. For each multi-event acquirer, only the observation with the latest 
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completion date is kept so that the consolidated wealth effects of previous events can 
be examined. The result is reported in the following table. 
Table 3.9 reports the results of the wealth effects of M&A on two groups of acquirer: 
one with CBA experience and the other group only includes newcomers. As can be seen 
from the table, the newcomer underperforms significantly after four and five years 
compared to the performance of experienced acquirer. The experienced acquirer no 
longer significantly underperforms in this setting, even though the result of the full 
sample (Table 3.8) indicates significantly negative impacts for the three, four and five 
year event windows. This finding is consistent in three different specifications and 
suggests a certain impact of developed-market experience in the abnormal performance 
of the acquirer. Such an impact is minor since it cannot overturn the strong negative 
impacts of M&A events to create positive wealth gains for acquirers shareholders.  
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Table 3.9: Wealth effects of acquirers with CBA experience 
ATT: average treatment effects on the treated (i.e. wealth effect). Specification 1: Default setting of local linear regression technique 
in psmatch2 where no trimming is made and bandwidth is set to 0.8. Specification 2: 5% of the treated cases are trimmed to drop 
cases in the off-support region. Specification 3: The bandwidth is set to a smaller value of 0.5, meaning that a smaller number of 
control cases is used in the calculation of the counterfactual outcome. *: Significant at a 95% confidence interval, generated by bias-
corrected (BC) method in bootstrapping procedure. 
Event window 
Specification 1 Specification 3 Specification 3 
Prior exp. No exp. Prior exp. No exp. Prior exp. No exp. 
ATT ATT ATT ATT ATT ATT 
one year 0.0503338   -0.027608   0.0589615   -0.0286786   0.052285   -0.0251211   
two year -0.042089   -0.0874687   -0.0300026   -0.1063324   -0.0432672   -0.0873121   
three year -0.2973804   -0.2353713   -0.2947782   -0.2506002   -0.2985368   -0.2389561   
four year -0.2724165   -0.3992467 * -0.2724165   -0.4261084 * -0.2542419   -0.3733256 * 
five year -0.2999706   -0.7815655 * -0.2999706   -0.8155929 * -0.2524284   -0.7017829 * 
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3.5.2.2. Related vs. Conglomerate acquisition 
We examine whether the wealth effect of related firms differs from that of 
conglomerate acquisitions given the infancy of the market for corporate control in 
emerging countries. To examine this issue, the full sample is partitioned into two 
groups: one includes observations of related acquisitions and the other group contains 
observations of conglomerate acquisitions. The relatedness is defined upon a two-digit 
SIC code. Acquirer and target are related if they share the same two-digit SIC and are 
not related otherwise.  
Table 3.10 shows that acquirers in related acquisitions significantly underperform in all 
specifications after four years from the completion of the event, whilst acquirers in 
conglomerate acquisitions significantly underperform after five years in two 
specifications. No significant evidence of a positive wealth effect is reported for both 
groups of acquirers. There is a tendency that an acquirer in a related acquisition has a 
worse performance to one in conglomerate acquisition in every corresponding event 
window on average. However, this observation is not statistically verified. In short, we 
expected to find positive impacts of unrelated acquisition but find some evidence of a 
significant underperformance for this type of acquisition. This result suggests a strong 
nature of value destruction of acquisitions in our particular study.  
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Table 3.10: Wealth effects in related and conglomerate acquisitions 
ATT: average treatment effects on the treated (i.e. wealth effect). Specification 1: Default setting of local linear regression technique 
in psmatch2 where no trimming is made and bandwidth is set to 0.8. Specification 2: 5% of the treated cases are trimmed to drop 
cases in the off-support region. Specification 3: The bandwidth is set to a smaller value of 0.5, meaning that smaller number of 
control cases is used in the calculation of counterfactual outcome. *: Significant at 95% confidence interval, generated by bias-
corrected (BC) method in bootstrapping procedure. 
Event window Specification 1 Specification 3 Specification 3 
Related Unrelated Related Unrelated Related Unrelated 
ATT ATT ATT ATT ATT ATT 
one year -0.1278941   0.0866509   -0.1310043   0.0867789   -0.1220711   0.0791636   
two year -0.1683895   0.0028916   -0.1751241   0.0088281   -0.1715971   0.0161309   
three year -0.2954098   -0.2250474   -0.3291019   -0.2281891   -0.298377   -0.2155707   
four year -0.4730157 * -0.280053   -0.50843 * -0.2708524   -0.4617662 * -0.242835   
five year -0.7535396   -0.5778723 * -0.7681   -0.5718103 * -0.7163161   -0.5075691   
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3.5.2.3. Method of payment 
The examination of this issue cast some light on whether the signal of payment method 
has a long memory effect on an acquirers performance. We proceed by dividing the full 
sample into two groups: one includes deals funded by cash only and the other group 
consists of deals funded by stock or by mixture of stock and other assets. The result is 
reported in Table 3.11.  
Table 3.11 shows that the significant underperformance reported in the full sample 
result (Table 3.8) disappears in the cash-funded subsample. Meanwhile, some significant 
evidence of significant negative impacts remains in the settings of the three and five 
year event windows, and this evidence is consistent in three specifications. Also, the 
magnitude of negative impacts on acquirer using cash (although not significant) is 
smaller than that of acquirers using non-cash payments. This evidence suggests that 
paying by cash has a less negative impact on an acquirers performance than paying 
otherwise. This finding is not consistent with Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Moeller et al. 
(2004), who document positive effects of cash payment on the performance of bidders 
in developed markets.  
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Table 3.11: Effects of payment method 
ATT: average treatment effects on the treated (i.e. wealth effect). Specification 1: Default setting of local linear regression technique 
in psmatch2 where no trimming is made and bandwidth is set to 0.8. Specification 2: 5% of the treated cases are trimmed to drop 
cases in the off-support region. Specification 3: The bandwidth is set to a smaller value of 0.5, meaning that a smaller number of 
control cases is used in the calculation of counterfactual outcome. *: significant at 95% confidence interval, generated by bias-
corrected (BC) method in bootstrapping procedure. 
Event window Specification 1 Specification 3 Specification 3 
Cash Non-cash Cash Non-cash Cash Non-cash 
ATT ATT ATT ATT ATT ATT 
one year -0.0112904   0.0092247   -0.0116033   -0.0055821   -0.0082974   0.0102665   
two year -0.0620575   -0.0865666   -0.0432649   -0.1029444   -0.0652089   -0.0867173   
three year -0.1398618   -0.3982647 * -0.130925   -0.4258754 * -0.1644433   -0.3906915 * 
four year -0.2561195   -0.5368785   -0.2629488   -0.5415291   -0.263144   -0.4886269   
five year -0.4375748   -0.986899 * -0.4480883   -0.9705498 * -0.4248568   -0.8913002 * 
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3.5.2.4. Acquisition for corporate control 
This paper examines whether acquisition for corporate control generally creates or 
destroys the value of an acquirer in the long run. To do that, we divide the full samples 
into two subsamples: one includes acquisitions where the acquirer holds 50% of the 
targets outstanding shares afterwards, and the other sample includes acquisitions of a 
minority stake where less than 50% of the targets shares are controlled by the acquiring 
firm after the successful bid. Table 3.12 reports the result.  
Table 3.12 illustrates that acquirers in both acquisitions for control or for minority 
interest consistently and significantly underperform in the five-year event window. The 
level of underperformance in the five year window ranges from 61 to 67%. The story is 
different in the three and four year event windows, where the underperformance is 
consistently significant in acquisitions for corporate control and is also consistently 
insignificant in acquisitions for minority interest. This finding suggests that gaining 
control rights appears to fail to create greater wealth for bidders shareholders. 
Compared with acquisitions for minority interests, it even destroys a significant value 
after three and four years.  This finding is therefore different from Chari et al. (2008), as 
they find acquisitions create small but positive impacts on the bidders performance. The 
difference can be attributed to the difference in the location of targets and acquirers. 
Their targets are in emerging countries and the acquirers are in developed countries, 
while this essay examines acquirers in emerging countries and targets in developed 
countries. A plausible scenario for this result is that acquisitions in emerging countries 
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are severely inflicted by free-rider and agency problems, where bidders are likely to 
engage in unprofitable mergers and acquisitions. Alternatively, acquisition for control 
may have a positive impact, but such an impact is outweighed by the transaction cost. In 
the former scenario acquisition destroys value, and therefore more targets shares 
acquired means greater harm to the bidders shareholders.  
In a nutshell, this essay finds that the control in this specific context does not have 
positive impacts on the acquirers long-run performance. Instead, the finding suggests 
the value destruction nature and the dominance of agency costs over materialized 
synergies of control.  
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Table 3.12: Wealth effects in acquisitions for corporate control 
Control: bidders own more than 50% of the targets share post-acquisition. Minority: bidder owns less than 50%. ATT: 
average treatment effects on the treated (i.e. wealth effect). Specification 1: Default setting of local linear regression 
technique in psmatch2 where no trimming is made and bandwidth is set to 0.8. Specification 2: 5% of the treated 
cases are trimmed to drop cases in the off-support region. Specification 3: The bandwidth is set to a smaller value of 
0.5, meaning that smaller number of control cases is used in the calculation of the counterfactual outcome. *: 
Significant at 95% confidence interval, generated by bias-corrected (BC) method in bootstrapping procedure.  
Event window Specification 1 Specification 3 Specification 3 
Control Minority Control Minority Control Minority 
ATT ATT ATT ATT ATT ATT 
one year -0.0487678   0.0782937   -0.0576896   0.0962735   -0.0426278   0.0909323   
two year -0.1158204   0.0143798   -0.1270833   0.0259559   -0.1187318   0.0236602   
three year -0.3369824 * -0.0250731   -0.368764 * -0.0085425   -0.3464006 * -0.0387614   
four year -0.3671314 * -0.2925756   -0.395998 * -0.2872536   -0.3752591 * -0.2897118   
five year -0.6675326 * -0.6105304 * -0.6703053 * -0.6256434 * -0.6148346 * -0.6241567 * 
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3.5.2.5. Acquisitions occurred in current merger wave 
Finally, we examine whether the effects of acquisitions in the current wave of mergers is 
different to those in the previous wave. Accordingly, the full sample is partitioned into 
two waves: one starting from 2003 onwards and the other is the period before 2003 and 
dating back to 1990. Previous studies may divide merger waves differently. For instance, 
Barber and Lyon (1997) separate waves upon decades, or Agrawal et al. (1992) form a 
wave every five years. This essay examines the two waves by using a break in the year 
2003 for two reasons. First, Figure 1 shows the trend of M&A in this context, and it 
shows a two-wave pattern which breaks around 2003. Secondly, 2003 is when the 
current takeover wave starts to pick up along with gradual recovery after the Asia 
financial crisis (Martynova and Renneborg, 2009). In this period, several governments in 
emerging countries such as India and China started to change their policies towards 
integration and liberalization. Finally, dividing into more than two waves dramatically 
reduces the number of events in each wave, which therefore makes the estimations of 
ATT inefficient. Table 3.13 reports the result.  
Table 3.13 shows the wealth effects of acquisitions which occurred in each merger 
wave. The effects documented are similar to results reported for the full sample (Table 
3.8). In the previous wave, M&A has significant and consistent negative impacts on an 
acquirers performance three, four, and five years after the acquisitions. Unexpectedly, 
the negative effects are also documented in the current wave where the acquirer, on 
average, underperforms four and five years after the completion date. The evidence 
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suggests that welcome changes in policies and business environment, to a certain 
extent, benefit acquirers in emerging countries since the level of underperformance in 
the current period is consistently lower than that of the previous wave (in the setting of 
the four and five year event windows). However, such a positive influence is incapable 
of overthrowing the value destroying nature of M&A in emerging markets.  
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Table 3.13: Wealth effects in current merger wave 
ATT: average treatment effects on the treated (i.e. wealth effect). Specification 1: Default setting of local linear regression technique 
in psmatch2 where no trimming is made and bandwidth is set to 0.8 
Specification 2: 5% of the treated cases are trimmed to drop cases in the off-support region. Specification 3: The bandwidth is set to 
a smaller value of 0.5, meaning that a smaller number of control cases is used in the calculation of the counterfactual outcome. *: 
Significant at 95% confidence interval, generated by bias-corrected (BC) method in bootstrapping procedure.  
Event window Specification 1 Specification 3 Specification 3 
After 2003 Before 2003 After 2003 Before 2003 After 2003 Before 2003 
ATT ATT ATT ATT ATT ATT 
one year -0.0191734   -0.0033615   -0.0213521   -0.0006645   -0.0167777   0.0219962   
two year -0.0779626   -0.0901399   -0.0867016   -0.1092002   -0.0882433   -0.0873666   
three year -0.2481173   -0.3129033 * -0.2843859   -0.3512752 * -0.2702902   -0.3359067 * 
four year -0.341759 * -0.4540894 * -0.3790317 * -0.5225648 * -0.3663556 * -0.4589173 * 
five year -0.608784 * -0.7514457 * -0.6363323 * -0.8739262 * -0.5980386 * -0.736625 * 
 
 
 
  
147 
 
3.6. Summary 
This paper examines the impacts of mergers and acquisitions on the long-run 
performance of acquiring firms in emerging countries when they acquire targets in the 
developed world. We address two issues: (1) the lack of evidence about long-term 
effects for these particular groups of acquirer and target, and (2) the methodological 
problem that plagues a number of long-run studies in the literature. We contribute to 
the literature by arguing that the wealth effects in emerging countries are different from 
what has been widely documented in the developed world. Special characteristics on a 
firm level and a distinctive institutional framework in these countries can change the 
behaviours of traditional factors which influence the wealth effects. We also make a 
contribution in methodology. This paper uses propensity score matching framework in 
tandem with difference-in-differences technique to generate a counterfactual outcome 
for each acquiring firm. Within this contemporaneous method, the measure of average 
abnormal returns is less vulnerable to selections on observable and, to a certain extent, 
unobservable characteristics.  
Using a sample comprising a wide range of variables from 281 acquiring firms and more 
than 35,000 control firms in emerging markets, we show that the acquirer in emerging 
countries significantly underperforms after three, four and five years from the 
completion of the acquisition on average. Moreover, the level of underperformance 
appears to increase with the length of the event windows. Further analysis on 
subsamples indicates that previous experience in developed countries, paying by cash, 
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and to some extent policies reform in emerging countries in the current merger wave 
fails to yield positive impacts on the acquirers performance. To our surprise, we find 
that gaining control via acquisition appears to destroy more value than the acquisition 
of a minority interest. These findings suggest a remarkable nature of value destruction 
when emerging-markets bidders acquire firms in the developed world. Several 
influential factors which presumably have a positive impact on the acquirers wealth are 
unable to dominate the value destroying effects of the merger event.  
In summary, this part of the thesis documents evidence of the strong and negative 
effects of M&A on an acquirers long-run performance. It also casts some light on the 
determinants of wealth effects on an average level. However, due to the design of the 
study, we could only examine the effects of binary variables and were unable to 
examine the effects of other continuous firm-specific and deal-specific variables. 
Therefore, the next part of the thesis will use a different method to address these 
shortcomings.  
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Chapter 4: On the determinants of long-run abnormal return in 
emerging markets 
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter is essentially an extension of the wealth effects examinations in the 
previous chapter where we shed some light on the effects of several binary factors (such 
as acquisition for control, method of payment, and industry relatedness) on average 
wealth effects. In this chapter, we further examine the determinants of a long-run 
abnormal return on a firm level. This research design can accommodate both categorical 
and continuous variables.  
It is not surprising that this issue has been studied extensively in the literature31. 
However, the empirical evidence from emerging countries is rather limited, perhaps due 
to data unavailability and the contemporary nature of cross-border M&A activities in 
emerging countries. In addition, most of the previous studies examine the determinants 
of short-run (e.g. Asquith et al., 1983) instead of long-run return abnormality, thereby 
leaving a significant gap for this paper to fill in.  
On the determinants of wealth effects, the signs and magnitude of traditional variables 
may differ in emerging markets for corporate control. The previous chapter shows 
strong evidence of the value destroying effects of mergers on a bidders wealth. 
Evidence of a high level of underperformance after three, four and five years signals 
31
 Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; Bruner, 2004; and Martynova and Renneboog, 2011. 
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serious agency or hubris problems. Therefore several variables such as size, market-to-
book and level of cash may have strong effects on the abnormal return.  
We also argue in the discussion of acquisition motive that emerging-market acquirers 
may possess a different set of ownership advantages such as the ability to facilitate 
mass production with a cheap labour force (Guillen and Garcia-Canas, 2009). They are 
also characterized by different ownership structures (Kim, 2000; Bhaumik, 2010). As a 
result, the pattern of the value creation of bidders in these countries might differ from 
that of developed-market bidders in that bidders can use advanced technology to 
leverage their existing advantage in size and scale (Seth et al., 2000; Eun et al., 1996). 
Therefore, large size may be beneficial since quality resources in developed markets 
may generate a greater economy scale for a large firm than for small firms.  
We undertake this investigation on the basis of 281 merger events in emerging 
countries in the 1990 -2010 period. With respect to methodology, we estimate the long-
run abnormal return of individual acquirers using the same method to that of the first 
essay (i.e. a combination of propensity score matching model and difference-in-
differences technique). The estimated abnormal return then serves as a dependent 
variable in the cross sectional investigation that accommodates deal-, firm-, industry- 
and country-specific independent variables. To increase the robustness of the final 
results, a long-run abnormal return is estimated in two matching methods including 
nearest neighbor matching and kernel-based matching. This type of methodological 
framework is arguably able to address the loophole in using a single-index model in a 
151 
 
long-run study as it is only capable of controlling for selections on some observables 
and, to a certain extent, selections on unobservables (Girma et al., 2006; Blundell and 
Costa-Dias, 2000).  
As for the results, this paper documents that an acquirer with a high market-to-book 
ratio (glamour bidder) and acquirers with large cash holdings (compared to total assets) 
underperform in the long run. These findings are consistent with the hubris hypothesis 
and agency theory since managers of glamour acquirers tend to be overconfident32 
and managers with more cash at their discretion are more likely to waste firms 
resources on unprofitable projects33, thereby leading to the potential destruction of the 
firms value.  
In addition, this paper provides mild evidence of the positive impacts of several factors 
on firm-level abnormal returns such as cash payment, bidders previous CBA experience 
and the acquisition of majority control. We also document interesting findings that 
show that acquiring firms in the same industry has a negative impact, but this impact 
appears to rapidly decrease overtime. This evidence suggests that markets for corporate 
control in emerging countries were in an infant stage but have a rapid pace of 
development. Finally, the most interesting piece of evidence is the consistently strong 
and positive impacts of size on abnormal returns. Although this finding is in contrast 
with the hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986), it is consistent with reverse internalization 
theories (Seth et al., 2000; Eun et al., 1996).  
32
 Rau and Vermalen (1997) 
33
 Jensen (1986) 
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4.2. Determinants of return abnormality 
4.2.1. Relative size 
The relative size of a bidder compared with the target is a potential determinant of the 
bidders abnormal return. Asquith et al. (1983) find that a bidders abnormal return is 
positive and significantly higher when relative size is taken into consideration. More 
specifically, a bidders abnormal return increases significantly from 1.7 to 4.1% when a 
relatively large target is acquired. Asquith and his colleagues emphasize the impact of 
this variable on the wealth effect. They argue that previous studies were unable to 
capture a large market reaction because they failed to account for size difference. Their 
reasoning is that when acquiring a smaller target, even if the net present value (NPV) is 
relatively large compared to the size of the target firm, this NPV may be small for a large 
bidder. As a result, the ratio of dollar gain from the acquisition is relatively trivial to the 
bidder, thus resulting in a positive but mild impact on the bidders stock performance.  
This minor impact can then easily disappear in the noise of the bidders stock return. 
Therefore mergers may have positive impacts on an abnormal return when relative size 
is controlled for.  
As relative size is a potential determinant of abnormal return, the stand-alone firm sizes 
of the bidder and target are also relevant determinants.  
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4.2.2. Acquirer size 
The acquirer size effects are defined as the difference between the abnormal returns of 
small and large acquirers (Moeller et al., 2004). Moeller and his colleagues find robust 
evidence of significant bidder size effects on announcement returns. After controlling 
for a wide variety of firm and deal characteristics, the size effects remain statistically 
significant at a 99% interval in all of their regressions. This evidence suggests that on 
average small acquirers have a better performance than large acquirers. The reason for 
this is that managers in large firms have either succeeded in increasing the firm size over 
the years or have overcome more obstacles to become managers of a large corporation 
than in the case of the small firms managers. Moreover, large firms stocks are more 
likely to be overvalued. Moeller et al. (2004) observe that a large firm has a higher 
market-to-book and Tobins q ratio than those of small firms, while these ratios are 
often used as proxies of overvaluation (as in Dong et. al., 2002; Rau and Vermaelen, 
1997). Therefore overconfidence might arise from a high managerial status in a large 
corporation or from the appreciation of the market towards the large firms stocks. As a 
result mangers of large firms are more likely to overpay, thereby resulting in negative 
impacts on the ex-post performance.  
The size effect can also be explained by agency theory. Firstly, the incentives of 
managers in small firms are better aligned with those of shareholders since they often 
hold a larger portion of the outstanding shares34. Secondly, large firms are more likely to 
be further along their life cycle, where opportunities for growth gradually deplete. 
34
 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find the management ownership ratio is higher in small firms than in large firms.  
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Meanwhile, managers in large firms have more resources at their discretion. A 
combination of readily available resources and a lack of investment opportunities is a 
formula of the agency cost of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). In brief, large firms are 
more vulnerable to agency and hubris problems than small firms.  
It is important to note that according to the above reasoning the severity of agency and 
hubris problems is dependent on firm size and is independent of merger events. It is 
therefore natural to witness a downward adjustment of a large firms stock return along 
the time horizon, regardless of whether the acquisition takes place or not. However, 
when large firms announce merger events the market may interpret this news as 
though organic investment opportunity within the firm is exhausted, and managers have 
no other way but to expand externally. Running short of investment opportunities, in 
turn, is a sign of diminishing management quality (Bhagat et al., 2011). As a result the 
merger announcement may trigger the revaluation attempt of market investors and 
draw their attention to the hubris and agency problems of large corporations, thus 
causing a further decline in stock performance. 
In brief, the literature suggests that large size combined with a merger announcement 
may have strong negative impacts on firm performance. In other words, there is a 
potentially positive relationship between bidder size and the ex-post performance of 
the firm.  
However, in the emerging markets the bidder size effects may manifest differently. 
Regarding the agency problems, bidders in these countries are not short of investment 
155 
 
opportunities as they are still in the early stage of development. In fact, Kale (2004) 
argues that there are many low hanging fruits opportunities for them in local markets. 
Moreover, a high proportion of bidders in these markets are family firms with a 
significant incentive alignment (Bhaumik et al., 2010). Nonetheless, Kim (2000) argues 
that a number of state-owned bidders in emerging economies operate in an 
environment of efficient corporate governance. As a result managers of large bidders 
can use excessive resources on unprofitable acquisitions without being disciplined for 
post-acquisition failure. Under these circumstances large bidder size may be associated 
with underperformance after the acquisition.  
4.2.3. Target size and deal value 
In an early study, Roll (1986) presents a hubris problem that states a bidder can overpay 
in an acquisition, not because of any managerial motive but because they make 
mistakes in estimating the targets firms value35.When target size is sufficiently large, 
overpayment is less likely because bidders are generally more careful in the evaluation 
of a large target. Large targets also attract less rivalry, which is a great benefit since the 
bidder can avoid paying an extravagant premium in a contested bid. Finally, a general 
feature of dispersed ownership in a large target may undermine the bargaining power of 
shareholders, thus making them less reluctant to accept a low premium for their shares 
(Roll, 1986). Therefore, acquiring a large target may entail lower transaction costs.  
35
 The hubris problem has been clarified in a previous chapter.  
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In contrast to Roll (1986), Bayazitova et al. (2009) argue that very large mergers are 
more likely to be inflicted by hubris than small mergers. They find short-term negative 
average abnormal returns of 3.2% in mega-mergers and positive 1.7% returns for non-
mega-mergers. A plausible explanation for such a discrepancy is that even if more 
efforts are spent on the evaluation of a large deal, these efforts might not be sufficient 
to cover for the many more things that can go wrong in a mega deal36. Furthermore, 
large deal size ignites the managerial motive of the acquirers managers because the 
commission and reputation awarded afterwards is positively correlated with the deal 
size (Maris, 1964). As a result, these managers are more willing to pay a high premium 
to the target shareholders.  
Hubris and agency problems relating to target size in emerging markets may be different 
to such issues in a developed country. Acquiring a large target may prove inefficient for 
emerging market firms because a large stock of quality assets in developed markets 
requires a strong absorptive capacity from the acquirer. Indeed, we found in the 
previous chapter that the acquirers in this context are less likely to aim at a large 
developed firm as it prevents them from quickly accessing quality resources. In addition, 
a large target may be associated with the managerial motives of state-owned bidders in 
emerging countries. Therefore we expect a negative relationship between target size 
and acquirer performance.  
36
 The top 1% of mergers in absolute transaction value (Bayazitova et al., 2009). 
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4.2.4. Market-to-book value 
Rau and Vermaelen (1997) consider firms with a recent good performance as glamour 
firms. Glamour firms, by their definition, have a high market-to-book ratio and 
significant growth opportunities, while value firms have a low market-to-book ratio. 
Rau and Vermaelen find that being a glamour or value bidder even has significant 
impacts on a bidders abnormal returns in the long run. Using the market-to-book ratio 
as a proxy for glamour or value status, they find that the value acquirers abnormal 
return after adjusting for size and market-to-book ratio is 26% on average, whilst the 
same figure for glamour acquirers is -57% three years after the completion of the 
merger. In addition, when examining the stock price premium they also find that 
glamour bidders tend to pay a higher premium for a targets stock than value bidders. 
The remarkable difference in abnormal returns was attributed to the overpayment, 
which is a result of management overconfidence in their ability to manage the 
acquisition to success. This high level of confidence is perhaps the result of a 
performance record that has been appreciated by the stock markets. Indeed, Roll (1986) 
argues that the hubris level is expected to rise for firms that have a good track record 
before the acquisition.  
One would expect a higher level of hubris and thus more aggressive pursuit of a target 
in firms that had experienced recent good times Roll (1986 p. 206).  
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Therefore, a higher glamour status (i.e. higher market-to-book ratio) of the acquiring 
firm may accompany a greater magnitude of hubris, which eventually leads to lower 
abnormal returns.  
4.2.5. Acquirers cash holding 
Bidders with large cash holding are more likely to destroy value in mergers and 
acquisitions as large cash reserves might fuel the managerial and hubris motives of the 
bidders management. Harford (1999) examines acquisitions of cash-rich firms and finds 
that acquirers with large cash reserves tend to destroy value regardless of whether 
abnormal returns are measured in stock or operating performance. For every dollar of 
excessive cash reserve, he finds a cash-rich bidder destroys seven cents. Harford also 
finds that bidders with a large cash reserve tend to acquire targets which are more likely 
to be unattractive to other bidders37. Evidence of the poor performance of cash-rich 
bidders can be explained by Jensens free cash flow theory. This theory of merger 
predicts that excessive cash flow and poor investment opportunities lead managers to 
make unprofitable acquisitions rather than paying out dividends to shareholders 
(Jensen, 1986). Also, a large amount of cash at disposal can further tempt a managers 
empire building motive as excessive cash can be used as a cheap cost of capital.  
However, the effects of a large cash holding can be puzzling in an empirical study as on 
average small firms have a higher ratio of cash over their size, while the agency cost of 
37
 Diversification can be considered as a value maximizing motive since merging with a low correlated target can 
reduce an acquirers risk, thus making borrowing or issuing corporate bonds less expensive (Bhagat et al. 2011). 
However, this financial benefit is less likely to be adequate compensation for the harm associated with acquiring 
unattractive firms.   
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free cash flow is arguably lower for smaller firms. This issue requires the examination of 
the cash effects on abnormal returns to control for firm size.  Therefore we use cash 
over the total assets ratio as a proxy for a firms level of cash.  
4.2.6. Targets public status 
Acquisition of public targets and private targets may have different wealth effects. 
Chang (1998) finds that a significant bidders abnormal return is pertinent to a 
combination of stock-financed deals and private targets, whereas cash-financed 
acquisitions of private targets fail to create abnormal returns. Fuller et al. (2002) find 
similar evidence that bidders still manage to achieve wealth gains in the acquisitions of 
private targets, even when paying by stock. Chang (1998) uses monitoring hypothesis to 
explain his results. He argued that a small number of owners in the ex-ante target 
become ex-post blockholders38. These blockholders may serve as effective monitors of 
managerial performance, thereby mitigating information asymmetries. Meanwhile, 
Fuller et al. (2002) attribute positive wealth effects to the discount of illiquidity assets. 
They argue that the market for private firms is not as liquid as the market for public 
firms. As a result, bidders are compensated with an illiquidity discount which outweighs 
the negative effects of the stock payment. Recently, Bhagat et al. (2011) used the free-
rider hypothesis to explain the potential gains from acquiring private firms. This 
hypothesis is essentially the combination of Chang and Fullers arguments. Bhagat and 
colleagues hypothesize that any shareholder who refuses to tender their shares to an 
acquirer can make the same profit from price appreciation after the acquirers gain 
38
 As private firms are usually owned by a small number of shareholders. 
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control of the target firm. Target shareholders of the listed firms have bargaining power 
over the acquirer since they anticipate a price appreciation from holding out with their 
shares (Grossman and Hart, 1980). Meanwhile, the free-rider problems in private firms 
are negligible due to greater constraints in liquidity. Blockholders are less likely to be 
able to take advantage of an ex-post price appreciation due to the private status. 
Therefore, a private firms blockholders have less bargaining power compared to a listed 
targets shareholders. Consequently, they might be more willing to accept a lower bid 
price from the acquiring firm 
These findings are interesting since they demonstrate that the effect of a targets public 
status can overwhelm the negative effects of a stock payment. Nonetheless, acquiring 
private firms may entail significant risks because the information of private firms is 
limited and less reliable than public firms. Indeed, Bradley and Sudaram (2004) show 
that the acquisition of private firms leads to a decline in the wealth effect. Therefore the 
literature seems inconclusive about the effect of a targets public status on abnormal 
returns.  
4.2.7. Acquirers attitude  
An acquirers attitude can be hostile, neutral or friendly39. Empirical evidence in the 
literature shows mixed findings about the effects of a hostile attitude on the bidders 
wealth. On the one hand, hostile takeovers are often associated with value destruction 
rather than value creation (Gregory, 1997 Frank and Mayer, 1996; Goergen and 
39
 Franks and Mayer (1996, p. 165) define a hostile bid as one in which the first offer is opposed by the incumbent 
management, but the target is eventually acquired in the later revised bid. 
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Renneboog, 2004).  Goergen and Renneboog (2002; 2004) find that a hostile takeover 
triggers significant negative abnormal returns (-2.5%) around the announcement date. 
Gregory (1997) finds the bidders return to be negative but not significant in hostile 
takeovers. The evidence of a negative consequence of hostile takeovers has been 
highlighted in the literature, as hostile takeovers are exceedingly bad for the economy, 
or a tremendously expensive and imprecise solution, or hostile takeovers destroy 
valuable corporate cultures Frank and Mayer (1996). The reason for this is that hostile 
bidders often expect large gains from the acquisitions so they are willing to pay a high 
premium for the targets stocks. Frank and Mayer (1996) show evidence of large assets 
disposals and high bid premiums in hostile bids. Moreover, paying a high premium in a 
revised bid may be interpreted as a reflection of the hubris and agency related motives 
of management, which explains the ex post negative reaction of market investors.  
On the other hand, hostile bids can result in positive abnormal returns. Sudarsanam et 
al. (1996) studied announcement returns of UK bidders in the 1980-90 period and found 
that hostility exhibits a significantly positive coefficient. Higson and Elliott (1993) also 
found that UK hostile bids produce greater announcement returns than friendly bids. 
These evidences of positive abnormal returns are consistent with the market for 
corporate control hypothesis which posits that takeovers benefit the targets 
shareholders by punishing the underperforming incumbent management. In short, the 
above two different perspectives ensure that the arguments regarding deal attitudes 
effects remain controversial.  
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4.2.8. Macroeconomics variables 
Macroeconomics variables may offer an important explanation for the effects of 
mergers and acquisitions on an acquirers wealth. Kiymaz (2004) found the targets GNP 
to be highly significant but a negative determinant of the bidders abnormal return. 
Kiymaz argues that countries with favourable economic conditions are more likely to be 
destinations of an expansion strategy, but US bidders might be too optimistic about the 
potential of transactions in such countries. His finding is consistent with the hubris 
hypothesis, in that an over optimistic attitude should lead to over payment, and this will 
eventually lead to a significant wealth transfer from the bidder to the target 
shareholders in the form of high premiums. As a result, target countries with good 
economic prospects might be a trap for the bidding firm.  
Other researchers argue instead that acquiring targets in more developed countries can 
have positive impacts on a bidders wealth. In fact, the bootstrapping hypothesis posits 
that the acquirer voluntarily bootstraps itself to the higher governance standards of the 
target-resulting in a positive valuation impact for the acquirer (Bhagat et al., 2011; 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Khanna and Palepu, 2004). Accordingly, if the 
difference in GDP can to some extent represent the differences in the corporate 
governance standard then this difference should be positively correlated with the 
bidders abnormal returns.  
In addition, Ali-Yrkko (2002) documents a positive and significant correlation between 
GDP and the number of M&A transactions within a country. This finding implies that 
163 
 
countries with a high GDP level also have a more active market for corporate control. If 
the bidders are located in more active M&A markets they would have more takeover 
experience, and thus would perform better in cross-border acquisitions than those in 
less active markets (Danbolt, 1995). In fact, Danbolt find that US acquirers perform 
better than ones based in Continental Europe, and this empirical evidence lends direct 
support to his hypothesis. Therefore a high GDP level of a bidding country is associated 
with the takeover experience of firms in the market and has positive impacts on a firms 
performance once it engages in cross-border acquisitions.  
Moreover, the level of development of a bidders country may determine the bidders 
abnormal return. In a recent study, Hope et al. (2011) found that on average bidders 
from developing countries pay a higher premium to acquire assets in developed 
countries compared to acquirers from developed countries. The remarkable difference 
in the premiums paid by developing and developed countries bidders is attributed to 
national pride. National pride sentiments appear to occur when developing country 
bidders acquire targets in developed countries. Meanwhile, such sentiments are less 
likely to arise when acquisitions occur in developing countries (Hope et al., 2011). In line 
with this study, it is therefore plausible to hypothesize that the level of development of 
a country drives the magnitude of national pride sentiments, and this eventually affects 
the premium paid to target firms. Hubris problems associated with national pride 
sentiments are possibly less severe for bidders in countries with a higher level of 
development, and therefore bidders in these countries are less likely to overpay for 
targets. In brief, the level of development of target and acquirer countries can partly 
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capture the impacts of macroeconomics factors, the behaviour of bidders on a country 
level, and the technology gap in the acquirers wealth. 
Finally, the literature has documented a high correlation between national income level 
and technological innovation (Comin and Hobijin, 2004; Caselli and Coleman, 2001). 
Generally speaking there has been a huge technology gap between developed and 
developing countries. Unsurprisingly, Tao (2010) documents that 84% of scientific and 
innovative outputs belong to high-income countries.  However, he also notes that the 
rapid pace of economic development has led to the employment of world-class 
technology of certain sectors in the urban areas of advanced emerging countries (such 
as China and India). Therefore, despite the huge technology gap on an aggregate level, 
the variation of the gap between an emerging and a developed country could range 
from a huge difference to a close distance. Meanwhile, technology gap has been 
documented as an important determinant of a bidders abnormal returns. A large gap 
negatively affects the absorptive capacity of the bidder when they acquirer the targets 
technology. In order to achieve successful integration, the bidders absorptive capacity 
needs to pass a certain threshold level. Therefore the difference in national income 
might be a close representative of the technology gap, so a large difference should have 
negative impacts on the bidders wealth. 
In summary, the literature has shown various dealspecific and firm-specific 
determinants of a bidders abnormal returns. These variables represent two major 
theories of mergers and acquisitions: (1) variation of bidders abnormal returns is 
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dependent on the revaluations of the firms stand-alone value, and (2) abnormal returns 
are driven by hubris, managerial motives and weak corporate governance. In the 
context of this study, where acquirers are from emerging markets and targets are in 
developed markets, the theory associated with the revaluation of stand-alone firm value 
appears to have weaker explanatory power on the variation of abnormal returns than 
the hubris and managerial motives theory. Firstly, the revaluation upon deal 
announcement is dependent on the rationality of investors in the markets. In developed 
markets, investors are often more knowledgeable and rational than their counterparts 
in developing countries. As a result they might interpret a bidders signals more 
rationally. In contrast to this, investor behaviour in developing markets is less rational, 
especially when bidders in developing markets announce acquisition transactions with a 
famous target in developed countries. Under such circumstances, investors often react 
positively without thoughtful consideration of the bidders signals, terms of the deal and 
the targets details.  Such behaviors are common as investors in developing markets are 
prone to prestige factor. Acquisitions of a great brand in developed countries may 
exert national pride40 and thus underpin the optimistic behaviour of the investors. As 
a result the lack of rationality of bidders in developing countries can eliminate the 
effects of the revaluation attempts of a small number of rational investors in the 
market.  
On the other hand, the effects of hubris and managerial motives on the wealth effects 
of emerging market bidders are greater, particularly when targets are in different 
40
 Hope et al. (2011) 
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countries, and the effects get even stronger if the target is in developed markets. In 
cross-border acquisitions, bidders are even more vulnerable to hubris problems since 
they face an extra set of issues such as the legal system (La Porta et al. 2000, 2002), tax 
liability (Norback et al. 2009), exchange rate (Georgopoulos, 2008), accounting system, 
and governance and cultural discrepancies. Furthermore, the prospect of expanding 
abroad into developed countries is attractive bait for the managerial motives of 
managers in developing countries. Finally, the previous chapter provides evidence of the 
average underperformance of acquirers in emerging markets in the acquisition of 
developed-market firms. The consistent and strong evidence of underperformance in 
the long run suggests the dominance of the value-destroying factors (including agency 
and hubris problem) as drivers of abnormal return. Therefore, hubris and managerial 
motives seem to be prime contributors to the variation of the bidders abnormal returns 
in this study.  
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The M&A literature documents a variety of factors that affect the abnormal return of 
acquiring firms. For instance, firm size (Moeller et al., 2004; Asquith et al., 1983; 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), market-to-book ratio (Rau and Vermaelen, 1997) and cash 
holdings (Jensen, 1986) often cause negative effects, while the private status of the 
target firm often exhibits a positive impact (Chang, 1998; Bhagat et al., 2011). The 
empirical effects of these variables are commonly attributed to several fundamental 
theories such as agency, free cash flow, hubris or free-rider theories. Specifically, agency 
and free cash flow theory can be used to explain for the negative effect of the firm size 
or amount of cash at the discretion of the firms mangers. The hubris hypothesis can be 
used to explain the negative effects of the market-to-book ratio, which represents the 
level of the managers overconfidence. Additionally, the free-rider theory is able to 
explain the positive effects of the targets private status (Bhagat et al., 2011).  
In chapter two of this thesis, we find evidence supporting a hypothesis that acquirers in 
emerging countries are motivated by the strategic assets of developed-market firms. 
They aim at small firms with relatively low stock of intangibles in order to quickly gain 
access to high quality resources in advanced economies. As a result, a potentially 
positive causal relationship between the targets strategic assets and long term 
abnormal returns may exist. However, we find in chapter three consistent and strong 
evidence of the acquirers long-term underperformance. Therefore, the presumably 
positive impact of the targets intangible assets appears to be dominated by the negative 
impacts of other characteristics. Accordingly, potential firm-level proxies for agency-
168 
 
related and hubris problems such as size, market-to-book and level of cash holding are 
likely to be the key determinants41.  
Along with these variables, the previous chapter suggests additional control for several 
deal-specific characteristics such as relatedness, previous experience, acquisition for 
control and method of payment. We also advocate further control for bid attitude (i.e. 
friendly or unfriendly bid), and the targets competitiveness and macroeconomic factors 
that represent the differences in the technology level. The latter two need attention 
since our sample consists of firm-level data across countries and industries.  
The following section presents the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence of 
these variables.  
4.3. Methodology and data 
4.3.1. Method 
In this paper, we argue that a precise measure of the long-run abnormal return 
(dependent variable) is the most important factor, since data of potential independent 
variables such as size, market to book ratio or cash holdings are standardized and 
consistent. We have shown that a combination of propensity score matching and 
41 We are aware of the need to take the targets technology into consideration for our empirical analysis. However, the 
design of the data and methodology in this essay is different from that in the previous chapter about acquisition 
motive. As a result the attempt to match two datasets to collect information about the targets technology (research 
and development expense) results in a very small sample. Therefore we have no choice but to drop this variable.  
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difference-in-differences technique is superior to the methods used in earlier studies. 
The combined methods yield an estimate of abnormal return that is less vulnerable to 
selection on observables and un-observables. In the previous chapter, we calculated the 
average of abnormal return estimates to examine the overall wealth effects of merger 
events. However, in this chapter, we use firm-level abnormal return as dependent 
variables for an investigation of the determinants of abnormal returns.  
In order to examine this issue we use a linear robust regression and an outlier robust 
regression method. The robust choice is used in the former method because it deals 
with the heteroskedasticity problem in cross-sectional investigations (White, 1980). The 
latter model has the advantage of mitigating the impacts of extreme value in the 
estimated abnormal returns (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000; Girma et al., 2007). This 
feature is important for examinations in emerging countries since the outliers are 
prevalent to stock data, and this problem is likely to get worse in highly volatile markets 
like emerging ones (Coutt et al., 1994). 
In essence, we perform an empirical analysis on the basis of following equation 
ܦܫܦݏ = ܨ(݈݀݁ܽ െ ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ, ݂݅ݎ݉ െ ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ,݉ܽܿݎ݋ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁, ݐ݅݉݁ ݀ݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) 
ܦܫܦݏ = ൫ ଵܻ௧భ௜ െ ଵܻ௧బ௜൯ െ෍ܹ(݅, ݆)( ଴ܻ௧భ௝௡మ௝א஼ െ ଴ܻ௧బ௝) 
Where 
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ܦܫܦݏ: difference-in-differences estimate of firm-level abnormal return 
൫ ଵܻ௧భ௜ െ ଵܻ௧బ௜൯: return growth rate of the acquirer 
σ ܹ(݅, ݆)( ଴ܻ௧భ௝௡మ௝א஼ െ ଴ܻ௧బ௝): counterfactual growth rate  
݈݀݁ܽ െ ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ: relatedness, payment, control, experience, attitude, target status, 
deal value, and targets herfindahl index.  
݂݅ݎ݉ െ ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ: size, market-to-book, cash ratio 
݉ܽܿݎ݋ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁: difference in gdp between target and bidder country 
4.3.2. Data 
This chapter is essentially an extension of chapter three. In this chapter we analyze the 
determinants of long-run abnormal returns upon the same sample. Therefore the 
description of the data regarding distributions of sample by year, country and category 
is the same as in the previous chapter. However, we present the descriptive statistics of 
the bidders characteristics and the bidders long term abnormal return in an additional 
table since these variables are used to find the determinants of wealth effects.  
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of bidders characteristics 
DIDs1 to DIDs5 represent the long-run abnormal return of an individual bidder. Size is measured by the market value 
of the bidder, cash ratio by the cash amount over total assets. Relatedness, payment, control, experience, and target 
status are dummy variables. The definitions of these variables are explained in the previous chapter. Gdpdiff reports 
the difference in gdp between the target and bidder country, while target hi shows the herfindahl index of the target 
industry. 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
size 6.103 6.046 1.907 
mtbv 3.479 2.170 4.901 
cashratio 0.160 0.114 0.148 
relatedness 0.448 0.000 0.498 
payment 0.594 1.000 0.492 
control 0.725 1.000 0.447 
experience 0.324 0.000 0.469 
attitude 0.943 1.000 0.232 
target status 0.281 0.000 0.450 
dealvalue 250.2 20.0 1219.7 
gdpdiff 24.320 36.120 51.480 
target hi 0.168 0.077 0.198 
DIDs1 -0.011 -0.158 0.827 
DIDs2 -0.076 -0.426 1.243 
DIDs3 -0.264 -0.686 1.374 
DIDs4 -0.378 -0.973 1.645 
DIDs5 -0.672 -1.422 2.199 
N=281 
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This table reports the descriptive statistics of bidders. There are 281 observations used 
for the robust linear regression and outlier robust regression. The descriptive statistics 
of abnormal return shows a consistent pattern to the empirical evidence in the previous 
chapter. The mean abnormal return of all event windows is negative, which indicates 
the underperformance of the bidding firm. This underperformance increases rapidly 
with the length of the event window, which is in line with our argument in an earlier 
chapter about the value destruction nature of merger events in this context. The 
standard deviation of abnormal return also increases with the number of years in the 
event window, perhaps because of the high level of volatility in emerging stock markets.  
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4.4. Results and discussions 
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 present empirical results of robust regression and outlier robust 
regression. Each table contains two panels: Panel A shows the parameters and t-
stastistics of the Robust OLS regression, and Panel B reports the same figures of the 
Outlier Robust Regression. Two regression methods are mixed with five event windows 
to create various settings for empirical analysis. These results shed more light on the 
relationship between the estimated long run abnormal returns and firm-, deal-, 
industry-, and country-level characteristics.  
4.4.1. The impact of bidder size 
Regarding size effects, bidders size appears to be the most consistently positive and 
significant determinant of abnormal return. When abnormal return is estimated in the 
kernel-based matching and DIDs (Table 4.2), panel A shows the significant impact of size 
on the two-year and four-year abnormal return. In addition, the significant size impact is 
also documented in the one-, two-, and three-year abnormal returns in panel B. The size 
parameters in Table 4.2 range from 0.071 (one-year abnormal return in panel B) to 
0.229 (four-year abnormal return in panel A), which means that one unit increases in 
size (measured by the natural log of the bidders market value) results in a significant 
increase of abnormal return by 7.1% (one year after the event) or by 22.9% (four years 
after the event). Similar impacts of size on abnormal return can also be observed in 
Table 4.3, where abnormal returns are estimated on the basis of nearest neighbor 
matching and DIDs. Panel A shows the significant impact of size on the two-year and 
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four-year abnormal return while panel B documents significant size effects on the one- 
and two-year abnormal return. 
The strong evidence of statistical significance and remarkable magnitude of size effects 
across various settings of the event window and regression method is surprisingly 
contrary to my prior expectation. In finance literature, bidders size has regularly been 
used as a proxy for managerial hubris, since (1) Smaller firms have a better incentive 
alignment (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), (2) Managers in larger firms are more likely to be 
overconfident (Moeller et al., 2004), and (3) Large firms investment opportunities are 
often depleted as they are further along the business cycle (Moeller et al., 2004). As a 
result the finance literature shows a tendency of overpayment when bidder size is large, 
meaning large size should have negative effects on the bidders abnormal return.  
However, according to a different branch of literature, the ownership advantages 
paradigm (Dunning, 2008; Dunning, 2000), the acquired assets from developed 
countries might have stronger leverage effects for larger bidders. For instance, the 
acquirer can use the brand image of the acquired firm for their current product range, 
thus allowing them to extract more rent from their current production. Therefore the 
larger current production scale can be levered by the acquired assets for greater 
benefit. Alternatively, the acquirer may adopt the targets management skills in 
developed countries in order to streamline their own management system and improve 
efficiency. In this case, more complex organization might benefit more from the targets 
management capability. Therefore, this branch of literature lends support to the 
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empirical findings of this study about the effects of size on the bidders abnormal return 
in that the scale economies generated from utilizing acquired assets might be greater 
with larger acquirers.  
4.4.2. Market-to-book ratio 
The results also show evidence of significant impacts of Market-to-book ratio (MTB) on 
bidders abnormal return, mostly in robust OLS regression. MTB statistics in panel A of 
Table 4.2 indicate significant negative impacts of MTB on two, three, four and five year 
abnormal returns.  The coefficient ranges from -1.7% to -7%, and the impact appears to 
escalate over the time horizon of the event window. A similar pattern is documented in 
panel A of Table 4.3, where two, three and four year abnormal returns are significantly 
affected by the MTB ratio. The magnitude of negative effect also seems to increase 
along with the width of the event window, from -3.1% to -3.6% and -4.6% in the two, 
three and four year event windows respectively. Panel B of Table 4.3 adds more 
evidence of the significant negative impact of MTB ratio on the four-year abnormal 
return. The coefficients of MTB in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 appear to be smaller than the 
respective sizes coefficients in many settings. While this might suggest that the size 
effect is stronger than the MTB effect, it is not possible to draw such a conclusion under 
this circumstance since both size and MTB are not standardized as a unit of 
measurement.  
This finding is in line with Rau and Vermaelen (1997). Rau and Vermaelen found 
evidence of the significant long-term underperformance of glamour bidders, while 
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value bidders significantly outperform the control portfolio of peers with the same 
size and MTB ratio. More specifically, they examined the performance of bidders three 
years after the completion date of the merger event. They found that on average the 
glamour bidder earns a negative return of -57% after three years when compared with 
other bidders. They also find that glamour bidders performed worse than value bidders 
in every setting.  
This finding is also consistent with the proposition advocated by Jensen (2003). Jensen 
believes that overvalued equity is managerial heroin since it may make the managers 
feel good in the short run but can destroy them and their firm before long. The reason 
for this is that overvalued equity can boost a managers confidence, but if equity is 
overvalued, by definition, the manager will not, except by pure luck, be able to deliver 
the performance the market requires to justify that valuation (Jensen, 2003, p.552). The 
pressure to meet market expectation, plus the fact that overvalued equity can be used 
as cheap currency for acquisitions, is likely to push managers into making poor 
acquisition decisions, thereby destroying the firms value. 
4.4.3. Deal value 
Deal value or transaction size is measured by the dollar value of shares acquired from 
target firms in the M&A transaction. Panel A in Table 4.2 shows significant evidence for 
the one, two and three-year event windows. Panel B of Table 4.2 only shows significant 
evidence in the two-year event window. In addition, significant impacts are also 
reported in Table 4.3 for the one and two-year event windows in panel A and the two-
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year event window in panel B. It is noteworthy, however, that the marginal effect of the 
deal size is negligible in all sampling situations. This evidence is consistent with 
Bayazitova et al. (2009). By partitioning the sample into mega-size (top 1% of mergers in 
absolute transaction value) and non-mega-size deals, Bayazitova and her colleagues find 
a significant but negative average abnormal return of -3.2% for very large deals.  Our 
finding suggests that large transactions are associated with empire-building and hubris 
motives  
4.4.4. Friendly vs. Unfriendly bids 
DEALATTITUDE is a dummy variable receiving the value of 1 for friendly bids and 0 for 
unfriendly bids. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 indicate that this variable is significant in various 
settings. Table 4.2 reports significant results in two settings when the dependent 
variable is a two-year abnormal return in the robust OLS and outlier robust regressions. 
In particular, Table 4.3 shows significant evidence in four different settings (three in 
panel B and one in panel A). In all Tables the significant results show consistently 
negative impacts of friendly bids on abnormal returns, which is in sharp contrast with 
some insights from the literature. For instance, unfriendly takeovers are often 
associated with value destruction rather than value creation (Gregory, 1997; Frank and 
Mayer, 1996). In addition, Goergen and Renneboog (2002; 2004) find that hostile 
takeover triggers significantly negative abnormal returns (-2.5%) around the 
announcement date. An explanation often referred to in order to explain the negative 
impacts of unfriendly takeovers is that bidders are willing to overpay for the target firm 
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since they expect large gains from the acquisition. An alternative explanation is that an 
attempt to acquire a target with a high premium in revised bids might be a sign of 
management hubris, thus leading to a pessimistic reaction of the market (Frank and 
Mayer, 1996). A hostile attitude may also trigger the defense mechanism set by the 
targets management, which often skyrockets the transaction costs and makes potential 
gains from the acquisition vanish.  
As mentioned in the theoretical framework, the argument about the effects of deal 
attitude on firm performance remains controversial. Several studies about the UK 
markets find positive impacts of unfriendly bids on firm performance (Sudarsanam et 
al., 1996; Higson and Elliott, 1993)42. A plausible explanation is that the managers of 
target firms in developed markets often have much more experience than their 
counterparts in the acquiring firm. As a result the targets managers know how to 
negotiate and strike a deal, so the friendly and unopposed will to hand over the control 
rights of the targets managers might be the sign of an asymmetric information problem, 
where bidder is already overpaying for the target firm.  
The consistent findings of negative impacts of friendly takeovers need careful 
interpretation however since nearly 95% of bids in the sample are friendly, making the 
unfriendly bids in the sample a very small figure. This data structure makes sense in the 
case of this study, as targets managers in developed markets are often more 
42
 The evidence of the positive impacts of unfriendly bids on acquirer performance is consistent with the Market for 
Corporate Control Hypothesis. Unfriendly bids might be a market mechanism for overthrowing an incumbent 
underperforming management team, leading to more efficient ex-post management. However, this explanation is not 
suitable for bidders in emerging countries since we find their motivation is not about replacing underperforming 
managers, as it is about their wish to quickly gain access to strategic assets.  
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experienced and know how to fight back and defend themselves against hostile bids. As 
a result the excessive cost of engaging in unfriendly bids might overwhelm the 
transaction costs in friendly takeovers, thereby preventing bidders in emerging markets 
from pursuing unfriendly bids. Therefore, the bidders managers in emerging markets 
may not opt for acquisitions unless they strongly believe that the expected gains 
dominate the excessive transaction costs. That might explain the evidence of a positive 
bias toward unfriendly bids found in this study.  
4.4.5. Bidders cash holding  
The results in panel A and B of Table 4.3 show the significant effects of cash in the four-
year event window. However, this finding needs careful consideration when drawing a 
more generalized conclusion since only 3 out of the 30 settings show significant 
statistics, and the sign of this variable is not consistent in all settings.  
4.4.6. Relatedness 
To examine the impact of relatedness, a dummy variable is included in the list of 
regressors. If the acquirer and target have the same two-digit SIC code, the dummy 
variable will be assigned to 1, and it is assigned to 0 otherwise. We find related 
acquisitions have significantly negative impacts on abnormal return, which is 
inconsistent with the mainstream theoretical prediction. More specifically, panels A and 
B in Table 4.2 show significant negative effects of relatedness on the one-year abnormal 
return. In addition, significant negative effects on one-year and three-year abnormal 
returns are also reported in Panels A and B in Table 4.3. It is noteworthy that the 
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magnitude of relatedness is rather remarkable. For instance, the one-year abnormal 
return in related acquisition is 31.8% lower than that of conglomerate acquisitions with 
all else being equal (Table 4.2, panel A). This figure is down to 16.6% in the outlier 
robust regression (Panel B Table 4.2). The negative effect of relatedness ranges from -
16.6% to -47.6%.  The findings therefore statistically indicate that related acquisitions 
yield lower abnormal returns for acquirers than conglomerate acquisitions. This 
evidence is consistent with Agrawal et al. (1992,) as they find that in each decade (from 
1955 to 1987) the five-year post performance in the sample of related acquisitions is 
below that of the conglomerate sample.  
This empirical evidence can be explained by a stream of Efficient Internal Capital Market 
models (Stein, 1997; Li and Li, 1996; Matsusaka and Nanda, 1997)43. These models 
typically suggest that diversification creates value. The argument is that expansion via 
diversification can form an internal capital market where the internally generated cash 
flow can be pooled, thus allowing the managers to optimize the allocation of the 
combined resources. Alternatively, this evidence might suggest that M&A activity in an 
emerging market, especially when targets are in developed countries, are still in the 
infant stage. Being in the infant stage might explain why the diversification benefits in 
conglomerate acquisitions still have the upper hand. As the market for corporate control 
matures in these countries, these effects should be reversed.  
43
 see more studies in Rajan et al. (2000) 
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Our finding is in sharp contrast with Kale (2004)s. In an investigation of M&A in India, 
he finds the effect of relatedness is negligible in the early stage of liberalization. In later 
stages, Kale finds that related acquisition creates 3.75%, while conglomerate 
acquisitions yield a smaller abnormal return of 1.01%. Kale study, however, does not 
specifically target acquired firms in developed countries. Perhaps the discrepancy in my 
result and Kales can be attributed to the difference in the mechanism of value creation 
when the fact that target firms located in developed countries is not taken into account.  
4.4.7. Acquisitions for corporate control  
Chari et al., (2008) argue that the transfer of control right from the target to the 
acquirer is the key determinant of positive abnormal returns. They argue that the 
transfer of control rights can better facilitate the technology transfer and sharing of 
management skills. The target firm is not willing to share their know-how unless they 
are forced to. The acquirer is also not willing to share their secrets if they do not have 
control of what has been disclosed. This incomplete contract problem gets even 
worse in emerging markets, where the international property rights have not been 
sufficiently enforced to the standard of developed countries (Chari et al., 2008). As a 
result, acquiring the majority control of the target should have positive effects on the 
bidders abnormal return. The finding in this study is consistent with this hypothesis. 
Panel B in Table 4.2 reports significant and positive effects in the three-year event 
window. Panel B of Table 4.3 also shows significant and positive effects on the three-
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year abnormal return. The marginal effects in these three settings are also at a 
discernible level.  
4.4.8. Acquirer with previous CBA experience 
In M&A, and especially cross-border M&A, prior experience might be an invaluable asset 
for the bidders. The experience learnt and built up from carrying out previous deals can 
help acquirers reduce significant transaction costs and the cost of post-merger 
integration. In particular, experience in cross-border acquisitions might be linked with 
the capability to integrate firms in diverse cultures where the bidders and targets 
managers have a different nationality. Therefore previous experience might have 
significant impacts on the acquirers abnormal return. In this study, experienced bidders 
are defined as firms which have undertaken at least two acquisitions of target firms in 
developed markets. Unsurprisingly, significant evidence of a positive effect is reported 
in panel B of Table 4.2. However, the evidence is rather obscure since the effect is 
significant in only one setting, where the abnormal return is measured in the four-year 
event window.  
4.4.9. Payment method 
PAYMENT takes value 1 when the deal is financed by cash only, and takes value 0 
otherwise. Table 4.2 (panel A) reports significant evidence in the five-year event 
window, while Table 4.3 (panels A and B) shows the significant effects of PAYMENT on 
the four-year event window.  Also, the significant coefficients in three settings are 
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remarkable which indicates that paying by cash is associated with better performance 
than non-cash payment. This finding is, therefore, consistent with our expectation.  
4.4.10. Targets public status 
Private firms often do not have equal bargaining power as listed firms in takeovers. As a 
non-listed firm, private shares have liquidity constraints which prevent them from 
extracting free-riding benefits. In addition, private firms are often harder to value 
because information about them is not published. Under uncertainty about value and 
liquidity constrains, private firms are often cheaper than their equivalent listed firm. 
Buying private firms can benefit from additional monitoring as they are dominated by 
blockholders. Blockholders often have a sufficiently larger interest at stake than 
individual shareholders, and as a result are more willing to closely monitor the bidders 
management. Therefore it might be better for the bidder to acquire aprivate rather than 
a public firm.  
Target status takes value 1 when the target firm is listed, and value 0 when it is private. 
This study finds significant evidence of this variable in several settings, suggesting that 
acquiring private firms in developed countries is better for the bidder than acquiring 
listed firms. Table 4.2 (panel B) shows negative and significant effects on the four-year 
abnormal return. Panel A of Table 4.3 also shows significant evidence in the four year 
event window. These significant effects are consistently negative and marginally 
discernible, which is consistent with the theoretical prediction in that private firms have 
liquidity constraints that undermine their bargaining power. This finding is consistent 
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with Chang (1998) but is not consistent with Bradley and Sudarnam (2004), since the 
latter study finds that the acquisition of private firms leads to a decline in wealth effects.  
4.4.11. GDP Gap between acquirer and target country 
The literature review has earlier illustrated that the GDP level of the acquirer and target 
country could have significant effects on a bidders abnormal return. The GDP gap 
between acquirer and target country can represent the difference in technology and 
level of corporate governance. As a result a large GDP gap might entail the high cost of 
integration because bidders are less likely to cope with the more advanced level of 
corporate governance, or they might find the technology of developed countries too 
complicated, difficult and costly to combine with their current technology. Often, the 
bidders technology must stay at a certain threshold level in order to be able to integrate 
successfully with the much more advanced technology of developed countries. 
Therefore, a large difference in technology level (proxied by large GDP gap) can cause a 
negative influence on a bidders abnormal return. In addition, acquiring firms in 
developed countries can make the acquirers managers overly optimistic (Kiymaz, 2004), 
perhaps because they are driven by national pride (Hope et al., 2011). According to 
thehubris hypothesis, an over-optimistic attitude might lead to overpayment. As a 
result, large GDP difference should not be a good sign for a bidders subsequent 
abnormal return.  
To examine this issue, GDPDIFF is included in the regressor list. GDPDIFF is measured by 
subtracting the targets GDP by the acquirers GDP. Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 show 
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significant results in different settings of the matching and regression method. However, 
the marginal effects of this variable are very close to zero despite being statistically 
significant, thus suggesting negligible effects.  
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Table 4.2: Determinants of long-run abnormal return (Kernel matching) 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression (panel A) and outlier robust regression (panel B) of the bidders long-run abnormal returns for five different event windows. The abnormal return in 
this case is estimated in the kernel matching framework. kar1 to kar5: long-run abnormal return estimated in kernel matching for one to five year event windows. Relatedness = 1 denotes acquisitions 
of targets in the related industry, otherwise relatedness is 0. Payment =1 denotes that payment is made by cash and cash only. Other than that, payment is 0. Acquisition for control =1 denotes that 
acquirers gain at least 50% of the targets outstanding shares. Otherwise, this variable receives value 0. Multievent =1 if the acquirer has prior experience in developed markets, otherwise it is 0. 
Dealattitude =1 if the attitude is friendly. If it is an unfriendly bid this variable is 0. Target public status =1 if the target firm is a listed firm in a developed country. If the target is a private firm, this 
variable is 0. GDP diff.: The difference between the acquirer countrys GDP and the target countrys GDP. Target Hi index: The Herfindahl index of the target industry denoting the level of competition 
within the targets industry. VIF: Variance inflation factor. As a rule of thumb, no further multicollinearity concern is required if VIF is less than 10. N: Number of acquirers in the sample. For each 
variable, the coefficient and t value in parentheses is listed. *,**,*** indicators stand for statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Determinants Panel A: Kernel matching and robust OLS Panel B: Kernel matching and outlier robust regression 
kar1  kar2  kar3  kar4  kar5     kar1  kar2  kar3  kar4  kar5 
Size (ln(mv)) 
0.014  0.146 ** 0.074  0.229 * 0.243     0.071 ** 0.162 *** 0.107 ** 0.096  0.326 
(-0.4)  (-2.4)  (-0.6)  (-1.9)  (-1.5)     (-2.4)  (-3.1)  (-2.5)  (-1.4)  (-2.5) 
Mtb 
 
-0.001  -0.017 ** -0.033 *** -0.039 ** -0.07 *   -0.006  -0.004  -0.012  -0.021  -0.029 
(-0.19)  (-2.78)  (-3.17)  (-2.63)  (-1.92)     (-0.73)  (-0.35)  (-1.31)  (-1.33)  (-0.97) 
Cashratio 
0.25  0.484  1.027  -1.458  -0.666     0.093  -0.175  -0.02  -0.002  0.047 
(-0.7)  (-0.8)  (-1.1)  (-1.35)  (-0.32)     (-0.3)  (-0.31)  (-0.05)  (-0.00)  (0) 
Relatedness 
-0.318 ** -0.187  -0.148  -0.041  -0.033     -0.166 * -0.274  -0.122  -0.289  -0.163 
(-2.34)  (-1.15)  (-0.91)  (-0.17)  (-0.07)     (-1.69)  (-1.65)  (-0.96)  (-1.47)  (-0.41) 
Payment method 
0.177  0.279  0.26  0.319  0.697 **  0.039  -0.04  0.19  -0.03  0.396 
(-1.1)  (-1.4)  (-1.1)  (-1.1)  (-2.4)     (-0.3)  (-0.16)  (-1)  (-0.10)  (-0.7) 
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Acqui. for control 
0.01  0.115  -0.201  -0.019  0.452     -0.02  0.237  0.38 ** -0.366  0.322 
(-0.1)  (-0.6)  (-0.61)  (-0.05)  (-1.4)     (-0.18)  (-1.2)  (-2.6)  (-1.56)  (-0.7) 
Multievent 
acquirer 
-0.017  -0.169  -0.026  -0.144  0.288     -0.07  -0.026  0.133  0.664 *** -0.436 
(-0.14)  (-0.78)  (-0.08)  (-0.42)  (-0.3)     (-0.66)  (-0.14)  (-0.9)  (-2.7)  (-0.92) 
Deal attitude 
-0.585  -1.532 ** -1.941  -0.145  -0.859     -0.158  -1.072 *** -0.29  -0.097  -1.47 
(-1.47)  (-2.19)  (-1.60)  (-0.22)  (-0.69)     (-0.79)  (-3.24)  (-1.17)  (-0.23)  (-1.96) 
Target public status 
0.149  0.078  -0.46  -0.423  -0.358     0.042  0.184  0.148  -0.818 *** -0.151 
(-0.9)  (-0.3)  (-1.34)  (-1.21)  (-0.85)     -(0.4)  (-1)  (-1)  (-3.39)  (-0.32) 
Dealvalue 
-0.000 ** -0.000 *** -0.000 * -0.000  -0.000     -0.000  -0.000 *** -0.000  0.000  0.000 
(-2.75)  (-6.22)  (-2.11)  (-1.62)  (-0.32)     (-1.06)  (-2.99)  (-1.32)  (-1.5)  (-0.6) 
GDP difference 
-0.000 *** 0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000     -0.000 ** 0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
(-6.34)  (-0.1)  (-0.93)  (-0.9)  (-0.3)     (-1.99)  (-0.3)  (-0.43)  (-0.40)  (-1.50) 
Target HI index 
0.072  0.844  0.328  0.373  0.77     0.05  0.517  -0.419  -1.652 *** 0.949 
(-0.3)  (-1.4)  (-0.4)  (-0.4)  (-1)     (-0.2)  (-1.4)  (-1.43)  (-3.73)  (-1.1) 
R-squared 0.123  0.175  0.2  0.108  0.149              
N 162  129  118  100  72    162  129  118  100  72 
min VIF 1.09  
max VIF 1.5 
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Table 4.3: Determinants of long-run abnormal return (Nearest neighbour matching) 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression (panel A) and outlier robust regression (panel B) of the bidders long-run abnormal returns for five different event windows. 
The abnormal return in this case is estimated within the nearest neighbor matching framework. nnar1 to nnar5: long-run abnormal return estimated in nearest neighbour 
matching for one to five year event windows. Relatedness = 1 denotes acquisitions of targets in the related industry, otherwise relatedness is 0. Payment =1 denotes that 
payment is made by cash and cash only. Other than that, payment is 0. Acquisition for control =1 denotes that acquirers gains at least 50% of the targets outstanding shares. 
Otherwise, this variable receives the value 0. Multievent =1 if the acquirer has prior experience in developed markets, otherwise it is 0. Dealattitude =1 if the attitude is friendly. 
If it is an unfriendly bid this variable is 0. Target public status =1 if the target firm is a listed firm in a developed country. If the target is a private firm this variable is 0. GDP diff.: 
The difference between the acquirer countrys GDP and the target countrys GDP. Target Hi index: The Herfindahl index of the target industry, denoting the level of competition 
within the targets industry. VIF: Variance inflation factor. As a rule of thumb, no further multicollinearity concern is required if VIF is less than 10. N: Number of acquirers in the 
sample. For each variable, the coefficient and t value in parentheses is listed. *,**,*** indicators stand for statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Determinants Panel A: Nearest neighbour (5) matching and robust OLS Panel B: NN (5) matching and outlier robust regression 
nnar1  nnar2  nnar3  nnar4  nnar5  nnar1  nnar2  nnar3  nnar4  nnar5 
Size (ln(mv)) 
0.029  0.143 * -0.046  0.196 * 0.285  0.079 ** 0.139 ** 0.04  0.061  0.028 
(-0.7)  (-2)  (-0.36)  (-2.1)  (-1.7)  (-2)  (-2)  (-0.6)  (-0.5)  (-0.1) 
Mtb 
 
-0.008  -0.031 *** -0.036 *** -0.046 * -0.048  -0.013  -0.018  -0.02  -0.043 * -0.035 
(-0.77)  (-5.13)  (-4.45)  (-2.03)  (-0.80)  (-1.26)  (-1.16)  (-1.39)  (-1.71)  (-0.71) 
Cashratio 
0.065  0.536  1.055  -3.35 ** -3.597  0.309  0.38  0.527  -2.504 * -1.157 
(-0.2)  (-0.7)  (-1)  (-2.67)  (-1.04)  (-0.7)  (-0.5)  (-0.8)  (-1.98)  (-0.47) 
Relatedness 
-0.435 ** -0.244  -0.322 * -0.333  -0.251  -0.256 * -0.338  -0.348 * -0.33  -0.121 
(-2.59)  (-0.97)  (-1.87)  (-0.75)  (-0.24)  (-1.93)  (-1.55)  (-1.70)  (-1.01)  (-0.19) 
Payment method 
0.105  -0.014  0.475  0.742 * 0.493  0.071  -0.22  0.314  0.899 * 1.072 
(-0.5)  (-0.06)  (-1.5)  (-1.8)  (-0.8)  (-0.3)  (-0.69)  (-1)  (-1.7)  (-1.1) 
Acqui. for control 
0.014  0.07  0.07  0.586  1.201  0.059  0.279  0.624 *** 0.601  1.663 
(-0.1)  (-0.3)  (-0.2)  (-1.1)  (-1.1)  (-0.4)  (-1.1)  (-2.7)  (-1.5)  (-2.4) 
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Multievent 
acquirer 
0.029  -0.046  0.253  0.19  0.326  -0.052  0.023  0.191  0.314  0.299 
(-0.2)  (-0.21)  (-0.9)  (-0.6)  (-0.4)  (-0.37)  (-0.1)  (-0.8)  (-0.8)  (-0.4) 
Deal attitude 
-0.54  -1.369 ** -1.306  0.704  1.76  -0.364  -1.641 *** -1.087 *** -1.127 * -2.224 
(-1.49)  (-2.60)  (-1.04)  (-0.6)  (-0.7)  (-1.45)  (-4.05)  (-2.97)  (-1.78)  (-2.05) 
Target public status 
0.167  0.095  -0.548  -1.051 ** -1.096  0.165  0.368  0.017  -0.571  -0.158 
(-0.9)  (-0.3)  (-1.44)  (-2.34)  (-1.01)  (-1.1)  (-1.5)  (-0.1)  (-1.45)  (-0.20) 
Dealvalue 
-0.000 ** -0.000 *** -0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 ** -0.000  -0.000  0.000 
(-2.46)  (-4.43)  (-0.81)  (-0.40)  (-0.9)  (-1.21)  (-2.12)  (-1.51)  (-1.03)  (-0.2) 
GDP difference 
-0.000 *** -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000 * -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000 
(-3.05)  (-0.20)  (-0.90)  (-1.4)  (-1.9)  (-1.53)  (-0.63)  (-0.88)  (-0.7)  (-0.6) 
Target HI index 
-0.309  -0.141  -0.576  -0.155  -0.894  0.036  0.135  -0.185  -0.007  -0.018 
(-1.10)  (-0.35)  (-0.68)  (-0.20)  (-0.64)  (-0.1)  (-0.3)  (-0.49)  (-0.01)  (-0.01) 
R-squared 0.124  0.131  0.13  0.242  0.216           
N 161  128  116  96  67  161  128  116  96  67 
min VIF 1.06 
max VIF 1.52  
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4.5. Summary 
In this part of the thesis, we essentially examine whether any variation in the wealth 
effects in cross-border acquisitions from emerging markets can be explained on the 
basis of competing hypotheses. Although this topic has been well covered in the M&A 
literature of the US, UK and EU markets, the debate about the estimation method of 
long-run abnormal return still goes on. Since the abnormal return is measured in the 
long-run (i.e. over a long time after the acquisition completes), the models used to 
estimate it have always been under a lot of scrutiny. Taking that into consideration, we 
use a combination of the propensity score matching framework and difference-in-
differences technique in order to estimate the long-run abnormal return. This 
combination has been proved to be able to yield less biased estimates compared to the 
stand-alone PSM framework, traditional matching framework or single-index model 
(Girma et al., 2006; Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).  
The sample period in this study is from 1990 to 2010. Two scenarios of matching 
(kernel-based, and nearest neighbor) are combined with two regression methods 
(robust OLS and outlier robust regression) in order to form four different sampling 
situations. Each sampling situation consists of five settings of event windows ranging 
from one to five years.  
The results indicate that out of three variables used as proxies for hubris and managerial 
motives, market-to-book ratio and cash ratio are the significant determinants of a 
bidders abnormal return. The negative effects of these proxies in various sampling 
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situations are consistent with the prediction of agency theories (Jensen, 1986, 2000). 
However, the finding about the acquirers size is surprising. Bidders size has commonly 
been used as a proxy for hubris and managerial motive in the literature, and the 
available empirical evidence often indicates a negative correlation between an acquirers 
abnormal return and the acquirer size (Moeller et al., 2004; Gorton, Kahl and Rosen, 
2009). However we find that acquirers size is positively and significantly correlated with 
the acquirers abnormal return, and a significant effect is reported in most sampling 
situations. While this finding is certainly in contrast with the hubris hypothesis and 
agency theory, it is consistent with the ownership advantage paradigm and reverse 
internalization theory (Dunning 2000; Dunning 2008; Seth et al., 2000; Eun et al., 1996). 
According to the latter theories, greater size is associated with a larger economy of scale 
generated from leveraging the utility of the acquired tangible and intangible assets.  
Another interesting finding of this study besides the bidders size effects is the significant 
evidence of a negative correlation between relatedness and the acquirers abnormal 
return in various settings. This finding suggests the dominance of diversification benefits 
in conglomerate acquisitions over the benefits of operating in a single segment. 
However, the results also show that the coefficient, although not significant, decreases 
rapidly over the time horizon. This observation suggests that the conglomerate acquirer 
might have a greater benefit one year after the completion of the deal, but this benefit 
seems to decrease rapidly over time.  
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Finally, this study documents signs of the positive effects of the bidders previous CBA 
experience and cash payments on the abnormal returns. This evidence, though being 
consistent with the theoretical framework, can only be treated as a tentative finding 
since the parameter estimates are only significant in rare occasions in this sampling 
situation.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Over the last two decades, FDI outflows from developing countries have grown rapidly 
(WIR, 2006). A recent report documents that one quarter of all global FDI outflows are 
derived from these economies (WIR, 2010). Although most of the outlays from 
developing countries are directed towards less developed markets, there is a rising 
trend of FDI from developing to developed markets, and the predominant mode of such 
investment is through cross-border acquisitions (WIR, 2011; Bhagat et al., 2011). We 
find that the acquisition of firms in advanced economies, especially by firms in 
developing markets, represents a phenomenon where the traditional hunter is being 
hunted. Meanwhile, the literature surprisingly has little to tell us about the 
internationalization strategy and consequences of bidding firms in this type of 
acquisition. This thesis therefore addresses this contemporary trend and attempts to 
provide empirical evidence on the motivation of acquiring firms in this context. This 
thesis also provides evidence on the effect of acquisition events on the long-run 
performance of bidding firms and evidence of cross-sectional determinants of these 
effects.  
5.1. Summary of empirical findings 
We find that acquirers in non-developed countries are more likely to acquire small firms 
with low stock of intangible assets in developed countries. This evidence lends support 
to the strategic market entry hypothesis, in that by acquiring a small firm with a low 
stock of strategic assets, emerging-markets firms can familiarize themselves to the 
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advanced business environment and gradually consolidate their global competitive 
position in the long run. However, the outcome of this motivation is not always as the 
acquirers managers expect it to be, as shown in our examination of the -wealth effects. 
We also find that acquirers in emerging countries have a significantly lower growth rate 
of stock return after 3, 4 and 5 years (starting from the completion of the acquisition) 
than they could have been if they had not engaged in acquisition FDI into developed 
markets. The average difference in return growth rate is at least -35.91% after three 
years and may reach -71.4% after five years. The remarkable difference demonstrates 
the strong nature of the value destruction of an acquisition event. The high level of 
discrepancy between our results and results of previous studies is due to the difference 
in the measure of abnormal return. This discrepancy can also be partially attributed to 
the high variance of stock performance in emerging markets.  
Further analysis indicates that conventional factors such as previous experience in 
acquiring firms in advanced economies, method of payment and current policy reform 
in emerging countries may entail certain benefits. When we control for such factors, the 
wealth effects become less significant and less negative. Interestingly, gaining control 
over ownership appears to cast negative impacts on shareholder wealth compared to 
the acquisition of a minority interest. This evidence reaffirms the value destruction 
nature of acquisition FDI from emerging to developed economies, even though it is not 
consistent with some studies such as Chari et al. (2009).  
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Finally, in the examination of cross-sectional determinants of firm-level wealth effects, 
we find that market-to-book levels and the level of cash holding are significant 
determinants of the long-run firm-level abnormal returns. The negative effects of these 
proxies are in line with the prediction of agency theory (Jensen, 1986) and the hubris 
hypothesis (Roll 1986). We also find that size effects are robust in various empirical 
settings of the matching framework and robust regression methods. Interestingly, we 
find evidence showing that larger firms can mitigate the negative impacts of acquisitions 
events to some extent. This evidence is contrary to what has been reported in several 
studies (Moeller et al., 2004; Gorton Kahl and Rosen, 2009). It is, however, consistent 
with Dunnings (2000, 2008) ownership advantages paradigm. Dunnings argument is 
that large firms may use incremental economies of scale generated from acquired 
quality assets to partially compromise the negative effects of acquisition events.  
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5.2. Contributions to literature 
The first essay of the thesis set out to investigate the motivation of acquirers in non-
developed countries in their expansion into developed economies in the form of cross-
border M&A. Among the three competing theoretical frameworks (market for corporate 
control - MCC), agency theory, and strategic market entry hypothesis- SME), we argue 
that the strategic market entry leading to a gradual build up of advanced ownership 
advantages is the most important motive of the acquirer in the context of this 
investigation, even though the previous studies (where acquirers who are often from 
the US and UK) often find evidence supporting MCC (e.g. Zhu et al., 2011; Thompson, 
1997). Using a multinomial logistic regression framework, we find no evidence 
supporting MCC or managerial motives in this context. Instead, we find evidence which 
is consistent with the SME hypothesis that acquirers in non-developed countries aim at 
small firms with a low stock of intangible assets in developed countries.  
This systematic investigation contributes important understanding to the 
internationalization of the firms from non-developed markets. The primary motive of 
the internationalization is not necessarily the same as in non-developed markets. Firms 
in the US, UK and other developed economies are often endowed with advanced 
technology, management quality and high governance standards, whilst those in less 
developed countries are often characterized by a lack of resources and capabilities 
(Guillen and Garcia-Canas, 2009). The former therefore has the capability to search for 
and punish inefficient management, while the latter seems to be far from that stage. 
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Therefore they have the motivation to accumulate ownership advantages in order to 
catch up with the established firms in developed countries. They may do so by acquiring 
a small firm with a low stock of strategic assets in order to familiarize themselves with 
the advanced business environment and gradually consolidate their competitive 
position for the battle in the long run. Therefore, shareholders expectations and 
management perspectives may differ for firms in developed and non-developed 
economies.  
We also add to growing literature on the differential motivation underlying acquisition 
activities (e.g. Zhu et al., 2011; Thompson, 1997). More specifically, this investigation 
sheds more light on the explanatory power of SME, MCC and agency theory in the 
context of non-developed markets.  
The thesis follows with an examination of M&A effects on an acquirers wealth in the 
long run. Although the literature documents a large volume of studies regarding M&A 
wealth effects, this study makes further contributions by addressing two issues: (1) the 
lack of evidence regarding long-term effects for particular groups of emerging-market 
acquirers and developed-market targets, and (2) the methodological problem that 
plagues a number of long-run studies in the literature. Using a propensity score 
matching framework in tandem with a difference-in-differences technique, we find new 
evidence suggesting a remarkable nature of value destruction when emerging-markets 
bidders acquire firms in the developed world. Several influential factors which 
presumably have positive impacts on an acquirers wealth appear beneficial but are 
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unable to dominate the value destroying effects of the merger event in the long run. 
This strong evidence suggests that managers in emerging countries should be very 
careful in the consideration of cross-border acquisitions in developed markets since the 
expected synergies are very likely to be wiped out by underestimated difficulties. Along 
with this new evidence, the contribution of this essay may also lie in the combination of 
contemporary methods in the calculation of abnormal returns. This combination has 
hardly been employed in previous studies despite its remarkable advantages in dealing 
with selections on observable and unobservable issues.  
The last empirical essay is a natural expansion of the second, where we examine the 
various potential firm-level determinants of long-run abnormal returns. On the basis of 
the methodological framework used in the second essay, we find that acquirers with a 
large amount of cash and high market-to-book ratio generally suffer from significant 
long-term underperformance. This evidence is consistent with the agency theory, as 
within the agency framework a high level of cash holding and high market-to-book ratio 
is often associated with a greater degree of managerial and hubris problems 
respectively. We also find that the size of the acquirer has positive impacts on abnormal 
returns. This finding suggests incremental economies arising from leveraging the utility 
of the acquired assets on larger scale may partially compromise the value destruction 
nature of an M&A event. The reason for this is the acquired assets from advanced 
economies may enhance the ownership advantages, thereby putting the acquirer on the 
favourable side of market imperfections. This goes against the available empirical 
evidence of studies such as Moeller et al., (2004) or Gorton, Kahl and Rosen (2009), who 
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advocate a negative relationship between firm size and abnormal return. The 
discrepancy in the results of this study versus previous work highlights the contribution 
of this study, as it is sometime unreasonable to generalize the empirical results and 
implications in the context of developed markets and apply them to emerging countries.  
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5.3. Limitations and direction for future research 
We start with data quality. Data quality in developing countries is generally very poor. 
We need to drop a large volume of observations due to missing data points. This 
shortcoming confines the choices in our empirical investigations. In the first essay the 
data only allows for the control of three observable characteristics of the acquirers 
which influence the acquisition decision (i.e. size, market-to-book and cash ratio), even 
though the literature encourages the use of a broader set of covariates. A short list of 
covariates reduces the effectiveness of the control for selections on observables. This 
issue continues in the second essay, even though we find that even when it lacks control 
for observables the resulting evidence from the propensity score matching framework 
appears more reliable than the traditional matching approach. Additionally, an 
investigation on aggregate data across countries poses some problems. Although we 
attempt to control for country fixed effects in the generation of counterfactual 
outcome, averaging the wealth effect of individual acquirers in the sample is unable to 
deal with the heterogeneity of country effects in the final results. Nonetheless, this 
problem is dealt with properly in the cross sectional multivariate analysis in the second 
essay by including country dummies in the explanatory variables.  
The first essay uses an indirect approach to investigate the motivation of acquirers from 
non-developed markets, and the results could have been even more robust if we can 
use the direct approach at the same time to identify the characteristics that distinguish 
acquirers targeting firms in developed countries from those targeting firms in less 
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developed economies. Unfortunately, the limitation of data from developing countries 
prevents us from doing so.  
Given the data inadequacy, future studies may use a different approach such as a case 
study to find the evidence of wealth effects for an individual country in the developing 
world. Limiting the analysis within one country can eliminate the heterogeneity of the 
country fixed effects which contaminate the average wealth effects documented in this 
study. A case study might also be useful in similar investigations of wealth effects or 
acquirers motivation where acquiring firms are private rather than public corporations. 
Finally, the second essay documents evidence which is consistent with hubris and 
agency theory, thereby suggesting further investigation about the link between the 
acquisitions wealth effects and managerial ownership and corporate governance.   
  
202 
 
References 
AGRAWAL, A., JAFFE, J. F. & MANDELKER, G. N. 1992. The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring 
Firms - a Reexamination of an Anomaly. Journal of Finance, 47, 1605-1621. 
AHUJA, G. & KATILA, R. 2001. Technological acquisitions and the innovation performance of 
acquiring firms: A longitudinal study. Strategic Management Journal, 22, 197-220. 
ALMEIDA, P. 1996. Knowledge sourcing by foreign multinationals: Patent citation analysis in the 
US semiconductor industry. Strategic Management Journal, 17, 155-165. 
AMATO, L. & WILDER, R. P. 1985. The Effects of Firm Size on Profit Rates in United-States 
Manufacturing. Southern Economic Journal, 52, 181-190. 
AMSDEN, A. H. & HIKINO, T. 1994. Project execution capability, organizational know-how and 
conglomerate corporate growth in late industrialization. Industrial and Corporate 
Change, 3, 114-147. 
ANDRADE, G., MITCHELL, M. & STAFFORD, E. 2001. New evidence and perspectives on mergers. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15, 103-120. 
ASQUITH, P. 1983. Merger Bids, Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 11, 51-83. 
ASQUITH, P., BRUNER, R. F. & MULLINS, D. W. 1983. The Gains to Bidding Firms from Merger. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 121-139. 
ATHREYE, S. & KAPUR, S. 2009. Introduction: The internationalization of Chinese and Indian 
firmstrends, motivations and strategy. Industrial and Corporate Change, 18, 209-221. 
AUBERT, J.-E. 2005. Promoting Innovation in Developing Countries: A Conceptual Framework 
[Online]. Available: http://ssrn.com/abstract=722642. 
BARBER, B. M. & LYON, J. D. 1997. Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical 
power and specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics, 43, 341-372. 
BARKEMA, H. G., BELL, J. H. J. & PENNINGS, J. M. 1996. FOREIGN ENTRY, CULTURAL BARRIERS, 
AND LEARNING. Strategic Management Journal, 17, 151-166. 
BARNEY, J. B. 1988. Returns to Bidding Firms in Mergers and Acquisitions - Reconsidering the 
Relatedness Hypothesis. Strategic Management Journal, 9, 71-78. 
BARTEL, A. P. & LICHTENBERG, F. R. 1987. The Comparative Advantage of Educated Workers in 
Implementing New Technology. Review of Economics and Statistics, 69, 1-11. 
203 
 
BAYAZITOVA, D., KAHL, M. & VALKANOV, R. 2009. Which mergers destroy value? Only mega-
mergers. University of North Carolina working paper. 
BENOU, G., GLEASON, K. C. & MADURA, J. 2007. Impact of visibility and investment advisor 
credibility on the valuation effects of high-tech cross-border acquisitions. Financial 
Management, 36, 69-89. 
BHAGAT, S., DONG, M., HIRSHLEIFER, D. & NOAH, R. 2005. Do tender offers create value? New 
methods and evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 3-60. 
BHAGAT, S., MALHOTRA, S. & ZHU, P. C. 2011. Emerging country cross-border acquisitions: 
Characteristics, acquirer returns and cross-sectional determinants. Emerging Markets 
Review, 12, 250-271. 
BHAUMIK, S. K., DRIFFIELD, N. & PAL, S. 2010. Does ownership structure of emerging-market 
firms affect their outward FDI[quest] The case of the Indian automotive and 
pharmaceutical sectors. Journal of International Business Studies, 41, 437-450. 
BHAUMIK, S. K. & DRIFFIELD, N. 2011. Direction of outward FDI of EMNEs: Evidence from the 
Indian pharmaceutical sector. Thunderbird International Business Review, 53, 615-628. 
BLIND, K., EDLER, J., FRIETSCH, R. & SCHMOCH, U. 2006. Motives to patent: Empirical evidence 
from Germany. Research Policy, 35, 655-672. 
BOATENG, A., QIAN, W. & TIANLE, Y. 2008. Cross-border M&As by Chinese firms: An analysis of 
strategic motives and performance. Thunderbird International Business Review, 50, 259-
270. 
BRADLEY, M., AND SUNDARAM, A., 2004. Do acquisitions drive performance or does 
performance drive acquisitions? SSRN Working paper. 
BRADLEY, M., DESAI, A. & KIM, E. H. 1988. Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and 
Their Division between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 21, 3-40. 
BRAV, A., GECZY, C. & GOMPERS, P. A. 2000. Is the abnormal return following equity issuances 
anomalous? Journal of Financial Economics, 56, 209-249. 
BROUTHERS, K. D. & BROUTHERS, L. E. 2000. Acquisition or greenfield start-up? Institutional, 
cultural and transaction cost influences. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 89-97. 
BROWN, S. J. & WARNER, J. B. 1980. Measuring security price performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 8, 205-258. 
204 
 
BUHNER, R. 1991. The Success of Mergers in Germany. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 9, 513-532. 
BYRD, J. W. & STAMMERJOHAN, W. W. 1997. Success and Failure in the Market for Corporate 
Control: Evidence from the Petroleum Industry. Financial Review, 32, 635-658. 
CAKICI, N., HESSEL, C. & TANDON, K. 1996. Foreign acquisitions in the United States: Effect on 
shareholder wealth of foreign acquiring firms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 20, 307-
329. 
CAPRON, L., DUSSAUGE, P. & MITCHELL, W. 1998. Resource redeployment following horizontal 
acquisitions in Europe and North America, 1988-1992. Strategic Management Journal, 
19, 631-661. 
CARHART, M. M. 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance, 52, 57-
82. 
CASELLI, F. & COLEMAN, W. J. 2001. Cross-country technology diffusion: The case of computers. 
American Economic Review, 91, 328-335. 
CAVES, R. E. 1971. International Corporations - Industrial Economics of Foreign Investment. 
Economica, 38, 1-27. 
CAVES, R. E. 1989. Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic-Efficiency - Foresight Vs Hindsight. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 7, 151-174. 
CHANG, S. J. 1995. International Expansion Strategy of Japanese Firms - Capability Building 
through Sequential Entry. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 383-407. 
CHANG, S. Y. 1998. Takeovers of privately held targets, methods of payment, and bidder returns. 
Journal of Finance, 53, 773-784. 
CHARI, A., OUIMET, P. P. & TESAR, L. L. 2010. The Value of Control in Emerging Markets. Review 
of Financial Studies, 23, 1741-1770. 
CHATTERJEE, A. 2000. The financial performance of companies acquiring very large takeover 
targets. Applied Finacial Economics, 10, 185-191. 
CHEN, C. & SU, R. 1997. Do cross-border acquisitions of U.S. targets differ from U.S. domestic 
takeover targets? Global Finance Journal, 8, 71-82. 
CHILD, J. & RODRIGUES, S. B. 2005. The Internationalization of Chinese Firms: A Case for 
Theoretical Extension?[1]. Management and Organization Review, 1, 381-410. 
205 
 
COHEN, W. M., NELSON, R. R. & WALSH, J. P. 2000. Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: 
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not). National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 7552. 
COMIN, D. & HOBIJN, B. 2004. Cross-country technology adoption: making the theories face the 
facts. Journal of Monetary Economics, 51, 39-83. 
CONN, R. L., COSH, A., GUEST, P. M. & HUGHES, A. O. 2005. The impact on UK acquirers of 
domestic, cross-border, public and private acquisitions. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 32, 815-870. 
COSH, A. D., HUGHES, A., LEE, K. & SINGH, A. 1989. Institutional Investment, Mergers and the 
Market for Corporate-Control. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 7, 73-
100. 
COUTTS, J. A., MILLS, T. C. & ROBERTS, J. 1994. The market model and the event study method: 
A synthesis of the econometric criticisms. International Review of Financial Analysis, 3, 
149-171. 
DANBOLT, J. 1995a. An analysis of gains and losses to shareholders of foreign bidding companies 
engaged in cross-border acquisitions into the United Kingdom, 1986-1991 European 
Journal of Finance, 3, 279-309. 
DANBOLT, J. 1995b. An analysis of gains and losses to shareholders of foreign bidding companies 
engaged in cross-border acquisitions into the United Kingdom, 1986-1991 %U 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/3692. European Journal of Finance, 1, 279-309. 
DANIEL, K., HIRSHLEIFER, D. & SUBRAHMANYAM, A. 1998. Investor psychology and security 
market under- and overreactions. Journal of Finance, 53, 1839-1885. 
DATTA, S., ISKANDAR-DATTA, M. & RAMAN, K. 2001. Executive compensation and corporate 
acquisition decisions. Journal of Finance, 56, 2299-2336. 
DE BEULE, F. & DUANMU, J.-L. 2012. Locational determinants of internationalization: A firm-
level analysis of Chinese and Indian acquisitions. European Management Journal, 30, 
264-277. 
DEHEJIA, R. H. & WAHBA, S. 1998. Propensity Score Matching Methods for Non-experimental 
Causal Studies. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 6829. 
DEMSETZ, H. & LEHN, K. 1985. The Structure of Corporate-Ownership - Causes and 
Consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177. 
DENG, P. 2009. Why do Chinese firms tend to acquire strategic assets in international 
expansion? Journal of World Business, 44, 74-84. 
206 
 
DESAI, H. & JAIN, P. C. 1997. Long-Run Common Stock Returns Following Stock Splits and 
Reverse Splits. Journal of Business, 70. 
DICKERSON, A. P., GIBSON, H. D. & TSAKALOTOS, E. 1997. The impact of acquisitions on 
company performance: Evidence from a large panel of UK firms. Oxford Economic 
Papers-New Series, 49, 344-361. 
DIMSON, E. & MARSH, P. 1986. Event Study Methodologies and the Size Effect - the Case of Uk 
Press Recommendations. Journal of Financial Economics, 17, 113-142. 
DINARA BAYAZITOVA, M. K., AND ROSSEN VALKANOV, 2009. Which Mergers Destroy Value? 
Only Mega-Mergers. Working Paper. 
DOIDGE, C., KAROLYI, G. A. & STULZ, R. M. 2007. Why do countries matter so much for 
corporate governance? Journal of Financial Economics, 86, 1-39. 
DONG, M., HIRSHLEIFER, D., RICHARDSON, S. & TEOH, S. H. 2006. Does investor misvaluation 
drive the takeover market? Journal of Finance, 61, 725-762. 
DUNNING, J. & LUNDAN, M. 2008. Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. 
DUNNING, J. H., PAK, Y. S. & BELDONA, S. 2007. Foreign ownership strategies of UK and US 
international franchisors: An exploratory application of Dunning's envelope paradigm. 
International Business Review, 16, 531-548. 
DYCK, A. & ZINGALES, L. 2002. Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison. 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 8711. 
EASTERLY, W. & LEVINE, R. 2001. It's not factor accumulation: Stylized facts and growth models. 
World Bank Economic Review, 15, 177-219. 
EATON, J. & KORTUM, S. 1996. Trade in ideas - Patenting and productivity in the OECD. Journal 
of International Economics, 40, 251-278. 
ECKBO, B. E., GIAMMARINO, R. M. & HEINKEL, R. L. 1990. Asymmetric Information and the 
Medium of Exchange in Takeovers - Theory and Tests. Review of Financial Studies, 3, 
651-675. 
EUN, C. S., KOLODNY, R. & SCHERAGA, C. 1996. Cross-border acquisitions and shareholder 
wealth: Tests of the synergy and internalization hypotheses. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 20, 1559-1582. 
FAMA, E. F. & FRENCH, K. R. 1993. Common Risk-Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 33, 3-56. 
207 
 
FAN, J. Q. 1992. Design-Adaptive Nonparametric Regression. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 87, 998-1004. 
FAN, J. Q. 1993. Local Linear-Regression Smoothers and Their Minimax Efficiencies. Annals of 
Statistics, 21, 196-216. 
FRANKS, J. & MAYER, C. 1996. Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 40, 163-181. 
FRANKS, J. R. & HARRIS, R. S. 1989. Shareholder Wealth Effects of Corporate Takeovers - the Uk 
Experience 1955-1985. Journal of Financial Economics, 23, 225-249. 
FREY, R. & HUSSINGER, K. 2006. The role of technology in M&As: a firm-level comparison of 
cross-border and domestic deals. Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. 
FROLICH, M. 2004. Finite-sample properties of propensity-score matching and weighting 
estimators. Review of Economics and Statistics, 86, 77-90. 
FROOT, K. A. & STEIN, J. C. 1991. Exchange-Rates and Foreign Direct-Investment - an Imperfect 
Capital-Markets Approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 1191-1217. 
FUKAO, K., ITO, K., KWON, H. U. & TAKIZAWA, M. 2006. Cross-Border Acquisitions and Target 
Firms' Performance: Evidence From Japanese Firm-Level Data. National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 12422. 
FULLER, K., NETTER, J. & STEGEMOLLER, M. 2002. What do returns to acquiring firms tell us? 
Evidence from firms that make many acquisitions. Journal of Finance, 57, 1763-1793. 
GEORGOPOULOS, G. J. 2008. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions: does the exchange rate 
matter? Some evidence for Canada. Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D 
Economique, 41, 450-474. 
GIBSON, M. S. 2003. Is corporate governance ineffective in emerging markets? Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 231-250. 
GIRMA, S., GREENAWAY, D. & KNELLER, R. 2003. Export market exit and performance dynamics: 
a causality analysis of matched firms. Economics Letters, 80, 181-187. 
GIRMA, S., KNELLER, R. & PISU, M. 2007. Do exporters have anything to learn from foreign 
multinationals? European Economic Review, 51, 993-1010. 
GOERGEN, M. & RENNEBOOG, L. 2003. Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and 
Cross-Border Takeover Bids. United Nations University, Institute for New Technologies. 
GRAEBNER, M. E. 2004. Momentum and serendipity: How acquired leaders create value in the 
integration of technology firms. Strategic Management Journal, 25, 751-777. 
208 
 
GRAFF, G. D., RAUSSER, G. C. & SMALL, A. A. 2003. Agricultural biotechnology's complementary 
intellectual assets. Review of Economics and Statistics, 85, 349-363. 
GREGORY, A. 1997. An Examination of the Long Run Performance of UK Acquiring Firms. Journal 
of Business Finance & Accounting, 24, 971-1002. 
GRINSTEIN, Y. & HRIBAR, P. 2004. CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A 
bonuses. Journal of Financial Economics, 73, 119-143. 
GROSSMAN, S. J. & HART, O. D. 1980. Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of 
the Corporation. Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42-64. 
GROSSMAN, S. J. & HART, O. D. 1986. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership - a Theory of Vertical 
and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691-719. 
GRUBAUGH, S. G. 1987. Determinants of Direct Foreign-Investment. Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 69, 149-152. 
GUBBI, S. R., AULAKH, P. S., RAY, S., SARKAR, M. B. & CHITTOOR, R. 2010. Do international 
acquisitions by emerging-economy firms create shareholder value? The case of Indian 
firms. Journal of International Business Studies, 41, 397-418. 
GUILLEN, M. F. & GARCIA-CANAL, E. 2009. The American Model of the Multinational Firm and 
the "New" Multinationals From Emerging Economies. Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 23, 23-35. 
GUO, S. & FRASER, M. 2010. Propensity score analysis Statistical methods and applications, Sage. 
HALL, R. E. & JONES, C. I. 1999. Why do some countries produce so much more output per 
worker than others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 83-116. 
HARRIS, R. S. & RAVENSCRAFT, D. 1991. The Role of Acquisitions in Foreign Direct-Investment - 
Evidence from the United-States Stock-Market. Journal of Finance, 46, 825-844. 
HART, O. & MOORE, J. 1990. Property-Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political 
Economy, 98, 1119-1158. 
HART, O. & MOORE, J. 2008. Contracts as reference points. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123, 
1-48. 
HASBROUCK, J. 1985. The Characteristics of Takeover Targets Q and Other Measures. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 9, 351-362. 
HENNART, J. F. & REDDY, S. B. 2000. Digestibility and asymmetric information in the choice 
between acquisitions and joint ventures: Where's the beef? Strategic Management 
Journal, 21, 191-193. 
209 
 
HITT, M. A., LI, H. & WORTHINGTON, W. J. 2005. Emerging Markets as Learning Laboratories: 
Learning Behaviors of Local Firms and Foreign Entrants in Different Institutional 
Contexts. Management and Organization Review, 1, 353-380. 
HOLMSTROM, B. & TIROLE, J. 1997. Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real 
Sector. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 663-691. 
HOPE, O. K., THOMAS, W. & VYAS, D. 2011. The cost of pride: Why do firms from developing 
countries bid higher? Journal of International Business Studies, 42, 128-151. 
HORST, T. 1986. The process of direct foreign investment. Working Paper. 
HUSSINGER, K. 2005. Did Concentration on Core Competencies Drive Merger and Acquisition 
Activities in the 1990s? Empirical Evidence for Germany. ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische 
Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. 
JAMES, H., HIDEHIKO, I., JEFFREY, S. & PETRA, T. 1998. Characterizing Selection Bias Using 
Experimental Data. Econometrica, 66, 1017-1098. 
JAMES, J. H. & PETRA, E. T. 2009. A Note on Adapting Propensity Score Matching and Selection 
Models to Choice Based Samples. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
JARRELL, G. A., BRICKLEY, J. A. & NETTER, J. M. 1988. The Market for Corporate-Control - the 
Empirical-Evidence since 1980. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2, 49-68. 
JARRELL, G. A. & POULSEN, A. B. 1989. The Returns to Acquiring Firms in Tender Offers - 
Evidence from 3 Decades. Financial Management, 18, 12-19. 
JEFFREY, S. & PETRA, T. 2003. Does Matching Overcome Lalonde's Critique of Nonexperimental 
Estimators? : University of Western Ontario, CIBC Centre for Human Capital and 
Productivity. 
JENSEN, M. C. 1986. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate-Finance, and Takeovers. 
American Economic Review, 76, 323-329. 
JENSEN, M. C. & RUBACK, R. S. 1983. The Market for Corporate-Control - the Scientific Evidence. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 5-50. 
JIM, L. 2009. Does Size Matter in Firm Performance? Evidence from US Public Firms. 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, 16, 189-203. 
JOVANOVIC, B. & ROUSSEAU, P. L. 2002. The Q-theory of mergers. American Economic Review, 
92, 198-204. 
JYRKI, A.-Y. 2002. Mergers and Acquisitions - Reasons and Results. The Research Institute of the 
Finnish Economy. 
210 
 
KALE, P. 2004. Acquisition value creation in emerging markets: an empirical study of acquisitions 
in India [Online]. University of Michigan Business School. 
KANG, J. K. 1993. The International Market for Corporate-Control - Mergers and Acquisitions of 
United-States Firms by Japanese Firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 34, 345-371. 
KATAYAMA, H., LU, S. & TYBOUT, J. 2003. Why Plant-Level Productivity Studies are Often 
Misleading, and an Alternative Approach to Interference. National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper Series, No. 9617. 
KELLER, W. 1996. Absorptive capacity: On the creation and acquisition of technology in 
development. Journal of Development Economics, 49, 199-227. 
KELLER, W. 2004. International technology diffusion. Journal of Economic Literature, 42, 752-
782. 
KHANNA, T. & PALEPU, K. 1997. Why focused strategies may be wrong for emerging markets. 
Harvard Business Review, 75, 41-&. 
KHANNA, T. & PALEPU, K. G. 2004. Globalization and convergence in corporate governance: 
evidence from Infosys and the Indian software industry. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 35, 484-507. 
KIM, W. S. 2000. Does FDI Increase Firm Value in Emerging Markets? [Online]. Available: 
http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/node/414. 
KIYMAZ, H. 2004. Cross-border acquisitions of US financial institutions: Impact of 
macroeconomic factors. Journal of Banking & Finance, 28, 1413-1439. 
KLEIN, M. W. & ROSENGREN, E. 1994. The Real Exchange-Rate and Foreign Direct-Investment in 
the United-States - Relative Wealth Vs Relative Wage Effects. Journal of International 
Economics, 36, 373-389. 
KLENOW, P. J. & RODRIGUEZ-CLARE, A. 1997. The neoclassical revival in growth economics: Has 
it gone too far? Nber Macroeconomics Annual 1997, 12, 73-+. 
KOGUT, B. & ZANDER, U. 1992. Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and the 
Replication of Technology. Organization Science, 3, 383-397. 
KOHERS, N. & KOHERS, T. 2001. Takeovers of technology firms: Expectations vs. reality. Financial 
Management, 30, 35-54. 
KOTHARI, S. P. 2001. Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 
31, 105-231. 
211 
 
KOTHARI, S. P. & WARNER, J. B. 1997. Measuring long-horizon security price performance. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 43, 301-339. 
KRUSELL, P. & RÍOS-RULL, J.-V. 1996. Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and 
Growth. The Review of Economic Studies, 63, 301-329. 
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A. & VISHNY, R. 2002. Investor protection and 
corporate valuation. Journal of Finance, 57, 1147-1170. 
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A. & VISHNY, R. W. 1998. Law and finance. 
Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113-1155. 
LAKONISHOK, J. & VERMAELEN, T. 1990. Anomalous Price Behavior around Repurchase Tender 
Offers. Journal of Finance, 45, 455-477. 
LALL, S. 1983. The new multinationals Wiley. 
LANGETIEG, T. C. 1978. Application of a 3-Factor Performance Index to Measure Stockholder 
Gains from Merger. Journal of Financial Economics, 6, 365-383. 
LECRAW, D. 1977. Direct-Investment by Firms from Less Developed-Countries. Oxford Economic 
Papers-New Series, 29, 442-457. 
LEVINSOHN, J. & PETRIN, A. 2003. Estimating production functions using inputs to control for 
unobservables. Review of Economic Studies, 70, 317-341. 
LIMMACK, R. J. 1993. Bidder Companies and Defended Bids: A Test of Roll's Hubris Hypothesis. 
Managerial Finance, 19, 25-36. 
LOUGHRAN, T. & VIJH, A. M. 1997. Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit From Corporate 
Acquisitions? The Journal of Finance, 52, 1765-1790. 
LOUGHRAN, T. & RITTER, J. R. 1995. The New Issues Puzzle. The Journal of Finance, 50, 23-51. 
LUO, Y. D. & TUNG, R. L. 2007. International expansion of emerging market enterprises: A 
springboard perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 38, 481-498. 
MACKINLAY, A. C. 1997. Event studies in economics and finance. Journal of Economic Literature, 
35, 13-39. 
MAGEE, S. P. 1981. The Appropriability Theory of the Multinational-Corporation. Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 458, 123-135. 
MAKINO, S., LAU, C. M. & YEH, R. S. 2002. Asset-exploitation versus asset-seeking: Implications 
for location choice of foreign direct investment from newly industrialized economies. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 33, 403-421. 
212 
 
MALATESTA, P. H. 1983. The Wealth Effect of Merger Activity and the Objective Functions of 
Merging Firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 155-181. 
MARKIDES, C. C. & ITTNER, C. D. 1994. Shareholder Benefits from Corporate International 
Diversification - Evidence from United-States International Acquisitions. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 25, 343-366. 
MARTYNOVA, M. & RENNEBOOG, L. 2008. A century of corporate takeovers: What have we 
learned and where do we stand? Journal of Banking & Finance, 32, 2148-2177. 
MCCONNELL, J. J. & SERVAES, H. 1990. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate 
Value. Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 595-612. 
MEYER, K. E., ESTRIN, S., BHAUMIK, S. K. & PENG, M. W. 2009. Institutions, resources, and entry 
strategies in emerging economies. Strategic Management Journal, 30, 61-80. 
MOELLER, S. B. & SCHLINGEMANN, F. P. 2005. Global diversification and bidder gains: A 
comparison between cross-border and domestic acquisitions. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 29, 533-564. 
MOELLER, S. B., SCHLINGEMANN, F. P. & STULZ, R. M. 2004. Firm size and the gains from 
acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 73, 201-228. 
MOELLER, S. B., SCHLINGEMANN, F. P. & STULZ, R. M. 2005. Wealth destruction on a massive 
scale? A study of acquiring-firm returns in the recent merger wave. Journal of Finance, 
60, 757-782. 
MORCK, R., SHLEIFER, A. & VISHNY, R. W. 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation - 
an Empirical-Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315. 
MORCK, R. & YEUNG, B. 1991. Why Investors Value Multinationality. Journal of Business, 64, 
165-187. 
MORCK, R. & YEUNG, B. 1992. Internalization - an Event Study Test. Journal of International 
Economics, 33, 41-56. 
MYERS, S. C. & MAJLUF, N. S. 1984. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms 
Have Information That Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187-
221. 
NEUBAUSER, L. A. C., N. 1992. Why Japanese Firms Have Pulled Back on Overseas Buying. 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 27, 13-17. 
213 
 
NORBACK, P. J., PERSSON, L. & VLACHOS, J. 2009. Cross-border acquisitions and taxes: efficiency 
and tax revenues. Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique, 42, 
1473-1500. 
PALEPU, K. G. 1986. Predicting Takeover Targets - a Methodological and Empirical-Analysis. 
Journal of Accounting & Economics, 8, 3-35. 
PARENTE, S. L. 1994. Technology Adoption, Learning-by-Doing, and Economic Growth. Journal of 
Economic Theory, 63, 346-369. 
PINKOWITZ, L. & WILLIAMSON, R. 2001. Bank power and cash holdings: Evidence from Japan. 
Review of Financial Studies, 14, 1059-1082. 
RADELET, S. & SACHS, J. D. 1998. The East Asian financial crisis: Diagnosis, remedies, prospects. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1-90. 
RAJAN, R., SERVAES, H. & ZINGALES, L. 2000. The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount 
and Inefficient Investment. The Journal of Finance, 55, 35-80. 
RAJNEESH, N. & JOHN, D. 2010. Multinational Enterprises, Development and Globalization: 
Some Clarifications and a Research Agenda. Oxford Development Studies, 38, 263-287. 
RANFT, A. L. & LORD, M. D. 2002. Acquiring new technologies and capabilities: A grounded 
model of acquisition implementation. Organization Science, 13, 420-441. 
RAU, P. R. & VERMAELEN, T. 1998. Glamour, value and the post-acquisition performance of 
acquiring firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 49, 223-253. 
RAVENSCRAFT, D. J. 1983. Structure Profit Relationships at the Line of Business and Industry 
Level. Review of Economics and Statistics, 65, 22-31. 
RHODES-KROPF, M. & ROBINSON, D. T. 2008. The market for mergers and the boundaries of the 
firm. Journal of Finance, 63, 1169-1211. 
RICHARD, B. & MONICA COSTA, D. 2000. Evaluation methods for non-experimental data. Fiscal 
Studies, 21, 427-468. 
ROLL, R. 1986. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. Journal of Business, 59, 197-216. 
ROSENBAUM, P. R. & RUBIN, D. B. 1983. The central role of the propensity score in 
observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70, 41-55. 
ROSENBAUM, P. R. 2002. Covariance Adjustment in Randomized Experiments and Observational 
Studies: Rejoinder. Statistical Science, 17, 321-327. 
ROSSI, S. & VOLPIN, P. F. 2004. Cross-country determinants of mergers and acquisitions. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 74, 277-304.  
214 
 
RUBIN, D. B. 2008. For objective causal inference, design trumps analysis. The Annals of Applied 
Statistics, 2, 808-840. 
RUGMAN, A. M. & LI, J. 2007. Will Chinas Multinationals Succeed Globally or Regionally? 
European Management Journal, 25, 333-343. 
RUI, H. C. & YIP, G. S. 2008. Foreign acquisitions by Chinese firms: A strategic intent perspective. 
Journal of World Business, 43, 213-226. 
RUMSEY, J. 1996. The market model and the event study method: A synthesis of econometric 
criticisms: Comment. International Review of Financial Analysis, 5, 79-81. 
SAFIEDDINE, A. & TITMAN, S. 1999. Leverage and corporate performance: Evidence from 
unsuccessful takeovers. Journal of Finance, 54, 547-580. 
SCHARFSTEIN, D. S. & STEIN, J. C. 2000. The dark side of internal capital markets: Divisional rent-
seeking and inefficient investment. Journal of Finance, 55, 2537-2564. 
SCHERER, F. M. 1973. Determinants of Industrial Plant Sizes in 6 Nations. Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 55, 135-145. 
SCHNEIDER, C. 2008. Fences and competition in patent races. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 26, 1348-1364. 
SCHOLES, M. S. & WOLFSON, M. A. 1990. The Effects of Changes in Tax Laws on Corporate 
Reorganization Activity. Journal of Business, 63, S141-S164. 
SCHWERT, G. W. 2000. Hostility in takeovers: In the eyes of the beholder? Journal of Finance, 55, 
2599-2640. 
SETH, A., SONG, K. P. & PETTIT, R. R. 2002. Value creation and destruction in cross-border 
acquisitions: An empirical analysis of foreign acquisitions of US firms. Strategic 
Management Journal, 23, 921-940. 
SHEPHERD, W. G. 1972. Elements of Market Structure. Review of Economics and Statistics, 54, 
25-37. 
SHIMIZU, K., HITT, M. A., VAIDYANATH, D. & PISANO, V. 2004. Theoretical foundations of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions: A review of current research and recommendations 
for the future. Journal of International Management, 10, 307-353. 
SHIN, H. H. & STULZ, R. M. 1998. Are internal capital markets efficient? Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 113, 530-552. 
SINGH, A. 1975. Take-Overs, Economic Natural-Selection, and Theory of Firm - Evidence from 
Postwar United-Kingdom Experience. Economic Journal, 85, 497-515. 
215 
 
SMITH, C. W. & WATTS, R. L. 1992. The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, 
Dividend, and Compensation Policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 32, 263-292. 
SONG, M. H. & WALKLING, R. A. 1993. The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Acquisition 
Attempts and Target Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
28, 439-457. 
SORESCU, A. B., CHANDY, R. K. & PRABHU, J. C. 2007. Why some acquisitions do better than 
others: Product capital as a driver of long-term stock returns. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 44, 57-72. 
SPIESS, D. K. & AFFLECK-GRAVES, J. 1995. Underperformance in long-run stock returns following 
seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 243-267. 
STIGLITZ, J. E. & WEISS, A. 1981. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. 
American Economic Review, 71, 393-410. 
SUDARSANAM, S. 2003. Creating value from mergers and acquisitions: The challenges, Harlow, 
Prentice Hall. 
SUDARSANAM, S. & MAHATE, A. A. 2003. Glamour Acquirers, Method of Payment and Post-
acquisition Performance: The UK Evidence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
30, 299-342. 
TAN, X. M. 2010. Clean technology R&D and innovation in emerging countries-Experience from 
China. Energy Policy, 38, 2916-2926. 
THOMPSON, S. 1997. Takeover activity among financial mutuals: An analysis of target 
characteristics. Journal of Banking & Finance, 21, 37-53. 
TRAVLOS, N. G. 1987. Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firms Stock 
Returns. Journal of Finance, 42, 943-963. 
TSAGKANOS, A., GEORGOPOULOS, A. & SIRIOPOULOS, C. 2006. Predicting Takeover Targets: 
New Evidence from a Small Open Economy. International Research Journal of Finance 
and Economics, 4. 
URRUTIA 1995. Tests of random walk and market efficiency for Latin American emerging 
markets. Journal of financial research 18, 299-309. 
WIR 2006. World investment report 2006: FDI from developing and transitional economies: 
Implication for development, NewYork and Geneve, United Nations. 
WIR 2007  Transnational corporations, extractive industries and development. 
WIR 2010. Investing in low-carbon economy. 
216 
 
WIR 2011. NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. 
WU, F. 2005 The Globalization of Corporate China. National Bureau of Asian Research, 
December. 
XU, B. 2000. Multinational enterprises, technology diffusion, and host country productivity 
growth. Journal of Development Economics, 62, 477-493. 
YIU, D. W., LAU, C. M. & BRUTON, G. D. 2007. International venturing by emerging economy 
firms: the effects of firm capabilities, home country networks, and corporate 
entrepreneurship. Journal of International Business Studies, 38, 519-540. 
YOUNG, M. N., PENG, M. W., AHLSTROM, D., BRUTON, G. D. & JIANG, Y. 2008. Corporate 
governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal-principal perspective. 
Journal of Management Studies, 45, 196-220. 
ZAHEER, S. 1995. Overcoming the Liability of Foreignness. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 
341-363. 
ZHU, P. C., JOG, V. & OTCHERE, I. 2011. Partial acquisitions in emerging markets: A test of the 
strategic market entry and corporate control hypotheses. Journal of Corporate Finance, 
17, 288-305. 
217 
 
